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Preface
Agricultural product markets are receiving much attention from
economists. The industrialization of food processing in the past 50
years has aroused mixed emotions in the minds of many thoughtful
citizens. On the one hand, it has been welcomed as a source of
employment and economic growth, and of labor saving in the home.
On the other hand, the dwindling number and expanded size of
firms that process and market most food products has been viewed
as a potential threat to the public interest in competitive, efficient
food markets.
Private and public research agencies, including the u.s. Department of Agriculture and universities, are examining this situation.
The Marketing Economics Division of the United States Department of Agriculture is conducting a study of the economic consequences of consolidation, integration, and merger among agricultural product marketing firms. Studies are being conducted in
Washington and in universities on a cooperatively sponsored
basis. This book presents the findings of a recently completed
inquiry into the baking industry-the structure, conduct, and performance of bread markets. Funds for this research were authorized
by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, under a contract
initiated in July, 1957, between the Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of Nebraska, and the Economics Research
Service of the U.S.D.A.
The authors are grateful for the assistance of many individuals
and groups in the development of this study. Dr. Paul E. Nelson,
Jr., Head, Market Structure and Practices, U.S.D.A., was particularly
helpful in planning and initiating the research. Drs. Winn Finner
and Allen B. Paul contributed as U.S.D.A. representatives. Dr.
Charles C. Slater, Economist, Arthur D. Little, Inc., formerly with
the baking industry, acted as a continuing consultant to the study.
Much of the work would have been impossible without the generous cooperation of many individuals and firms in the baking
industry. We are also indebted to Eleanor M. Birch and to Drs.
J. B. Hassler, H. W. Ottoson, and C. J. Miller, Department of
Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska, for their valuable
advice and critical comments. These and many others have contributed to the original design of the study, to the collection of data,

and to the analysis and findings presented here. The authors express
their appreciation to all and willingly share with them whatever
credit the study may earn. We reserve for ourselves, however, any
debits that may be charged against it owing to possible errors of
fact or inference.

R. G.

WALSH

B. M.

EVANS
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1/ Introduction

Baking is one of the largest industries in the United States.
Its sales, which exceed $4 billion annually, rank it third among the
food processing industries, and thirteenth among all manufacturing
industries. Bakery products account for nearly $1 out of every $10
spent by American consumers for food. Almost half of the domestic
consumption of wheat flour is in the form of bread, rolls, cake,
pie, doughnuts, sweet goods, and other perishable bakery products.
While this study encompasses the perishable bakery products industry as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, it focuses primarily on
wholesale markets for white bread. 1
Since World War II, important changes have occurred in the
bread baking industry. A decline in the per capita demand for
bread products coupled with changes in technology and costs has
affected the relationships between baking companies, their market
behavior, and the resulting level of efficiency and price performance.
In an industrial economy, the farming, milling, baking, retailing,
and consuming functions are integrally related. Changes in the
organization and practices in one may induce changes in others.
The baking industry occupies a strategic position2 in this process,
1. As shown in Table 1, the U.S. Census Bureau defines the industry to
include plants producing bread and related perishable bakery products, primarily for sale off the premises. Plants producing crackers and related semiperishable products are not included. Nor are retail bake shops with baking on
the premises. Bakery product markets segment into sub-groups along distributive channels such as direct home service, multi-unit retail, wholesale, and
integrated grocery chain. Distribution wholesale to grocery stores is by far the
most important. Table 9 shows that white bread accounts for more than half
of the total bakery product. Individual bread markets are primarily in large
cities with a 100-150 mile rural fringe, where the cross elasticity of demand
among sellers' products is economically significant. Willard Cochrane, "The
Market as a Unit of Inquiry in Agricultural Economic Reseach," Journal of
Farm Economics (February, 1957), p. 23.
2_ In 1958, the function of wholesale baking received 58 percent of the
19.11 cent average retail price per pound of white bread, as compared with
16 percent paid the retail grocer, 11 percent paid the miller, 15.5 percent paid
the farmer, and slightly over 7 percent paid for other functions in the process
of wheat marketing. Marketing Margins in White Bread, Miscellaneous Bulletin
712, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (WaShington,
D.C., 1959).
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and as a result, consumers, farmers, millers, and retailers, as well as
bakers themselves, have a vital interest in the way the baking
industry performs.
Changes in market structure and firm behavior in the baking
industry have been the subject of study and concern by several
interested individuals and groups. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has followed with increased concern the widening of the
market margin and the declining farmer share of consumer bread
prices.s The Senate Agricultural Committee has completed a study
of average cost and returns of bakery operations.4 The Federal
Trade Commission has followed the pricing practices of many baking companies with frequent cease and desist orders. I> The Justice
Department, through periodic prosecutions, has kept baking firms
aware of the limitation imposed by the antitrust laws. 6 The Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly has studied the impact
of "discriminatory pricing" by large baking companies on small
independent bakers.7 The industry has encouraged economic study
of the historic development of baking and changes in market
organization and practices. s Most recently, the F.T.C. studied buyer
concentration and the integration of retail grocery organizations
into baking and other food processing industries. 9
This study describes and analyzes: (1) the changes in the market
structure and organization of the bread industry, primarily since
1946; (2) the principal technological-cost factors associated with
combination-integration; (3) the related changes in price and non3. Ibid.
4. Cost and Margin Trends in the Baking Industry, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957).
5. For example: In the matter of Ward Baking Co., Docket No. 6833,
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, December 30, 1958.
6. U.S. vs. Continental Baking Co., American Baking Co., Colonial Baking
Co. (a subsidiary of Campbell-Taggart Associated Bakeries), Hart's Bakery, et aI.,
Dec. 18, 1958, Trade Regulation Report (New York: Commerce Clearing House,
1959), pars. 66, 345.
7. Administered Prices Bread Hearings, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1959), hereafter referred to as Hearings; Administered Prices Bread Report,
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), hereafter referred to as Report.
8. William G. Panschar, Baking in America, Vol. 1, EconomIc Development
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1956); Charles C. Slater, Baking in
America, Vol. 2, Market Organization and Competition (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1956); Charles C. Slater, Economic Changes in the Baking
Industry, (Chicago: American Bakers Association, 1958).
9. Federal Trade Commission, Economic Inquiry into Food Marketing, Part
I, Concentration and Integration in Retailing (Washington, D.C., 1960).
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price behavior patterns of firms, and; (4) the impact of these changes
on industrial performance, particularly production, distribution,
and selling costs.

Theoretical Bases for the Analysis
Market structure 10 refers to characteristics of market organization considered important in determining firm conduct and industrial performance. Market structural variables measured in this
study include the number and size of buyers and sellers operating
within the relevant markets, the extent to which firms sell identical
or differentiated products, the height of barriers to entry of firms,
and the role of mergers in structural change.
Market conduct refers to patterns of behavior that enterprises
follow in relation to their markets. Market conduct variables measured in this study include the methods employed by groups of firms
in determining price and output, sales promotion policy, product
variation policy, and various predatory and exclusionary tactics.
Market performance refers to the important economic results
of market structure and conduct patterns relative to the public
interest. Market performance variables measured in this study
include the relative efficiency of production and distribution as
influenced by technological advances, the size of operations and
the extent of excess capacity, the amount and type of sales promotion costs, the improvement in quality of product, the price level
in large city and in outlying market areas relative to costs, and
the level of profits.
Market structure analysis is less concerned with the private
interest in the maximization of individual bakery firm profit levels
than with the public interest in greater per capita production,
more optimum distribution of resources, freedom of opportunity,
and the like. Other industry studies are currently under way to
analyze the impact of various economic changes on the individual
bakery firm profits. l1
The need for further and continued research is evident from
10. Stephen H. Sosnich, "A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 1958), pp. 380-423. Joe S. Bain,
Industrial Organization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), p. 9. More
recently, Robert L. Clodius and Willard F. Mueller, "Market Structure Analysis
As An Orientation for Research In Agricultural Economics," Journal of Farm
Economics (August, 1961), pp. 513-553.
II. See, for example, Distribution: The Challenge of the Sixties, Report to
the American Bakers Association, (Arthur D. Little, Inc.: Cambridge, December,
1960).
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the findings of this study. One such area is the study of implications
for antitrust policy, and for other possible remedies which may
help achieve either adequate or optimum performance of the baking
industry. This study analyzes the costs to society of some strategic
deficiencies in the performance of bread markets, but it does not
"suggest for what purpose antitrust and other legislation might be
enacted, how it might be interpreted, where cases might be selected
for administrative and judicial action, what remedies might be
applied, and how the success of public policy might be judged."12
Specific policy recommendations would require extended investigation and analysis. There are no complete or final answers to all
the relevant economic and noneconomic questions, nor any solution
in the sense of a guaranteed long-run optimum performance of the
baking industry. This study should be viewed as a partial and first
approximation to be verified or rejected by further study.
The market structure framework outlined above permits inclusion and use of the rich literature and theory recently developed
which relates to the explanation of changes in market structure
and behavior. Measurement of change in bread market conditions
is based on comparisons between variables at the beginning and at
the end of the time period under study. Explanation of the dynamic
factors underlying changes in bread markets relies, in large part,
on the many questions raised by oligopoly theory.
Oligopoly refers to an industry characterized by fewness of
sellers, and to the interdependent market behavior among them.
An oligopolistic market structure characterizes most bread markets.
Markets are served by a few large bread producers, with a fringe of
many small sellers some of which produce a specialty product or
provide a special service function. Entry into bread baking on a
significant scale is largely foreclosed except to certain established
retail grocery firms. With modifications appropriate to the baking
industry as subsequently outlined, oligopoly theory identifies important factors that may be associated empirically with changes in
bakery markets.
Fellner suggests that oligo polis tic markets may develop and
change because of changes in cost factors and because of changes
in the market power of participant firms.1 3 These two possible bases
for changes in market conditions are examined in this report:
First, that a dynamic variable tending to bring about economic
12. Sosnick, op. cit., p. 414.
13. William Fellner, Competition Among the Few (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1949), pp. 44-47.
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change in bakery markets is technical advance in bakery equipment,
in the transport and handling of bakery products, and in food
merchandising in general. The technological force is transferred
largely through its cumulative effect on cost economies in the production and distribution of bakery products.
Second, the market power relationship between firms in bakery
markets as manifest in the interdependent practices of enterprises
with respect to pricing policies, nonprice practices and plant utilization. Changes in market power between firms and segments of the
industry may have an important impact on several performance
dimensions, as for example, the maintenance of price stability and
profit goals; or the increase in price sufficient to cover the increased
costs of excess capacity and non price competition (advertising, product variation, and services).
A further advantage of the market structure approach is that
it opens the door to some of the new special theory applicable to
imperfect markets. Modifications of the general theory of oligopoly
will be discussed: (I) Most oligopoly theory has dealt largely with the
relation between oligopolists as a concentrated group of large firms.
Vatter has explored the possibility of extending oligopoly theory to
deal with group inter-relations between the dominant few and the
small firm periphery.14 This study considers both, and explores the
possible impact of oligopolistic behavior by the dominant few on the
number and size of the small firm fringe in bakery markets. (2) The
small-firm fringe may affect the stability goal of the oligopoly core
through their lack of knowledge and/or rational economic behavior.
Also, knowledge within the oligipoly core may differ significantly,
thereby giving rise to independent behavior in place of the interdependent type posited by general oligopoly theory. (3) Oligopoly
theory assumes enterprises have identical cost curves and, therefore,
is modified in this study to deal with changes in market positions
arising from secular changes (both shifts and shapes) in the cost
curves of interdependent firms as reflected in policies of capital
equipment adoption. (4) Aggregate demand for bread products is
exceptionally stable. Thus it is the extreme case in oligopoly theory
with respect to elasticity of demand, i.e., market price adjustment
may have practically no effect upon total quantity purchased. (5)
Market behavior of a bakery oligopoly may be modified from without through its vertical relation with a group of large grocery chains.
14. Harold G. Vatter, Small Enterprise and Oligopoly, Studies in Economics
No.4, Oregon State College (Corvallis. 1955). p. 4.
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The relationship may take the form of bilateral oligopoly or vertical
integration. In the case of bilateral oligopoly, grocery chains have a
position of strength by virtue of their control and allocation of retail
shelf space. Thus, the behavior of an oligopolistic baking group may
be influenced more by the behavior of an oligopsonistic retail grocery group than by the behavior of consumers. For consumer preference is modified by its reflection through a retail grocery group. Ordinarily, an oligopolist participating in a market would be a processor,
wholesaler, retailer or otherwise in a specific category. In this case,
however, many corporate and voluntary grocery chains integrate
vertically into bread baking, and thus compete directly with the
wholesale baker. The largest corporate and voluntary chains in retail
food markets may substitute a private label bread for that of wholesaler brands while at the same time representing a bilateral force
of concentrated buyers from without. This combined relationship
may have important implications for economic stability and change
in bakery markets.

Sources and Method
Much of the work on this project has been assembling and
developing data bearing on changes in market structure and behavior in the baking industry and interpreting these data within the
general theoretical framework outlined above. The sources fall into
three main categories: (1) published material including investment
manuals, trade journals, annual reports of firms, studies by federal
agencies, congressional investigations, and industry studies by individuals; (2) direct interviews and questionnaires from a selected
sample of firms; and (3) engineering studies of optimum plant
operations and labor time estimates on delivery routes.
Published material is largely from two sources. The U.S. Census
of Manufactures for 1947, 1954, and 1958 provides bench marks
from which to measure the changes in number and size of firms,
the type of products produced, and the marketing channels utilized.
The transcript of Hearings in 1959 and subsequent Report in 1960
by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly provides much previously unpublished information on market structure and behavior in the baking industry. Both sources provide
reliable economic data. The Census provides aggregative industrial
and sub-industrial data, and the congressional committee, not
bound by the disclosure rule and armed with the power of subpoena, provides historic information on the market behavior of
individual firms. Both micro and macro data are available for the
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baking industry of a quality and quantity not often available to
the research economist.
Data available from published sources were insufficient for the
entire analysis. To estimate some of the effects of structural and
behavior change in the baking industry, it was necessary to develop
primary data bearing on cost-volume relationships in bread production and distribution. No adequate empirical data for the analysis
of economies of scale or levels of plant utilization were available in
published material. One of the first steps was a lengthy survey of
wholesale bakery plant operations to provide the authors with a
general orientation into its characteristics. This 20-plant sample
provided an empirical basis for estimating under-capacity plant
utilization at three relevant levels-station (machine), cyclical
(within the week), and secular (average annual).
Independently, additional observations were taken on 23 wholesale and five house-to-house routes to illustrate the effect of volume
on per unit costs of driver-salesman distribution. When allowance is
made for changing volumes and factor costs these route observations
do not differ substantially from average cost data previously published. Neither set of survey data, however, fully reflects optimum
operation at minimum cost levels. This is a limitation of the survey
technique in industrial studies in general.
The engineering economic approach is an alternative method for
establishing cost-volume relationships reflecting minimum cost levels
to analyze the effects of structural and behavioral change in food
processing industries,15 It provides an empirical basis for economies
of scale in bread production. Engineering measures of machine performance, labor time, and physical input capabilities were prepared
by bakery equipment manufacturers. These were combined with
accounting costs from published sources to synthesize cost budgets
for model bread plants of small, medium, and large size, with automated-batch and with continuous-mix equipment.

15. See, for example, L. L. Sammet, "Structural Trends and Economies of
of Scale in Agricultural Marketing and Processing," Proceedings of the Western
Farm Economics Association (August 13-15, 1958), pp. 187-201.
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Structural Characteristics of
the Industry

This chapter deals with changes in the market structure or
market environment in which the production and distribution of
bread products occurs. Because the baking industry traditionally
has been considered one of America's least concentrated industries,
it is important to consider recent changes in market structure
variables: the degree of seller and buyer concentration, of product
differentiation, and barriers to entry.1 The transformation of an
industry from low to relatively high concentration, product differentiation, and/or net barriers to entry may affect market conduct
and performance more than any other factors in individual capitalistic markets. Measurement of market structure variables in this
chapter provides a partial basis for subsequent explanation of
market conduct in Chapter 5 and market performance in Chapter 6.

Concentration in the Bakery Industry 1947-58
Measurement of market concentration requires that a definition
of the relevant market be specified. In the baking industry, firms
buy flour and other inputs in regional or national markets but sell
bread products in essentially local market areas. Thus no single
measure of market concentration serves all purposes. Selection of
the various measures used here is based on the assumption that
baking companies buy in national markets and sell in a number
of local markets defined by the states and large cities in which
plants are located. Moreover, bakery markets are segmented into
several distinct channels of distribution. The primary market for
bread products is via wholesale distribution through grocery stores,
and some is distributed wholesale to restaurants, hotels, and institutions (Table I). Also, grocery chains have integrated vertically into
1. Bain,

op. cit., p.

211.
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the baking industry, and compete directly with baking companies
distributing wholesale to grocery stores. Some baking companies
have integrated vertically forward into retail marketing through
chains of retail bake shops and through home delivery service.
Measurement of market concentration here is at the aggregate industrial, wholesale segment, and bread plant levels.
TABLE

1

NUMBER OF EsTABLISHMENTS, TOTAL VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
PER ESTABLISHMENr, PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947,

1954,

AND

1958

Bakery Segment

Number of
Establishments

Total
Value of
Shipments
($I,OOOs)

Average
Value of
Shipments per
Establishment
($I,OOOs)

5,019
5,426
5,199

$1,764,968
2,385,721
2,807,650

$ 351.7
439.6
540.0

90
142
178

$ 150,174
265,851
371,941

$1,668.6
1,872.2
2,089.6

624
217
361

$ 281,937
297,551
363,937

$ 451.8

1,064
318
247

$ 219,812
117,892
155,945

$ 206.6

6,796
6,103
5,985

$2,404,000
3,067,000
3,699,473

$ 353.7

Wholesale
1947
1954
1958

Vertically integrated grocery chain
1947
1954
1958

Home service
1947
1954
1958

1,371.2
1,008.1

Retail multi-unit
1947
1954
1958

370.7
631.4

Total bread product industry
1947
1954
1958

502.5
618.1

SoURCE: 1947, 1954, and 1958 Census of Manufactures, Bakery Products, Bureau of the
Census, Department of Commerce (Washin"ton, D. C.).
NOTE: Excludes products purchased and resold without further processin". Also, excludes
11,901 retail bakeries in 1958 and 12,611 in 1954 which were covered in the Census of Business, Retail Trade. In current dollars, they had annual sales of $649.4 million in 1958 and
$581.9 million in 1954. While output may have increased sli"htly, the number of retail
bakeries declined by 710, or about 6 percent in this recent four Jear period. Also excluded
from the above tabulations are bakery product stores with no pai employees. In 1958 there
were 4,752 such stores with sales of $79.3 million compared to 3,932 stores in 1954 with sales
of $59.7 million, both in current dollars. Combined, these small retail bakeries account for
about 16.5 percent of the estimated total bakery product sales of $4,428.1 million in 1958, a
decrease from 17.3 percent of the total of $3,708.6 million in 1954, and about 19 percent of
the total of $2,966.4 million in 1947.

Decreasing Number of Bakeries
The overall trend in the agricultural processing industries is
one of declining numbers of rival firms. The most dramatic change
in recent years has been a decline in the number of bakeries.
Between 1947 and 1954, the number of bakeries going out of business was at a rate two-and-one-half times the rate for all food proces-
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sors. More than half of the postwar decline in total number of
processors in the 30 major food industries occurred in the bread
product industry.2 The number of food processing plants as a
whole has decreased at an average annual rate of about 0.5 percent
a year, while the number of bakeries has decreased at an average
annual rate of about 1.25 percent. For the nation as a whole,
the number of bakeries decreased from 6,796 in 1947 to 6,103 in
1954-slightly over 100 bakeries per year. This trend is continuing
although at a less rapid rate. The number of bakeries declined to
5,985 in 1958-approximately 30 fewer bakeries per year in the
most recent period for which data are available.
There have been important shifts within the bakery industry.
Some segments contained more bakeries in 1958 than in 1947. Table
1 shows that vertically integrated bakeries owned by chain stores
doubled in number from 90 in 1947 to 178 in 1958. The number of
wholesale bakeries increased from 5,019 in 1947 to 5,426 in 1954,
or by about 50 bakeries per year, but in more recent years decreased
at about the same rate to 5,199 in 1958. But the number of houseto-house bakeries fell sharply from 624 in 1947 to 217 in 1954,
though they increased to 361 by 1958. Multi-unit retail bakeries also
declined in number from 1,064 in 1947 to 318 in 1954 and to 247
in 1958. In addition to firms going out of business, these divergent
trends reflect shifts in distribution patterns that result in reclassification by segment. According to Census procedure, a bakery is
classified in a particular segment if its distribution by the primary
channels of that segment exceeds in value its distribution by the
channels of any other segment. Many small bakeries that formerly
delivered primarily via high-cost house-to-house routes shifted to
restaurant and grocery store delivery and are now classified as
wholesale bakeries. Also, a change in Census definition of retail
multi-unit bakeries may account for part of the decline in numbers
of these bakeries between 1947 and 1954. Multi-unit bakeries producing baked goods at each location for sale through a retail outlet at the same location were included in the 1947 Census but
excluded in 1954 and 1958. Thus, a trend toward operation of multiunit bakeries, producing baked goods at each location, in supermarkets of grocery chains, not counted in the bakery industry in
1954 and 1958, would seem to account for some of the decrease in
number of multi-unit bakeries noted. For by 1959, some 38 percent
2. Forest E. Scott, "The Food Marketing Industries-Recent Changes and
Prospects," The Marketing and Transportation Situation, U.S. Department of
Agriculture (Washington, D.C., November, 1957), p. 21.
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of all supermarkets ($1 million sales and over) had in-store bakeries,
and nearly half were operated by concessionaires.3
Increased Size of Those Remaining
Accompanying the decrease in numbers of bakeries is an increase
in the average size of those remaining. Table 1 illustrates this
trend for each of the four types of baking plants and for the industry as a whole, as measured by current value of sales. When the 38
percent increase in the transfer price of bakery products from
1947-58 is removed, the real increase in average bakery plant sales
is $130,000 or an increase of 37 percent.
Industrial segments that experience the highest attrition rates
also have the largest average increase in size of plants remaining.
This relationship shows that bakeries going out of business are
usually the smaller producers. When all baking plants are classified
by size of employment and the number of plants within each size
group noted for each of the Census years, this tendency is readily
apparent. Table 2 shows that plants with 1-19 employees and average sales of $75,650 in 1958 declined in number by 656, or 15 percent, from 1947-58. Likewise, the number of plants with 20-99
employees and average sales of $686,070 in 1958 decreased by 207
plants, or 13 percent. On the other hand, plants with 100-249
employees and average sales of $2,757,050 in 1958 increased by 97
plants, or 23 percent. Large baking plants with over 250 employees
and average sales of $7,447,770 in 1958, increased by 46 percent in
the postwar years, to 184 plants in 1958. Census year comparisons
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF BAKERY PLANTS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND AVERAGE VALUE
OF SHIPMENTS PER PLANT, BREAD PRODUcrS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954,
AND 1958

Year

1 • 19

1947
1954
1958

4,492
4,079
3,836

1958

$75,650

Number of Employees
100·249
26·99

number of plants
1,648
426
1,371
474
1,441
523

250 or
more

126
179
185

(average value of shi~ments per plant)
$686,070
$2, 57,050
$7,447,770

SOURCE: Census of Manufactures, Bakery Products, op. cit., p. 10.
NOTE: The 1958 Census shows that 708 plants, or 12 percent of all bakeries, had 100 or
more employees with averall"e sales of about $4 million, and accounted for $2.8 billion or
about 70 percent of total bakery sale. of $4.1 billion (includes resales and miscellaneous reo
ceipts of $0.5 billion).

3. Annual Report, 1959, Super Market Institute (Chicago, 1959), p. 9.
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(not shown) reveal that all of the increase in number of large plants
is in two segments of the industry, the wholesale and vertically integrated grocery chain plants, while some 80-90 percent of the decrease
in number of small plants is in the home service and multi-outlet
retail segments-and the remaining decrease in small plants is in the
wholesale segment.
Share of Sales by Largest Companies
While the bakery industry as a whole has experienced a high
casualty rate, the largest companies have captured an increasingly
larger share of the industry'S sales. Table 3 shows that between
1947 and 1958 the share of all bakery business done by the four
largest companies increased regularly-from 16 percent in 1947 and
1950 to 20 percent in 1954, and to approximately 23 percent in 1958.
The four largest companies do a 50 percent greater share of the
business today than they did in 1947. Moreover, while the industry
grew at an annual rate of about 1 percent per year, the four
largest wholesale baking companies grew at an annual rate of
about 5 percent per year. As a result the total growth of the four
largest companies during the 11 year period accounted for all the
industry'S growth. These comparisons are made after correcting for
the 38 percent increase in transfer price of bakery products from
1947 to 1958.
While the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that white bread
prices at retail increased 54 percent during this period, the 38 percent figure is more appropriate for this industrial comparison; it
was obtained by dividing total pounds produced into total value
of sales of all bakery products, as reported by the Census of Manufactures for these years.
The baking industry, as a buyer of flour and other ingredients in
regional and national markets, exhibits a medium to high degree of
concentration. Kaysen and Turner classify an industry as concentrated (Type II Oligopoly) if the eight largest firms account for
33 percent or more of total industrial shipments and the 20 largest
firms account for 75 percent or more. 4 The eight largest baking
companies purchase about 32 percent of the total flour and other
ingredients utilized by the industry (Table 3), and it can be shown
that the 20 largest buyer groups purchase about 60 percent. Added
to the eight largest wholesale baking companies are the eight largest
integrated grocery chain baking divisions buying 8-9 percent of
4. Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and
Legal Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 80.

TABLE II
CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION AMONG THE EIGHT LARGEST BAKERIES AND COMPARISONS OF THE SALES OF THE EIGHT LARGEST BAKERIES WITH
TOTAL SALES OF THE PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1958
1947
Bakery
Group

Sales of top
two bakeriesb
Sales of top
four bakeries·
Sales of next
four bakeries
Sales of eight
largest bakeriesd
Total industrial
sales

Total
Bakery
Sales'
(million
dollars)

Percent
of 8
Bakeries
(percent)

Percent of
All Bakery
Sales
(percent)

Total
Bakery
Sales'
(million
dollars)

1954
Percent
of 8
Bakeries
(percent)

1958
Percent of
All Bakery
Sales
(percent)

Total
Bakery
Sales'
(million
dollars)

Percent
of 8
Bakeries
(percent)

Percent of
All Bakery
Sales
(percent)

en

if.....
~

~

~

25l1.7

40.6

10.6

lI46.6

lI6.5

Il.!1

506.2"

44.5

14.1

lI84.6

61.6

16.0

61!1.4

64.5

20.0

820.7

72.2

22.9

240.4

lI8.4

10.0

lI37.3

35.5

11.0

lI15.9

27.8

8.8

624.9

100.0

26.0

950.7

100.0

31.0

1,lll6.6

100.0

lI1.7

~:

100.0

!I,067.0

100.0

lI,579.0

100.0

~

n

~

\:>

~

....

~

<1\
~

2,403.6

SoURCE: Concentration in American Industry, Report of Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957); Census of Manufactures, op. cit., p. 4; Moody's Industrials.
• Industry value shipments, bread and related products: does not include products sold but not produced. Excludes non-bakery sales.
b Continental Baking Co. and General Baking Co. in 1947: Continental Baking Co. and American Baking Co. in 1954 and 1958. Moody's Industrials.
• Add to b above, Campbell Taggert and American Baking Companies in 1947: Campbell Taggert Baking Co. and General Baking Co. in 1954 and
1958. Moody's Industrials.
d Includes in addition to the foregoing, Ward, Interstate, Langendorf, and Purity Bakeries in 1947: Ward, Interstate, Langendorf, and Omar in 1954:
Interstate, Ward, LanKendorf, and Southern in 1958. Moody's Industrials.
e Includes estimated sales of firms acquired by Continental in 1958. Excludes non-bakery sales.
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total bakery supplies, and the 258 independent baking companies
buying about 16 percent of total bakery supplies through three
purchasing cooperatives. This leaves unaccounted for only one of
the largest 20 organizations buying bakery supplies.
Another relevant consideration is the level of concentration in
wholesale baking, the largest and most important segment of the
industry, as Table I shows. While the eight largest baking companies
account for about 32 percent of all bakery industry sales, they
share about 42 percent of all wholesale bakery business. It is true
that smaller independent bakeries still do more than half (58 percent) of the wholesale bakery business, but many of these have
become affiliated with management cooperative groups to achieve
some of the advantages of buying (as noted above) and merchandising available to the largest companies. 5 Although such organizations
date from 1922, they have become increasingly important in recent
years, until in 1958 around $570 million or more than 36 percent
of the sales of the smaller wholesale baking companies are made
by the 258 members of three cooperative groups. These organizations
rival in size the largest wholesale baking companies. For example,
the 120 members of Quality Bakers of America, the largest of the
bakery cooperatives, have combined sales of over $280 million. If
the annual sales of the eight largest wholesale baking companies are
added to the sales of the 258 bakeries affiliated with the three management cooperatives, these II large organizations combined account
for approximately half of all sales by the baking industry and for
two-thirds of total wholesale bakery sales.
Significant changes have also taken place in the multi-market
organization of wholesale baking. In the postwar years, there were
seven wholesale baking campanies that owned 20 or more plants
each. Generally speaking, each of the seven companies operated in
20 or more markets. In 1947, they operated a total of 203 bakeries.
By 1954, they had increased this to 260 bakeries, and they expanded
further to approximately 300 bakeries in 1958.6 Comparing these
findings with Census data reveals that the smaller companies owning
5. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6035 If. Affiliations of independent bakers provide
small business members with advice and guidance comparable to that available
to the largest baking companies in the following areas: accounting and cost service, advertising, dealer relations, insurance analysis, laboratory, engineering,
management, personnel, production, sales promotion, sanitation, supplies purchasing, transportation, and brand franchise. Average sales of affiliated bakeries
are $2.2 million as compared with average sales of $3.2 million by the 351 plants
of the largest eight baking companies, and average sales of $0.6 million for
all bakeries.
6. Moody's Industrials.
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two or more bakeries declined sharply from 141 in 1947 to 98 in
1954, to 78 in 1958, and the number of plants they owned declined
from 753 in 1947, to 479 in 1954, to 380 in 1958. Not only is the
number of multi-plant companies declining, but also the largest
wholesale baking companies have expanded their operations horizontally into more and more markets. This increased horizontal
integration brings under unified control bakeries operating very
similar production and marketing functions in an increasing number of bakery markets.
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF BREAD PLANTS BY CAPACITY PER HOUR AND OWNERSHIP, UNITED
STATES, 1958

Plant Capacity

2,000 pounds per hour
(from 1,000 to 2,999)
Number
Percent
4,000 pounds per hour
(from 3,000 to 4,999)
Number
Percent
6,000 pounds per hour
(from 5,000 to 6,999)
Number
Percent
8,000 pounds per hour
(7,000 and above)
Number
Percent
Total bread plants
Number
Percent
Median plant capacity
(pounds)
Annual capacityb
Million pounds
Percent

Next
4 Largest
4 Largest
Wholesale Wholesale
Companies Companies

8 Grocery
Chain
Companies

All
Other

Total

U.S.

16
8

12
17

14
17

814
82

856
63

125
62

37
51

49
59

113
11

324
24

45
22

19
26

13
16

54
6

131
10

17
8

4
6

7
8

14
1

42
3

203
100

72
100

83
100

995
100

4,800

4,800

4,000

2,500

7,016
23

2,788
9

2,390
8

17,910
60

1,353"
100

30,104
100

Calculated from data [resented in Report, op. cit., p. 105; and 1958 Cens ..... of
18.
"Baking plants with 90 percent or more specialization in bread and bread type rolls.
Practically all of these plants (1,234) are wholesale bakeries. These 1,353 plants had sales
of $1.5 billion in 1958. An additional 1,114 baking plants had 51-89 percent specialization
in bread and bread type rolls, and sales of $1.5 billion in 1958. Estimated total sales of
bread and bread type rolls in 1958 were $3.3 billion, slightly more than half of which was
produced in plants with less than 90 percent specialization in bread and bread type rolls,
and not shown in this table.
b Takes into account allowance for breakdowns. holidays, etc., which decreases the number
of three·shift operatinl( days to 300 annually. Bakeries of approximately 2,000 founds per
hour capacity had total annual capacity of 12.500 million pounds or 41 percent 0 total U.S.
bread plant capacity. Bakeries of approximately 4,000 pounds per hour capacity had total
annual capacity of 9.300 million pounds or 31 percent of total U.S. bread plant capacity.
Bakeries of approximately 6,000 pounds per hour capacity had total annual capacity of 5,700
million pounds or 19 percent of total U. S. bread plant capacity. Bakeries of approximately
8,000 pounds per hour capacity had total annual capacity of 2,600 million pounds or 9 percent of total U. S. bread plant capacity.
SoURCE:

Manufactures, op. cit., pp. 10 an
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Another consideration relevant to this study is measurement of
the bread plant capacity owned by the largest baking companies,
and the distribution of that capacity by size or scale of plant. The
1958 Census shows that 1,353 baking plants specialized 90 percent
or more in the production of bread and bread type rolls with an
estimated annual capacity of 30 billion pounds. The tabulation of
bread plant capacities in Table 4 shows that the largest eight wholesale baking companies own about 32 percent of the estimated annual
capacity of bread plants. This is very close to their share of total
bakery sales. But the largest four and largest eight wholesale companies operate a disproportionately greater share of the larger capacity plants, as do the eight largest bakery divisions of integrated
grocery chains. It is true that many smaller companies operate
medium and large bread plants, but fully 82 percent of the 995
bread plants owned by the smaller companies have productive capacities of less than 3,000 pounds per hour, while this is the case for
only about 12 percent of the large wholesale and grocery chain companies. These findings as to size of bread plants have important
implications for production costs of large baking companies as
compared with their smaller competitors, to be discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.
Seller Concentration in Bakery Markets
The industry may be further classified according to the geographic extent of market areas in which bread products are sold.
Despite a freight absorption system of pricing, high transportation
costs combined with perishability and bulk of the product necessitate 80 to 100 separate and semi-independent bakery markets. 7 The
radius of market areas has widened from an estimated 50-100 miles
in 1946 to about 150-300 miles in 1958. This development has not
altered the fact that bread markets consist, typically, of a metropolitan area and a rural-urban fringe.
It is true that a small percentage of variety breads, cakes, sweet
goods, and other bakery products of higher value to bulk ratios are
frozen and transported longer distances than white bread. But only
within rather strict limits may market cross-over be accomplished
even with these higher value products. Roughly, transportation costs
are increased one-half cent per pound for every 50 mile extension
of the market area.
Most bread is distributed within 50 miles of its production point,
in keeping with the concentration of population in metropolitan
7. Arthur D. Little, Inc.,

op cit., p.

73.
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centers. It is not unreasonable to accept the individual market as
the . logically and empirically relevant unit for consideration of
economic organization, conduct, and performance in the bakery
industry. Each market constitutes a group of rival sellers supplying
close-substitute outputs to common buyers, where there is little or
no inter-penetration of markets.
Consequently, even though the industry is composed of more
than 5,000 firms, its anatomy does not conform to the structural
assumption of the usual competitive model, but has many oIigopoTABLE 5
MARKET SHARES OF THE SEVEN LARGEST WHOLESALE BAKING COMPANIES AND
MAJOR GROCERY CHAINS INTEGRATED INTO THE BAKING INDUSTRY, 27 SELECI'ED
METROPOLITAN MARKET AREAS
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SouRcE:.'Compiled by E. T. Sperry from newspaper surveys of consumer bread purchases,
as summanzed in Hearings, op. cit., p. 6146.
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lis tic characteristics. Although individual companies are of insignificant size in terms of the nation's total bakery business, they may
be very important in the markets in which they operate. For example, whereas Continental, the country's largest baking company,
does only 9.3 percent of the industry's total bakery business, it
does more than one-third of the bread business in many of the
markets in which it operates (Table 4). Typically, the largest bakery
in a bread market does more than 30 percent of the business, the
two largest bakeries about 50 percent, and the four largest over 65
percent (ranges from 46 to 92 percent).
These general estimates are based on tabulations by the authors
of newspaper surveys of consumer bread purchases in 27 large city
markets located throughout the country. Cities selected are shown
in Table 5. Reliability of these estimates is considered good; sample
size ranges from 1,200 to 6,000 households per city, and samples
were drawn on a probability basis.
Another measure that reflects more closely than national figures
the level of concentration in the industry's market areas is a special
tabulation of concentration on a state basis. It can be demonstrated
by the use of Census data that concentration in states is considerably
higher than for the nation as a whole (Table 6). In 1954, in three
states the four largest companies did over 80 percent of the total
bakery business; in nine states the four largest companies did more
than 70 percent of the bakery business; in 16 states the four largest
companies did over 60 percent; and in 23 states, the four largest
companies did over 50 percent. In only three states did the four
largest companies account for less than 30 percent of the bakery
business. This tabulation, however, generally understates the concentration in bread markets since the geographic extent of bread
markets does not typically correspond to state lines and the area of
the state is nearly always greater than the actual market areas
within the state.
The identity of the four largest baking companies in each state
can be deduced from industrial directories and consumer preference
studies. 8 They reveal that large firms tend to dominate bakery
markets in most sections of the country. Sellers in practically all
markets are composed of a concentrated core of a few dominant
companies and a fringe consisting of a large number of small firms.
The dominant core usually includes one to three of the largest
multi-plant wholesale companies plus one or two locally owned
8. Baking Industry Bluebook (Chicago: Baking Industry Magazine, 1958);
see also footnote to Table 5.
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TABLE 6
VALUE OF SHIPMENTS BY THE FOUR LARGEST BAKING COMPANIES AS A PROPORTION
OF TOTAL VALUE OF SHIPMENTS, BY STATES, BREAD PRODUCTS INDUSTRY, AND TOTAL
BAKERY PRODUCTS, 1951"

Region and State

United States
New England:
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

Percent
of Value
of Ship·
ments of
All
Bakeries
Accounted
for by 4
Largest
Baking
Companies

4 Largest
Baking
Companies
(2051)
(thousand
dollars)

All Manu·
facturing
Bakeries
(2051)
(thousand
dollars)

Percent
of Value
of Ship·
ments of
Manufac·
turing
Bakeries
Accounted
for by 4
Largest
Companies

613,403

3,067,017

20.0

3,711,299

16.5

16,687
5,170
3,989
39,726
14,182
21,706

27,136
7,592
5,205
119,410
24,902
45,119

61.5
68.l
76.6
33.3
57.0
48.1

(b)
(b)
(b)
147,714
29,499
59,261

(b)
(b)
(b)
26.9
48.l
36.6

All
Bakeries
Including
Retail
Bakeries
(2051 and
5462)
(thousand
dollars)

Middle Atlantic:
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
East north central:
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin

81,040
41,840
82,119

370,808
106,986
270,286

21.9
39.l
30.4

510,718
150,872
317,271

15.9
27.7
25.9

61,022
23,468
55,410
49,499
20,312

208,433
74,862
194,745
151,579
58,441

29.3
31.3
28.5
32.7
34.8

252,653
86,814
253,498
176,258
80,119

24.2
27.0
21.9
28.1
25.4

West north central:
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas

19,052
18,306
44,724
5,275
5,788
17,583
12,072

48,365
46,230
103,090
6,813
8,144
26,773
26,165

39.4
39.6
43.4
77.4
71.1
65.7
46.1

65,162
53,436
114,626
(b)
(b)
31,295
29,184

29.2
34.3
39.0
(b)
(b)
56.2
4l.4

South Atlantic:
Delaware
Maryland
District of Columbia
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida

4,855
23,371
20,190
20,345
11,418
27,217
16,724
27,521
24,530

5,167
55,849
27,329
47,785
33,550
59,386
20,503
52,751
54,504

94.0
41.8
73.8
42.6
34.0
45.8
81.6
52.2
45.0

(b)
66,431
(b)
54,132
35,059
63,165
22,237
56,642
65,688

(b)
35.2
(b)
37.6
32.6
43.1
75.2
48.6
37.3

SOURCE: 1954 Census of Manufactures; (Unpublished data, December 1958) U.S. De~art.
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as _summarized in, Hearin~s, Ope cit., p. 61 4.
" The larllest companies in each state were determined from the value of shipments of the
manufacturing establishments (S.LC. 2051) operated by the companies. The sales of retail
bakeries with bakinll at each location (S.l.C. 5462) were reviewed and found not large
enough to include any of those companies among the four largest in any state. A few of the
"four larllest" companies also operated some retail shops with baking on premises, but the
value of sales at su('h localions was relatively small in all cases and did not affect the proportion of total sales accounted for by the company by more than '/to of I percent.
b Data withheld to avoid disclosinlt fillures for individual companies.
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TABLE 6 (continued)

Region and State

4 Largest
Baking
Companies

(2051)
(thousand
dollars)

East south central:
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
West south central:
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain:
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Pacific:
Washington
Oregon
California
b

All Manufacturing
Bakeries
(2051)
(thousand
dollars)

Percent
of Value
of Shipments of
Manufacturing
Bakeries
Accounted
for by 4
Largest
Companies

All
Bakeries
Including
Retail
Bakeries
(2051 and
5462)
(thousand
dollars)

Percent
of Value
of Shipments of
All
Bakeries
Accounted
for by 4
Largest
Baking
Companies

18,656
29,579
17,013
9,630

34,605
58,092
31,678
15,392

53.9
50.9
53.7
62.6

39,353
61,179
35,335
16,218

47.4
48.3
48.1
59.4

10,901
15,070
16,137
61,970

19,378
49,772
30,331
132,412

56.3
30.3
53.3
46.8

(b)
54,663
32,618
143,359

(b)
27.6
49.5
43.2

6,075
3,793
1,033
12,767
4,106
10,475
9,697
1,846

9,071
5,839
2,476
26.186
6,422
13,262
13,596
2,260

66.9
64.9
41.7
48.7
63.9
78.9
71.3
81.6

10,895
6,575
3,112
29,234
8,163
15,163
15,564
3,034

55.7
57.6
33.1
43.6
50.3
69.0
62.3
60.8

18,615
12,994
112,445

42,015
29,795
256,527

44.3
43.6
43.8

49,598
34,956
308,517

37.5
37.1
36.4

Data withheld to avoid disclosing figures for individual companies.

independent companies that have grown large in terms of their
relevant market_ Vertically integrated bakeries owned by grocery
chain companies usually have not been one of the largest four companies in bread markets_ The number and size of bakeries comprising the fringe of small companies usually depends on their
ability: (1) to cut out a specialty product market-variety bread,
cookies, sweet goods and so forth; or (2) to disaggregate markets
into several distinct segments-restaurant, hotel, institution, houseto-house, and retail with a more secure market position than wholesale grocery store sales. As a result, the fringe of small companies
often is not strictly competitive with the large wholesale companies
distributing primarily at wholesale through grocery stores.

Buyer Concentration in Wholesale Bread Markets

1948-58
Perhaps the most important change in the structure and organization of bread markets since World War II is the increased con-
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centration on the buyer side of these markets brought about by the
increased size and buying power of food retailers. Whereas, in the
1930's and early 1940's, wholesale bakeries dealt primarily with independent grocers, today the bulk of their bread sales is through
corporate and voluntary grocery chains. Moreover, an increasing
number of retail grocery organizations are able to integrate vertically into the baking industry when this is more profitable than
buying from existing wholesale bakery companies. This places
baking companies under probably the most severe economic pressure of their history. Grocery chains control the terms under which
outlets for most bread products are made available and possess the
added leverage of actual and potential vertical integration. Grocery
chains have become highly concentrated buyers as well as vertical
integrators into the industry.
Since World War II, the number of retail food outlets for bread
products has decreased rapidly. In 15 food markets surveyed by
the Federal Trade Commission, the number of food stores decreased
from 12,466 in 1948 to 8,742 in 1958, or 30 percent (Table 7). There
has been a similar decline for the nation as a whole. Census of
Business reports show a 27 percent decline in number of food stores
between 1948 and 1958.
Practically all of this decline reflects the failure and liquidation
of unaffiliated food stores. It has been associated with increasing
numbers of corporate, cooperative, and voluntary food chain stores.
Even more important, it is related to the increase in size of chain
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF STORES AND AVERAGE SHARE OF GROCERY STORE SALES BY CORPORATE
CHAINS, COOPERATIVE AND VOLUNTARY CHAINS, AND UNAFFILIATED INDEPENDENTS IN 15 METRoPoLirAN AREAS OF THE UNITED SrATEs, 1948, 1954, AND 1958"

Store
Groups
Corporate chain
Cooperative and
voluntary chains
U naffilia ted
independents
Totalb

NUMBER OF STORES AND PERCENT OF TOTAL GROCERY STORE SALES
1948
1954
1958
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent

627

29.2

548

36.8

663

43.8

1,264

12.3

1,762

22.7

2,134

30.8

8,832

58.5

6,525

40.5

5,749

25.4

12,466

100.0

9,844

100.0

8,742

100.0

SoURCE: Federal Trade Commission, Economic Inquiry into Food Marketing, Par. I, Concentration and Integration in Retailing (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1960), pp. 241 and 245.
a Cities surveyed were Altoona, Atlanta, Bridgeport, Denver, Des Moines, Fort Smith,
Indianapolis, Lubbock, Manchester, Peoria, Phoenix, Roanoke, Spokane, Stockton and Utica.
Total food sales were $989 million in 1948, $1,348 million in 1954, and $1.697 million in
1958. Total population was 5.6 million in 1959. Chains were defined as companies with 11
or more stores, either corporate, cooperative, or voluntary.
b Total stores is greater than the sum of the parts due to unavailability of some data.
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stores. Corporate chains, in the F.T.C. study cited in Table 7,
had only a 6 percent increase in number of stores as compared with
a one-third increase in market share from 1948 to 1958. Cooperative
and voluntary chains had a 70 percent increase in number of
affiliated stores, and more than twice as great (150 percent) an
increase in market share for the same period. Table 7 shows that in
sample markets the share of corporate chains increased from 29
percent in 1948 to about 44 percent in 1958, while that of cooperative and voluntary chains increased from 12 percent to about 31
percent during the same period. Meanwhile, market share of
unaffiliated independent grocers declined from about 59 percent
in 1948 to 25 percent in 1958. This comparison based on sample
markets tends to understate the extent of increased concentration
of grocery store sales by voluntary and cooperative chains. Mueller
and Garoian reported national data for 1958 showing the following:
corporate chains, 43 percent of total grocery sales; voluntary and
cooperative chains, 41.6 percent; and unaffiliated independent stores,
15.4 percent of total grocery sales. 9 These tabulations compare
closely with national data from the F.T.C. survey.
An important implication for the wholesale segment of the
baking industry is the development of bilateral oligopoly. A
greater share of total food sales, including bread products, is now
channeled through large corporate, cooperative and voluntary chains
than ever before. This results in a changing balance of power
between wholesale baking companies as sellers and retailers as
buyers. In typical U.S. cities, the structural features of the retail
grocery market for bread products include a concentrated core
of a few grocery chains (corporate, cooperative, and voluntary),
and a fringe consisting of a large number of small unaffiliated
independents.
Typically, stores of the largest grocery chain account for 30
percent (ranges from 14-49 percent) of the total retail food sales,
stores of the four largest chains account for 63 percent (ranges from
39-90 percent),l0 the rest being distributed through a large number
of smaller firms essentially in different economic markets owing to
convenience of location or specialization of function. Indeed, by
9. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure of
Grocery Retailing, 1940-58 Research Report No.5, Agricultural Experiment
Station, University of Wisconsin (Madison, April, 1960), p. 7.
10. The Federal Trade Commission studied concentration in the 15 urban
markets shown in Table 7. Federal Trade Commission, op. cit., p. 248. Mueller
and Garoian found very nearly the same concentration levels in 133 U.S. cities in
1957. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure
of Grocery Retailing (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 35-36.
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1958 market concentration on the buyer (retail grocery) side of
wholesale bread markets was very high, yet, it should be noted,
not appreciably higher than on the seller side, among wholesale
baking companies supplying bread to food retailers.
Another development affecting wholesalers is the increasing
number of retail groups now able to enter baking when this is more
profitable than buying from existing bakery companies. The potential integration of retail groups into the baking industry is more
significant than existing levels of integration would indicate.
While the 1958 Census of Manufacturers shows that retail grocery
groups produce only about 10 percent of the total U.S. output of
bread products, corporate grocery chains produce approximately 39
percent of all bread products sold in their own stores. l1 Moreover,
trade sources suggest that 38 percent of the supermarkets ($1 million
sales or more annually) in 1959 had bake shops on their store
premises, half of which were owned by the retail food firm.12
On the other hand, the best available data indicate that the
existing level of integration by voluntary and cooperative chains
was much less. For example, voluntary chains reporting to the
1958 F.T.C. survey owned only four bakery plants producing only
$3 million worth of bread products. lS While voluntary and cooperative chain stores purchased about 44 percent of their total food
requirements through their affiliated group,14 they undoubtedly
purchased less of their bread this way.
Garoian reported that bread products were supplied to affiliated
stores by only 23.6 percent of the voluntary chains in 1957.1 5 It will
be shown later in this report that most of this was private label
bread produced under contract with wholesale baking companies.
Thus, organized buying and baking of bread products by retail
grocery groups would appear to be potentially more significant
than existing levels would indicate.

Role of Mergers in Structural Change
Growth of individual baking companies occurs both internally,
by building additional plants or expansion of existing plants, and
externally by acquisition or merger. Merger as used here includes
ll. Calculated from sales data in Report, op. cit., p. 103; and, Federal Trade
Commission, op. cit., p. 30.
12. Annual Report, 1959. Super Market Institute, Chicago, 1959, p. 19.
13. Federal Trade Commission, op. cit., p. 295.
14. Mueller and Garoian, op. cit., p. 7.
15. Leon Garoian, "Changes in the Market Structure of Food Retailing,
1940-1957," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1959),
p. 304.
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acquisitions, combinations, or consolidations; it implies the integration of previously independent businesses under a single ownership
unit. 16 The most important vehicle for the development of large
corporations in the baking industry has been merger. Mergers
explain much and perhaps most of the differential growth among
large firms. They explain most of the increased share of total bakery
sales of the eight largest baking companies. The 1946-58 merger
movement seems to have been largely motivated by the desire to:
(I) achieve economies of scale through better utilization of existing
plant, equipment, and personnel, or (2) lessen the impact of risk and
uncertainty by expanding market share and by diversifying into new
geographic areas, distribution channels, or types of product.
Medium and large baking companies have been using mergers
to grow since 1907. The movement gained in momentum until
the mid-twenties when several of the giants in the industry were
formed.17 Prior to that time the industry was characterized by
relatively small single-plant firms distributing in local market areas
or single cities. In 1924, Continental Baking Corporation was
formed, and by 1925 had combined approximately 80 bakeries.
General Baking Corporation was formed in 1925, and by 1926
owned 42 bakeries located in 32 cities. Through these and other
consolidations, the multi-plant structure of a few large bakery
corporations emerged and remained relatively stable until after
World War IllS when mergers again began to have an important
effect on concentration in the bakery industry.
Types of Bakery Mergers
Bakery mergers have been of four types: (1) horizontal integration of baking companies performing the same production and
16. See J. Fred Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 3.
17. Carl L. Alsberg, Combination in the American Bread-Baking Industry
With Some Observations on the Mergers of 1924-25, Miscellaneous Publication
No_ 3, Food Research Institute, Stanford University (California, 1926), pp. 146-7.
18. The early merger movement was temporarily halted in 1926 when the
Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with Ward, Continental
and General, the defendants agreeing to dissolve the Ward Food Products Corporation, a holding company whose purpose was to consolidate the three companies with 160 baking plants and approximately 20 percent of the total baking
business in the United States. Federal Trade Commission, Bakery Combines and
Profits, 69th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1927), p. 47_ The one major exception to relative structural stability from
1926-1946 is the formation of the Campbell Taggart holding company in 1927.
By 1929, it had acquired 16 plants, and by 1939, had added 22 more. Report,
op. cit., p. 135.
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distribution function, (2) forward vertical integration of wholesale
baking companies with firms performing production and distribution functions in different segments of the baking industry, (3)
backward vertical integration primarily of grocery retailers, into the
baking industry, and (4) conglomerate integration of baking companies into other industries. Most but not all of the recent merger
activity of baking companies has been horizontal integration. The
most notable example is the merger of firms in the wholesale segment of the industry. These were approximately 55 percent of the
bakery mergers reported in the years 1952-58. 19 But an additional
16 percent of the reported acquisitions resulted in the vertical integration of different distribution levels within the bakery industry.
Examples are the acquisition by large wholesale baking companies
of house-to-house and multi-unit retail baking firms. Moreover, for
the first time in the history of the industry, almost one-third (29
percent) of the mergers reported by baking companies were the
conglomerate type such as diversification into frozen foods, candy,
and potato chip manufacturing. No backward vertical integration
into flour milling or bakery equipment manufacturing via merger
was reported in the years 1952-58; in fact, Omar, the only producer
of perishable bakery products owning a flour mill in the post
World War II period, disposed of its milling division with assets
of $1 miIlion. 20
In addition to types of mergers in which a baking company is
the principal acquirer, there has been considerable backward vertical integration through acquisition of baking companies by retail
grocery chains since World War II. Food retail organizations have
entered bread production through acquisition since the 1920's when
67 bakeries were added to the 18 bakeries operated by food retailers
in 1920. 21 From 1930 to 1947, vertical integration by food retailers
into bread production stabilized with the addition of only five
bakeries during the 17 year period. Since 1947, vertical integration into bread production again proceeded at a rapid rate until,
in 1958, food retailers operated 88 more bakeries for a total of
178 plants, and produced about 10 percent of all bakery products
consumed in the United States.
19. Paul E. Nelson and Allen B. Paul, Ownership Changes By Purchase and
Merger in Selected Food Industries, Report No. 369, Agricultural Marketing
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., October, 1959).
20. Moody's Industrials.
21. Leon Garoian, "Changes in the Market Structure of Food Retailing
1940-1957," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1959),
p. 171.
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With the rapidly increasing size of many grocery chains and
independents affiliated with buying groups, more and more food
retail organizations have achieved sufficient size to integrate into
bread production. Whereas during World War II only 11 of the top
20 chains were integrated into baking, and only three more were
large enough to be potential integrators, by 1957, 19 of the top 20
chains were integrated into baking, and all of the top 40 chains
were large enough to be potential integrators. 22 They have developed "private labels" that are acceptable to consumers; they have
access to substantial financial resources, and, by buying out operating bakeries while retaining the previous owner as manager, they
can overcome the lack of technical and business know-how in the
bakery field. Moreover, they can often obtain bakeries in distressed
economic condition at bargain prices, far below new construction costs.
Much, if not most, of the recent vertical integration by food
retailers into bread production has been through merger. In 1958,
all of the 10 largest food chains were integrated into bread production operating 83 bakeries. Moreover, their combined value of
bakery shipments had increased from $247 million in 1954 to $321
million in 1958, or a 30 percent growth, only about half due to an
increase in bread prices. 23 Much of this expansion in the production
of bakery products was the result of acquisitions. For example, all
of the National Tea bakery growth resulted from the acquisition
of Miller Supermarkets which operated its own bakery in Denver.
Kroger's Houston bakery plant was acquired in 1955 with the purchase of the Henke and Pillot chain. Colonial Stores became a
bakery operator in Ohio when the company purchased Albers
Supermarkets in Cincinnati in 1955. Colonial, through its Albers
division, acquired the Pennington Brothers Bakery in Norwood,
a suburb of Cincinnati, in 1958. 24 Much of Winn-Dixie's bakery
growth can be traced to the 1955 merger of Winn-Lovett with Dixie
Home Stores. Smaller chains, too, have acquired baking companies.
Examples are Red Owl 25 of Minneapolis and Eberhard's Supermarkets of Grand Rapids, Michigan. 26 Red Owl is the 18th largest
22. Willard F. Mueller and Leon Garoian, Changes in the Market Structure
ot Grocery Retailing, 1940-58, Research Report 5, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1960), p. 16.
23. Report, op. cit., p. 104.
24. Bakers Weekly (March 17, 1958).
25. Garoian, op. cit., p. 330.
26. In 1959, Eberhard acquired the Polly Anna Pastry Kitchens, a multi-unit
retail bakery with one plant and 16 retail bakery stores. Baking Industry Magazine (October 31, 1959), p. 18.
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grocery chain, while Eberhard's is a medium sized chain with about
25 stores in Eastern Michigan.
Dimensions of the Recent Merger Movement
The external growth of large companies through merger has
been fairly widespread and has increased in recent years. In the
seven year period from 1952 to 1958, more than 30 of the 161 multiplant companies in the baking industry made one or more acquisitions.27 This represents at least a 20 percent participation in the
merger movement. However, most multi-plant companies failed to
participate and, as will be shown subsequently, most non-participants were the smaller firms.
Among acquiring firms, the degree of merging activity varied.
Of a total of 104 acquisitions reported, no single company acquired
more than 20 previously independent businesses, while two companies made between 10 and 20 acquisitions. Seven companies
acquired five or more firms each. Nineteen companies made two or
more acquisitions, and 12 made one acquisition each.
Large baking corporations made the greatest number of mergers
and usually acquired the larger companies sold (Table 8). The few
baking corporations with more than 5,000 employees made 42
percent of the acquisitions reported from 1952-58 and, of the total
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF MULTI-PLANT BAKERY FIRMS WITH NUMBER AND SIZE OF ACQUISITIONS
ARRAYED BY THE SIZE OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES, UNITED STATES, 1952-58

Total Number
of Multi-Plant
Firm., \954

Firm Size
(Number of
Employee.)

Number

5,000 and over
1,000-4,999
500-999
100-499
0- 99
Total

Percent

5

9
21
27
74
52

15
40
29

183

100

11

Total Number of
Firms Acquired
1952-58

Number

Percent of Employment in All Acquired
Companies 1952-58

Percent

44
18
22
17

42
17
21
17

3

3

77
12
5
5
1

104

100

100

SOURCE: Paul E. Nelson and Allen B. Paul, Ownership Changes By Purchase and Merger
in Selected Food Industries. Report No. 369, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., October, 1959), pp. 20-21; and, unpublished tabulation based upon the Company Statistics Report, 1954, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce (WashinKton. D.C.).

27. Although 92 percent of all multi-plant baking companies were included
in the U.S. Census survey, only about 70 percent of the companies with 100
or more employees participated. The latter size group of firms accounted for
99 percent of all reported mergers, thus the sample may tend to understate merger
activity. Nelson and Paul, op. cit.
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plant capacity transferred as measured by numbers of employees,
they acquired a sizable 77 percent share. Companies with 500 to
5,000 employees made 38 percent of the acquisitions reported, but
they accounted for less than half as great a share of total plant capacity transferred. While about 70 percent of the multi-plant companies were small (with less than 500 employees), they made only
20 percent of the acquisitions reported. And the companies they
acquired were small, representing in the aggregate only 6 percent
of the total employment of all acquired companies. Thus, small
baking companies experienced very little external growth in
recent years.
The number of mergers has increased in recent years. About
two-thirds of all acquisitions reported in the seven year period
between 1952-58 were made between 1956-58. The average size of
acquired firms during the most recent years was considerably
smaller than for the 1952-55 period. This suggests that increasing
numbers of small companies have been absorbed into larger organizations. About 10 percent of the companies acquired from 1952-58
were large themselves with more than 1,000 employees, and were
usually acquired by corporations with more than 5,000 employees.
But more of the acquired firms were small at the time of acquisition.
More than half had between 20 and 100 employees, while one-fifth
had fewer than 20 employees. In addition, about one-fifth were
medium-sized with 100-300 employees.
Comparison of published sales figures for 1954 and 1958 reveals
that the eight largest wholesale baking companies grew faster than
the rest of the industry. Their sales, not corrected for inflation,
increased by 32 percent while sales of the rest of the industry
increased by only about 12 percent. Most of this increased concentration among a few sellers has come about by external growth
through merger. Mergers by the eight largest baking companies
conservatively accounted for over half of their growth between
1954 and 1958, and added more than $150 million in sales. 28 Price
rise accounted for another 12 percent of growth during this period,
and internal expansion through better utilization of existing and
construction of new plant and equipment accounted for approximately one-third of increased concentration at the eight firm level.
Among the big eight companies, those with the largest or most
frequent mergers grew the fastest. Six made mergers and two did
28. Hearings,
firms.

op. cit.,

p. 6039; and Annual Reports to Stockholders of these
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not. Sales of the six merging companies grew by 35.5 percent and
the non-merging by only 8 percent. From 1954 to 1958, the most
active merging firm, Continental, grew by 76 percent, with an average increase in sales per year of about $40 million. 29 These comparisons are of sales growth in terms of current dollars. When sales are
adjusted for an increase in the index of bakery prices of 12 percent
between 1954 and 1958, the divergent growth trends become even
more pronounced. While the largest baking companies that merged
grew an average of about 5 percent a year, the rest of the industry,
with the exception of vertically integrated grocery chain bakeries,
experienced declining real sales. It was evident that without mergers,
several of the largest wholesale bakery corporations, too, would
have experienced declining bakery sales.
Bases for Merger
Industrial experience in the American economy suggests several
reasons why growth through merger may be a more profitable way
for a firm to expand than internal growth. For the acquirer, mergers
may be less expensive, quicker, or less uncertain; they may involve
fewer competitive problems, be more easily financed, increase market
power, and afford certain tax advantages. 3o For the acquired, merging with a larger company may provide a tax advantage, may facilitate financing of plant expansion, and may lead to less economic uncertainty as part of a multi-plant organization. This study did not
attempt an exhaustive empirical analysis of all these reasons, but
the information discussed below suggests their relative importance
to the bakery industry.
Individual mergers are motivated by a variety of reasons, depending, of course, on the circumstances of the economic environment
and the goals of the participating firms. The economic environment
of the bakery industry is unique in that it presents a special combination of limiting conditions. These include: (1) significant economies of scale in production and distribution, (2) relatively stable
and inelastic demand for the output of the industry, (3) relatively
high barriers to entry, (4) homogeneity, bulk and perishability of
product so that population density limits extent of the market, and
(5) durability of specialized machinery in the industry.31 The pres29. Includes estimated sales of acquired companies in 1958.
30. J. Fred Weston, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
31. These conditions are in contrast with those environmental conditions
assumed by George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," American
Economic Review (May, 1950).
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sure of these condtions in the past decade and a half ha,s intensified
the drive to expand through merger on the part of wholesale
baking companies. Two hypotheses to account for this recent merger
movement will be explored here: (1) acquisition to gain share of
existing markets to achieve sufficient market power, to stabilize
oligopolistic behavior, and to realize economies of scale in production and distribution; and (2) acquisition to diversify into the
protective cover of new geographic markets, distributive channels,
or specialty product areas.
First, many baking companies have initiated mergers to enlarge
the share of markets served by their existing plants. They have been
primarily interested in the acquisition of functioning distribution
systems rather than productive facilities, but have usually purchased
the plants and equipment of the acquired company along with the
rights to its distribution system. Frequently, the less efficient plant
contingent to or within the acquiring firm's market areas has been
discontinued, dismantled and sold piecemeal for scrap or to other
lines of commerce. There is considerable evidence of this practice.
Of companies reporting disposal methods in a U.S. Census pilot
survey of 87 baking companies with 250 or more employees, 17
sold 52 plants, and at least ten of these were liquidated piecemeal
with baking operations discontinued. 32 To give specific examples,
published operating statements show that General acquired at
least 18 plants since 1946 and discontinued operations in five.
Continental acquired ten companies with a total of 14 plants
since 1950, and discontinued operations in three of them. 33 In many
cases of discontinued operations of acquired plants, the acquired
brands may be kept on the market in an attempt to hold all its
former customers. 34 All production is transferred to the usually
larger, more efficient plant of the acquiring firm to realize economies
of scale in production.
There is another reason why baking firms try to increase their
share of the market through mergers. They seek greater power to
confine future competition for share to nonprice behavior as
opposed to price competitive practices. Even if price competition
were effective in gaining share, it would have serious implications
for self-destruction because of the static and inelastic demand for
32. Paul Nelson, "Ownership Changes Within Selected Food IndustriesA Progress Report," Marketing and Transportation Situation, U.S. Department
of Agriculture (Washington, D. C., April, 1958).
33. Report, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
M. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. llO.
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bread (see footnote 60 of this chapter). Each competitor in an
oligopoly group has an incentive to gain market power so he can
better influence the stability of pricing practices. The dominant firm
that shares a market with few competitors is in a much better position to influence price and non price methods of competition for
its own benefit than one not so favored.
In the second place, expanding bakery firms have entered new
market areas in nearly all cases by merger rather than by constructing new plant facilities. This has been equally true for all three
forms of company diversification-geographic, distributive channel,
and product. A typical case of geographic expansion through merger
is the purchase of plants in high growth markets for bread products
such as the West Coast and other areas where population is growing
rapidly. Acquired plants frequently have been modernized with
larger, more efficient equipment and operations continued.
In 1956, General Baking Company (second largest) acquired a
regional West Coast bakery and a Northwest bakery with annual
sales of about 30 percent of total sales of the parent company.
Largely as a result of these and two other recent mergers, General
increased coverage of bakery markets in the East and Central states
while operating for the first time west of the Rocky Mountains.
General's management explained these acquisitions to its stockholders saying they wanted to offset the uncertainties of local market
structure and behavior by a more balanced pattern of national
distribution and at the same time expand operation to markets
with high population growth.
It is apparent that the primary basis for multi-plant and multimarket operations in recent years has been to spread among many
plants and markets the internal competitive risks of local markets
such as price wars, active promotional campaigns of rivals, and
bakery worker strikes that cut off a plant's earning capabilities.
Large baking companies are aware that if oligopolistic price leadership and the approved methods of nonprice competition are to
work effectively in any particular market area, each of them must
spread its influence nationally to nullify any disadvantage it may
have among a single group on the local level.
Slater found sound reasons, from the viewpoint of the expanding
firm, for using mergers to get established in new markets: 36
In order to achieve economies in production, it needs to
enter a market on a substantial scale. A small plant would
35. Slater,

op. cit., p.

216.
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not achieve low costs, and a large plant operated at part capacity would not be efficient either. But there are strong barriers
to the quick building up of a large sales volume in a new
market. Time is required to build a sales organization and
(in the case of a wholesale baker) obtain a place on grocers'
shelves. Furthermore, the gradual growth of market demand
(tied to population changes) precludes the startling growth of
one seller without a decline in the market share of other
sellers. This would result in a sharp and costly competitive
struggle. Mergers avoid such problems, for the company buys
"market share" along with bricks and mortar of a plant.
Moreover, the entry into new market areas may be smoother
if accomplished through external expansion; it avoids the risk
of antagonizing the local community which otherwise might
result from driving out the existing firm and causing local
unemployment. 36
Diversification into new channels of bread distribution is another
factor that accounts for many of the recent bakery mergers. The
usual case has been for primarily wholesale baking companies to
integrate through merger into the home delivery or multi-unit
retail channels. The integrating company has sought the protective
environment of a high margin, direct contact, consumer market.
For example, General, primarily a wholesaler baker, merged with
Van de Kamp's, the largest multi-outlet retail baking company of
California, in 1957. Estimated 1957 net earnings on sales of the
acquired division were about twice that of the parent company
in 1956. 37
Perhaps the most notable example is the acquisition by Continental Baking Company (largest wholesale baker in the nation) of
Omar, Inc., Midwest home service company, in 1958, with annual
sales representing more than 10 percent of the parent company.
Continental also may have been motivated by desires other than
further diversification into the home service channel of bread distribution. Perhaps Omar was underpriced at $5.2 million (net worth
was $8.6 million in 1957).38 There was an opportunity to trim some
managerial overhead from the operating costs of Omar in subsidiary
relationship to the parent company. Moreover, Omar was already
36. Weston, op. cit., p. 75.
37. Baking Industry Magazine Guly 13, 1957), p. 55.
38. Moody's Industrials. Continental Baking Co. entered into a consent order
with the Federal Trade Commission on April 2, 1962, to dispose of Omar, Inc.,
and was forbidden for ten years to acquire any bread company without permission of the F.T.C.
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experimenting with diversification into the production of chain store
and cooperative contract private label bread. It thus offered
Continental the opportunity to enter this volatile market area
under the protective cover of an organization separate from the
wholesale division.
Omar operated 81 retail stores for the sale of "day-old" surplus
bakery products. While wholesale bakers seldom have an incentive
to retail all of their own output, there are certain advantages in
retailing some. For example, a baker may find that at 19 cents a
loaf he can distribute only 20,000 loaves a day via driver-salesmen
delivery to grocery stores. In order to get an additional 2,000 loaves
sold through grocery stores, he would have to lower the price to 15
cents a loaf under drop shipment delivery to a small chain. But
to avoid alienating his regular grocery store customers, he would
soon have to give the same price concession to all and sell his
entire output of 22,000 loaves per day for 15 cents, rather than
only the last 2,000. Thus, he may be better off selling the last 2,000
loaves through his own surplus bakery product stores at day-old
prices, even if retailing costs are somewhat higher than those of
grocery stores.
In recent years, diversification of product has become increasingly important as a factor explaining the merger of large baking
companies with other baking companies and with firms producing
other than bread products. A large firm may thereby obtain a competitive advantage over smaller competitors by lengthening its product line to provide certain bakery products and sometimes nonbakery products not previously supplied, but which were generally
used by the acquiring company's present customers. Also, diversification of product by major wholesale baking companies has frequently been into unrelated product areas having more favorable
demand prospects than bread.
Fully 29 percent of the bakery mergers reported between 1952-58
in a U.S. Census survey were of a conglomerate type. 39 Since 1955,
Continental, primarily a wholesale baking company, has diversified
into the manufacture of potato chips, mayonnaise, snack items,
frozen meat pies, frozen cakes, frozen TV dinners, and frozen biscuits, all by merger. 40 By 1958, about 10 percent of company sales
were non-bakery products. In 1958, General, primarily a wholesale
39. Nelson and Paul, op. cit., p. 21.
40. Continental acquired Morton's Frozen Foods, Inc., and Stewart's, Inc.
(potato chips, mayonnaise) in 1955, and Brownies Chip Co. of Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, in 1959. Moody's Industrials.
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baking company, acquired two candy manufacturers. 41 Other wholesale baking companies had diversified into non-baking products to
a lesser extent or not at all, but a noticeable diversification trend
was in evidence. Pepperidge Farms, a wholesale baking company
with $40 million annual sales, first entered the frozen food field in
1957 through merger. 42 In 1959, Interstate, the fifth largest wholesale
producer of bread products, diversified into cake production with
the acquisition of Kingston Cake Company with annual sales of
$6.5 million in Pennsylvania.43 In the same year, Ward, the sixth
largest wholesale producer of bread products, diversified into frozen
pies by acquiring the Johnston Pie Company of Los Angeles. 44

Product Differentiation
Another dimension of market structure is product differentiation
or the degree of consumer substitution between the output of
competing sellers. Where product differentiation is present, consumers have developed preferences for the output of certain sellers
over others. Consumers will be willing to pay at least slightly more
for a preferred brand, and/or grocery store outlets will be eager to
stock it. Thus, product differentiation can have an important
influence on the competitive relationships between bakery firms.
The principal product of the bakery industry is white bread,
to which we shall confine our attention in considering product
differentiation. But the industry is not a single product group. It
consists of bakeries primarily engaged in the· production of white
bread, variety breads, rolls, cakes, sweet yeast goods, pastries, doughnuts, pies, cookies, and similar perishable bakery products chiefly
for off-premise sale. White bread, however, accounts for about 56
percent of total industrial output (in pounds).
The common bases for product differentiation in most industries
are: (1) the opportunity for producing significantly different designs
and qualities of the goods, (2) the relative ignorance of buyers with
respect to the merits of various alternative products, and (3) the
susceptibility of buyers to persuasive appeals concerning the alleged
superiority of the outputs of individual sellers.45
As far as baking is concerned, the findings suggest that white
41. General acquired Vernell's Buttermints and Thompson's Candy House,
both of Seattle, Washington, in 1958. Moody's Industrials.
42. Baking Industry Magazine (October 19, 1957). Pepperidge Farms was
merged with Campbell Soup Co. in 1960.
43. Baking Industry Magazine (October 31, 1959), p. 88.
44. Report, op. cit., p. 137.
45. Bain, op. cit., p. 219.
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pan bread is a homogeneous product in physical quality, nutritive
value and palatibility. The output of one firm is highly, if not
completely, substitutable for the output of other firms in any given
market area. Limitations in differentiating the physical quality of
white bread are, however, partially offset by the consumer's lack
of information with respect to the similarity of alternative bread
products and his susceptibility to locational differentiation on the
grocery shelf and to the persuasive appeals of bread advertising.
Perhaps the leading factor making it increasingly difficult for
bread bakers to differentiate the physical quality of their product
from that of competitors is the widespread dissemination of technical and business know-how. Important ingredient and operational
determinants of bread quality vary only slightly if at all between
bread bakers in any given market area. General uniformity has been
achieved in the quality of ingredients and formulas used in the
cleanliness and timing of production and delivery operations, and in
the enrichment and subsequent nutritive value of white bread. 46
Product specifications vary somewhat between regions of the
country, but within any given region, product characteristics are
generally homogeneous among bakery firms. There are a few exceptions. A development of small but growing significance is white
bread made from stone-milled flour to save the vitamins lost in
modern milling, as well as breads made from honey, molasses,
natural-sugar syrup, whole milk and butter. Of course, most of the
known vitamins of importance are added to all enriched white
breads, but the nutrition and chemical additive scares of recent
decades explain, in part, the ability of many small bakers and a few
large ones (notably Pepperidge Farms and Brownberry) to sell a
somewhat differentiated product as a special "old-fashioned"
bread.47
Another important aspect of bread quality is its perishability.
Although "staling" is one of the major problems of the industry,
its cause has not yet been fully determined or controlled. The widespread addition of calcium propionate as a mold inhibitor and
lecithin as an emulsifying agent, combined with rapid cooling and
immediate wrapping are characteristic efforts to minimize bread
staling. Despite these efforts, within two or three days after baking,
46. See L. C. Taylor and M. C. Burk, Review of Cereal Food Enrichment in
the United States, 1950-53, National Food Situation No. 69, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1954), pp. 17-20.
47. See for example, Chemicals in Food Products, Hearings, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1951).
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the crumb of all bakers' bread becomes dry and hard, the crust soft
and leathery, and the flavor less desirable. 48 Heroic attempts are
made to overcome these factors since success would enable an individual firm to differentiate its product and make its advertising
more effective.
Despite repeated bread purchases at short intervals, the typical
consumer does not know enough about bread quality to make a
reasoned and informed choice among alternative brands. Several
consumer preference studies have demonstrated this lack. The most
notable example is a 1955 study of the preferences of a representative sample of approximately 300 families in Rockford, Illinois.49
Among five experimental white pan breads purposely made of distinctly different formulas, consumer discrimination powers were
almost nil. Analysts used a ten-point scale expressing a range of
preference from zero, "dislike extremely," to ten, "like extremely."
The five breads varied as to specific volume, and contents of lard,
sucrose, and nonfat milk solids, but the mean preference ratings
were between 6.06 and 7.35. There was no statistically significant
difference among the mean ratings for each of the quality characteristics evaluated.
It is a rare consumer, indeed, who, applying the usual tests of
flavor, freshness (squeeze), texture and keeping quality, can discriminate between the bread produced from distinct alternative
formulas. Discriminating powers are considerably less in actual
bread markets where the alternative seller brands are produced
with essentially the same formula.
Whatever basis there is today for product differentiation of
white bread results primarily from the sales-promotion activities
of sellers. Advertising is an obvious example. In addition to advertising, efforts to make the bread output of the individual baker
something special in the consumer's mind take various forms including: attractiveness and convenience of the display, including size,
location, and height above the floor; differential loaf size and/or
weight; differentiation in wrapping material; driver courtesy; and
other intangible factors sold along with the product itself. These
factors will be considered again in Chapter 5.
48. Bread Staling, Consumer Service Department, American Institute of
Baking, (Chicago, 1954); as quoted in Bread Facts for Consumer Education,
Agricultural Research Service, V.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C.,
1955), p. 19.
49. Hugh P. Bell, Consumers' Preferences Among Bakers' White Breads of
Different Formulas-A Survey in Rockford, Ill., Report No. 118, Agricultural
Marketing Service, V.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., May, 1956).
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A recent study showed that even consumers themselves realize
that advertising plays a more significant role in shaping their preferences for bread than physical quality.50 In a sample of 500 households in a western city, advertising accounted for 60 to 80 percent
of the reasons given for brand preference. Moreover, changes in
brand loyalty stem from a sense of monotony with the staple article
of diet and a desire for something new or different stimulated by
persuasive advertising. Advertising of bread is aimed at creating
product preferences for brands or company names through generally
phrased praises of the attributes of a branded product or simply
through dinning into the potential buyer's mind an awareness of
the brand through endless repetition. Thus, the most important
efforts to achieve bread differentiation are based primarily on a
nonrational or emotional basis. The possibility of informational
type advertising of bread, though consistent with the goal of an
informed discriminating consumer, would be inconsistent with the
short-run profit maximization goal of bakery firms. Informing the
consumer of the physical uniformity of alternative breads may
tend to destroy whatever consumer franchise is attached to particular
brands, and thus reduce an important source of market power
held by some bakery firms.

Barriers to Entry
Conditions of entry of potential new sellers into bakery product
markets may be defined as the circumstances under which potential
competition from new firms will or will not be realized. 51
Papandreou and Wheeler classify the common barriers to entry in
most industries as: (I) terms under which technology is made available; (2) terms under which factors of production are made
available; (3) terms under which outlets for the product are made
available; (4) consumer allegiances based on product differentiation
by existing firms, and (5) outright legal restrictions. 52 In the bakery
industry, the importance of most of these factors is continually
changing. Some barriers are becoming higher and others lower. Some
apply to one segment of the industry and some to others. The
important consideration is the net height of the barriers to entry
in each bakery segment.
There appear to be no outright legal restrictions or trade secrets
50. Nathanael H. Engle, "Bread Buying Habits," Journal of Marketing (October, 1956), p. 193.
51. Bain, op. cit., p. 3.
52. A. G. Papandreou and J. T. Wheeler, Competition and its Regulation.
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 179.
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to forestall entry into baking. Factors of production and technological know-how are freely available. Kaplan comments on these
variables as follows: 53 "Competent bakers can be found anywhere
in the country and little is required in the way of working capital
with which to get started. Machinery and equipment can frequently
be obtained on credit and financed by installment payments. Trucks
can be leased. Raw material inventories are relatively low because
of rapid turnover. Little or no finished-goods inventories exist
because of perishability."
Market Barriers to Entry into Wholesale Bread Markets
These factors making it easier to enter the production of bread
products are largely offset by higher market barriers. In recent years,
the leading factors making it increasingly difficult to enter the wholesale segment of the industry are: (I) the implicit and explicit preferential shelf space agreements of many established firms with grocery
outlets, (2) the penetration of one or another of the largest baking
companies and grocery chains into virtually all markets in the
country, (3) a uniform quality product giving rise to differentiation
efforts such as large scale advertising which puts an entering company of limited size and resources at a disadvantage both with the
grocer and the consumer, and (4) the existing and potential integration of grocery chains into baking.
The existence of preferential agreements between owners of
grocery outlets and established bakery firms is a substantial barrier
to entry into wholesale bread distribution through grocery stores.
In many cases, shelf space is not made available to newcomers on
the same terms on which it is made available to firms already in
the stores. Perhaps the most notable example is the provision of
display cabinets by an established firm in return for dominant
display space, position, and restriction of other brands. In this
and other ways, potential entrants are often prevented from reaching the final buyers of their products or from achieving minimum
cost display scale. Shelf space control may take other forms, of
course, and will be considered more fully in Chapter 5, as will other
market barriers presented in this section.
Until shortly after World War II, many companies sold in
interior markets essentially isolated from the largest baking companies and from chain store private label bread. These were the
small cities and rural communities where chain stores had not
53. David Kaplan, President, the Economics of Distribution Foundation,
New York, testimony before, Hearings, op. cit., p. 6494.
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penetrated. The main obstacles to the expansion of large baking
companies with plants in metropolitan areas into rural fringe
markets were distance and perishability of the product. Small and
medium sized bakeries entered such environments and prospered
until recently when two major displacements occurred. Either a
major chain acquired a small local chain of stores and introduced
private label bread, or a large city baking company set up a delivery
system in the outlying community and launched a large scale
advertising and promotional campaign which local companies
were unable to match.
Costwise, distance of market expansion by large city companies
through drop shipment to outlying area depots and subsequent
delivery to stores by driver-salesmen is limited by the relationship
between the slope of the production cost curve and the increased
costs of distribution due to increased outlying market area sales.
Roughly estimated from data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, these
balance at 150 miles. Distance of market expansion by grocery
chains through common carrier delivery to store docks is limited
by the relation between the slope of the production cost curve and
increased common carrier costs to the outlying market area. Roughly
estimated these balance at between 400 and 500 miles.
The increased importance of regional and national brands often
means that a small or medium sized company cannot compete
effectively with the largest firms and cooperatively affiliated companies in advertising. Ability to enter is partially dependent on
large scale advertising to develop brand acceptance by consumers
and retailers, as shown in Chapter 5. It has been demonstrated that
white bread is essentially the same product in every quality characteristic, thus more significance is attached to who defines the product
than to how it is defined. Insufficient volume to justify the costs of
large scale advertising forces many potential entrants to abandon
the contest before it begins. This is also a factor which contributes
to the discontinuance of many existing small and medium sized
firms. Under increased selling competition many firms bid for private label contract accounts and experience complete loss of consumer franchise.
Perhaps the most significant single barrier to entry into
wholesale baking is that an increasing number of grocery chains
(corporate, cooperative and voluntary) have become large enough
to bake their own products if they so choose. Widespread acceptance
of retailer labels by consumers has enabled grocery chains to integrate into many lines of food processing, the most extensive of
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which has been baking. 54 Moreover, preferential display of a store's
own brand of bread restricts the shelf space available for wholesaler
brands, reduces their volume of sales, and increases their per unit
costs of delivery. This forces some wholesalers to abandon the outlet.
Also, some chains have limited the number of wholesaler brands
allowed in the store. Thus, vertical integration by already established grocery chains makes it increasingly difficult for newcomers
to enter wholesale baking.
The above barriers to entry apply primarily to wholesale bakeries. Although other segments of the industry may not share these
particular barriers, they have others. For example, home delivery
and multi-outlet retail bakeries have a higher selling cost barrier.
A primary barrier to chain store entry into baking bread is ownership of a sufficient number of grocery outlets to take all of the output
of a minimum optimum-sized bakery plant. However, because of the
economies of private label bread distribution, the entry of grocery
chains into bread production may occur via a smaller sized, higher
unit cost baking plant; the chain may still achieve lower total unit
costs than the potential wholesale baking entrant who will experience much higher unit costs of driver-salesman distribution. Evidence for this is presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
Inelastic Demand with Respect to Price and Income
The baking industry as a whole has experienced a paucity of
market expansion since World 'Var II. Under almost static demand
conditions, the successful entry of a new producer requires almost
equal displacement of output by established producers. Total consumption of the industry'S products has increased at an average
annual rate of about 0.7-0.8 percent since 1947, or about half of the
annual population growth of 1.8 percent. This annual growth rate
is hardly sufficient to encourage the entry of new firms into most
bakery product markets. This was not always true. Prior to 1947,
entry into the baking industry had been eased by the substitution
of commercially produced bread for home baking. This was in spite
of the steady decline in per capita consumption of bread from an
estimated 130 pounds in 1920 to about 75 pounds in 1955. 55 Hence,
54. In 1958, the total value of shipment by food manufacturing plants owned
by chains (with 11 or more stores) was $1,303.6 million, about 30 percent of which
was bread products. Of the $228.6 million increase in the product of chain food
plants from 1954-58, about 40 percent was bread products. Federal Trade Commission, op. cit., p. 30.
55. How American Buying Habits Change, U.S. Department of Labor
(Washington, D.C., 1959).
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lack of demand did not present a serious barrier to entry. By the
end of World War II, however, this substitution was largely complete. In a recent year, for example, only 5 percent of U.S. households baked bread in the home. 56
Table 9 shows per capita consumption of the industry's products for the Census of 1947, 1954, and 1958. Per capita consumption of standard bread products (white, wheat, and rye breads) has
declined regularly since 1947, from 72 pounds per person to 62
pounds in 1958. This was partially offset by increased output of
TABLE 9
ANNUAL PElI. CAPITA SALES OF PERISHABLE BAKERY PRODUCTS, UNITED STATES,
1954 AND 1958

1947,

YEAR

Product'

White han bread
White earth bread
Wheat breads
Rye
Standard breads, total
Raisin and other specialty breads
(diet, protein, buttermilk)
Rolls, bread type
(including brown-and·serve)
Specialty breads and rolls, total
Sweet yeast goods
Cakes
Pies
Cookies
Doughnuts, cake, type
Sweet goods, total
Bakery products, total

1947
(pounds)

1954
(pounds)

1958
(pounds)

59.4
2.1
6.2
4.3
72.0

55.2
1.6
6.1
3.8
66.7

54.1
1.4
3.9
2.8
62.2

1.3

2.0

3.6

--.:r:g

9.2

9.5

If.2

If.l

4.3
8.4
4.2
.6
2.2

3.9
6.5
4.5
.4
2.3

4.5
6.2
4.0
.4
2.0

""19.7

l7.6

17.l

99.6

95.5

92.4

6.6

1947, 1954, and 1958 Census of Manufactures, Baker)! Products, op. cit., p. 12 .
• Omits for all years small amounts of miscellaneous bakery products not specified by
kind, but does include for white pan bread about 14 percent in 1958 and 4 percent in 1954
reported as "not specified by kind." Excludes retail bake shops. .
SoURCE:

specialty breads and rolls from about eight pounds per capita in
1947 to 13 in 1958. Per capita consumption of sweet goods dipped
sharply in the middle fifties, and leveled off by 1958 to 17 pounds
per person. In total, it appears that per capita consumption of the
industry's products declined by approximately 7.2 pounds between
1947 and 1958.
Thus, the overall demand picture for bread is less than encouraging. The slight increase the industry has experienced since World
56. Home Baking by Households in the United States by Region, 1955,
Report No. 13, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 2.

42

/

The Baking Industry, 1947-1958

War II cannot be attributed to the general rise in consumer incomes.
In fact, many investigators have found that income is inversely
associated with bread and flour consumption, which suggests a negative income elasticity. Using 1929-53 data, Juree found that a 1
percent increase in income is associated with a 0.27 percent decrease
in per capita consumption of wheat flour products as a whole. 57
More recent data suggest there has been a continued negative relationship between per capita income and per capita bread consumption. A U.S. Department of Agriculture study shows that as incomes
rise from very low levels to the national average, per capita consumption increases somewhat, but incomes above the national
average are associated with declining bread consumption. 58 Further
estimates based on the U.S.D.A. survey suggest that had per capita
income increased $1,000 above the actual level, cereal consumption
including bread would have declined by 4.6 percent. 59
Moreover, there is general agreement among competent analysts
that the response of bread consumption to changes in price are
insignificant. Using 1923-47 data, Meinken found that a 1 percent
change in price is associated with a -0.06 percent change in per
capita consumption of bread, rolls and coffee cakes. 6o Using earlier
data (1921-34), Schultz estimated a price elasticity coefficient of
between -0.17 and -0.25 for total domestic demand for wheat. 61
Malenbaum summarizes the relationship by observing that a price
elasticity of demand of zero, or no consumption response to price
changes, is a reasonably close conclusion. 62 This has an important
implication for entry. Lower bread prices resulting from potential
cost-reducing innovations by entering firms have little potential for
measurably increasing per capita consumption, and thus successful
entry by new firms requires an almost equal loss of sales by existing companies.
57. L. Juree, "Long-run Trends in Food Consumption: A Multi-Country
Study," Econometrics (Volume 24, 1958), pp. 1-21.
58. Household Food Consumption Survey, 1955, Reports 1-10, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1956).
59. john R. Wetmore, Martin E. Abel, Elmer W. Learn, and Willard W.
Cochrane, Policies for Expanding the Demand for Farm Food Products in the
United States, Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 231, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1959).
60. Kenneth W. Meinken, The Demand and Price Structure for Wheat, Technical Bulletin No. 1136, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Washington, D.C.,
1955), p. 21.
61. Henry Schultz, The Theory and Measurement Of Demand (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 397.
62. Wilfred Melenbaum, The World Wheat Economy, 1885-1939 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 72.
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Economies of Scale in Bread Plants
Under conditions of static demand, all potential entrants face
a scale efficiency barrier with respect to plant and distribution
systems (see Chapters 3 and 4). Entry at the optimum scale of production and distribution is essentially foreclosed, except to already
existing grocery chains that own a sufficient number of retail outlets
to take all of the output of a minimum optimum-sized bread plant.
A grocery chain serving about 360,000 people in a 150-mile
radius could enter bread production and distribution at near optimum scale with an investment of about $1.1 million. As shown in
Chapter 3, a 6,000 pound per hour automatic bread plant operating
at about three-fourths of capacity 24 hours per day, six days per
week, at minimum rated machine capacity, with allowance for breakdowns, could approach within 10 percent of least cost operation.
Average total costs of production would be about 7 cents per pound
and, as shown in Chapter 4, average costs of distribution to grocery
stores would be about 1.5 cents per pound. Weekly output would
be about 500,000 pounds of bread and bread type rolls, average
consumption of which was about 1.4 pounds per capita per week
in 1958.
Average total costs of production and distribution estimated
at about 8.5 cents per pound in the above example are essentially
outside the realm of possibility to the potential entrant into the
wholesale bread segment of the industry. This is because the share
of market necessary to operate a bread plant of near-optimum scale
would be sizable.
For example, in the Omaha market with 400,000 to 500,000
people, the required market share for entry at optimum levels of
efficiency would be roughly 70-90 percent. Given the further condition that five operating plants share the bulk of that market and
operate at varying levels of under-capacity such that any two ot
them with nearly full plant utilization could supply the entire
market, the height of the entry barrier is further raised.
Economies of scale and the existing excess capacity of plants
effectively foreclose entry at optimum levels of operation. For markets with lower population than the above example, economies of
scale and utilization levels of existing plants most likely present
an even greater barrier; for markets with higher or increasing population, the barrier may be somewhat less, but it is still a significant
deterrent to entry at optimum levels of efficiency.

3 /

Technology and Costs of
Bread Production

The preceding chapter dealt with the changing patterns of
market structure in the bakery industry. Here and in Chapter 4
we shall examine baking technology and costs, since they have a
bearing on our later appraisal of the industry's performance. Recent
changes in technology and costs seem to foreshadow changes in the
number and size of bread plants, the resource inputs required per
unit of output in bread production, the methods of production and
distribution, and the levels of horizontal and vertical integration.

Changes in Cost Factors of Production
Average costs provide some insight into the impact of technological and volume factors on optimum or model plant costs. Moreover, the industry's experience with changes in specific factor costs
of production may help to shape its future market structure and
behavior. In 1947, production costs accounted for about 60 cents
of the consumer's bread dollar, or 7.5 cents per pound of wholesale
bakery bread sold through retail stores. By 1958, the share of the
consumer's bread dollar going for production costs had decreased to
about 49 percent, or 9.4 cents per pound. Thus, while total production costs increased by about 25 percent, or 1.9 cents per pound,
they declined as a share of the consumer's bread dollar. From 1947
to 1958, an estimated 1.9 cents, or only 28 percent, of the 6.8 cent
increase in the retail price of a one-pound loaf of white bread was
due to an increase in bakery production costs.
Table 10 shows the postwar changes in the relative proportions
of selected factor costs in bread production. It is readily apparent
that all costs of bread production except costs of ingredients have
increased since 1947, and at a rate in excess of the 55 percent increase
in the average retail price of bread. Costs of ingredients have
decreased both relatively and absolutely. As a share of the con44
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sumer's bread dollar, they have dropped from about 41 percent in
1947 to about 26 percent in 1958. Moreover, as costs to the baker
they would have declined even more if it were not for absolute
increases in transportation (despite the introduction of bulk handling) and relative increases in exchange costs, both of which are
included in prices paid by bakery firms for ingredients. Also, modern baking demands higher quality flour and a higher ratio of
chemical additives-sugar, powdered milk, shortening and water to
flour-which have caused a significant composition change in "ingredients." Combined, these factors tend to understate the postwar
decline in prices paid to the producers of raw materials used in
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED AVERAGE PRODUCTION
STATES, 1947-1958

Cost Item

COSTS OF

WHOLESALE

A verage Costs per
Pound Produced"
1947
1958

WHITE

BREAD,

UNITED

Percentage of
Retail Price e
1947
1958

Cents

Cents

Percent

Percent

Shop laborb
Ingredien ts·
Wrapping sUlpliesb
Depreciation
Miscellaneous

1.15
5.10
.62
.20
.43

2.08
5.00
1.02
.35
.95

9.20
40.80
4.96
1.60
3.44

10.78
25.90
5.28
1.81
4.93

Total production costs

7.50

9.40

60.00

48.70

• One·pound loaf of white bread. Average cost estimates differ depending on the source.
the internal and external economies of firms included in the tabulation. and other variables.
The.e data are presented as reasonably typical; statistically significant data for the industry
as a whole are not available. Also see Table 28.
b Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084.
• Richard H. Long and V. John Brensike, "Marketing Margins for White Bread," The
Marketing and Transportation Situation, July, 1958, p. 18; and Developments in Marketing
Spreads for Agricultural Production 1958, Agricultural Marketing Service No. 316, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1959, p. 11.
d Derived from cost data on the four h.rgest bread manufacturers as presented in Hearings,
op. cit., p. 6580 .
• Based on average retail prices published by Bureau of Labor Statistics of 12.5 cents
per pound in 1947 and 19.3 cents per pound in 1958.

bread production. For example, the average prices received by
farmers for wheat dropped 25 percent in the period 1947-58. 1
Although there is generally a close relationship between the price
of flour and the price of wheat, there is little relationship between
the price of flour and the price of bread.
Baking companies do not pay a uniform price for ingredients.
This is due in part to locational advantage of some firms with
respect to sources of supply, in part to different levels of quality
1. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6089. Figures furnished by the Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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control necessitated by machinery employed, and in part to the
market power advantages of size. In 1958, the four largest baking
companies purchased ingredients for prices averaging about 10
percent less than those reported by bakery plants of the five major
grocery chains and by independent baking companies affiliated with
cooperative buying groups.2 Although ingredient costs for the
remaining unaffiliated independent baking companies are not available for 1958, data reported for the end of World War II suggest
their ingredient costs average considerably higher than those of
the largest four baking companies. 3
Labor is the primary factor among production costs contributing
to higher retail prices for bread in the postwar years. Increased costs
of production labor accounted for about half of the total postwar
increase in production costs, but it should be noted that this factor
accounted for only about 14 percent of the 6.8 cent increase in the
average retail price of bread from 1947-58. There is evidence suggesting that substantially all of the increase in per unit cost of
production labor was due to increased wage rates, fringe benefits,
social security taxes, and vacation allowances. The volume of bread
produced per production worker has increased in the postwar years.
Because of substitution of capital for labor, average productivity of
plant labor has increased, and per unit production labor costs have
not increased as much as hourly earnings. 4
Depreciation allowances and costs of wrapping supplies both
rose a little faster, on a per unit basis, than did bread prices after
World War II. Together their 1947-58 increase amounted to slightly
more than one-half cent. Higher depreciation costs reflect inflated
values of land and buildings as well as the widespread adoption of
2. Report, op. cit., pp. 31 and 113.
3. June, 1945, costs of ingredients and materials for the four largest baking
firms (then Continental, Purity, General and Ward) averaged 3.66 cents per
pound as compared with 3.87 cents per pound for medium and medium-large
sized bakeries, 3.92 cents per pound for medium-small sized bakeries, and 4.62
cents per pound for the smallest bakeries. Blair suggested that without the
advantage of power to buy materials cheaply which stems from size, the total
unit costs of the Big Four would have been only slightly lower than those of
small bakeries in 1945. It is important to note that changes in technology and
other conditions since that date may significantly alter these findings. John
Blair, "Does Large-scale Enterprise Lower Costs?" American Economic Review
(May, 1948), pp. 147-148.
4. From 1947-54 Census data as reported in Farm-Retail Spreads for Food
Products, Miscellaneous Publication 741. Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., November, 1957), p. 35. Also see
Imogene Bright, "Trends in Labor Input and Output in Selected Agricultural
Processing Industries, 1947-57," Agricultural Economics ReseaTch (October, 1959),
pp. 115-120.
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new bakery machinery. Wrapping supplies rose in cost partially
because of the increased use of more expensive wrapping materials,
more cellophane and polyethelene and less waxed paper. Increases
in miscellaneous production costs including return on investment,
plus light and power, fuel, repairs, and other expenses, accounted
for slightly more than one-half cent of the 1947-58 increase in
baking company costs.

Technological Advance and Increasing Scale
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in baking at
the turn of the 20th Century, there has been a tendency for the
scale of operations to increase. Early mechanization involved the
development of machines to take the place of repetitive hand operations. Mixing machines were introduced in about 1880 followed by
special machines for dividing, slicing, and wrapping. 5 The largest
bread plants which in 1900 turned out 1,000 pounds of bread an
hour, or 15,000 loaves per day, by 1930 often surpassed 2,000 pounds
per hour in a single production line, and some multi-line plants
produced more than 100,000 loaves per day.6 By 1958, the median
bread plant operated at a capacity of about 3,000 pounds per hour
and some of the larger plants operated bread lines with output
levels of 8,000 pounds per hour, or as much as 192,000 pounds per
single production line in a 24 hour period (Table 4). The basis for
this long-run trend has been technological innovation which has
provided the capital equipment for a larger scale of operations.
Table 11 shows the recent level of investment in selected bakery
machinery. Since technological changes and machinery adoption
have important effects on the baking industry, several of the more
important developments will be considered here.
Pneumatic Ingredient-Handling Equipment
During the past 15 years the expanded use of pneumatic conveyors had made possible the bulk handling of ingredients all the
way from the rail siding or truck dock to the mixing machines.
Although their chief use is to move flour, pneumatic conveyors also
carry dried milk, granulated sugar, and other ingredients. Introduced in the bakery industry in 1946, bulk handling of ingredients
by pneumatic conveyors is best suited for medium and large scale
5. Herman J. Rothberg, Studies of Automatic Technology, A Case Study of
A Large Mechanized Bakery, Bureau of Labor Statistics Report 109, U.S. Department of· Labor (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 1.
6. Panscher, op. cit., pp. 123-124.
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bread plants among which there was an estimated 75 to 90 percent
adoption by 1958 (Table 12). During the same period, it was adopted
by only about 15 percent of the small bread plants. Significant labor
saving results as the bulk material is moved by air through tubes
TABLE II
INVESTMENT IN

SELEerED BAKERY

MACHINERY,

UNITED STATES,

1954

1954

AND

1958

1958

Machine

Number

Dough mixers
Traveling tray ovens
Other ovens
Slicing machines
Other i?akery machinery and
eqUIpment
Bakery machinery and equipment
not specified by kind

N.A.
320
481
1,426

$ 3,810,000
4,805,000
2,580,000
2,371,000

N.A.
274
N.A.
N.A.

$ 6,584,000
5,126,000
3,085,000
1,176,000

N.A.

23,540,000

N.A.

29,222,000

Total

N.A.

SOURCE:

Value

Number

697,000

3,034,000
$43,247,000

Value

N.A.

$48,869,000

Census of Manufactures, op. cit., as reported in Baking Industry Magazine (March

19, 1960), p. 41.
N.A. -Not available. Total shipments include interplant transfers.

and hoses. A case study showed a substantial (40 times) increase
in output per man hour for unloading flour into the plant, or from
less than 1,000 pounds per man hour for bagged delivery to 40,000
pounds per man hour for bulk delivery.7 Investment pay-out time on
the basis of labor saving alone has been estimated at less than three
years. In addition, it reduces the cost of flour through reduced transportation costs of bulk as compared with bagged delivery. Pneumatic handling eliminates loss due to sack breakage. It also facilitates
sanitation and quality control as the conveyor system is sealed air
tight and the bulk ingredient passes through sifters and an intoleter
to assure product purity and proper aeration. 8
Continuous Mix
Recent combination of the various dough preparation stages into
one machine that will mix, develop, divide, shape, and pan bread
dough automatically provides the element of automation between
automatic ingredient handling and the automatic oven, depanner,
slicer, and wrapper. Although there had been substantial automation of the individual stations replaced by continuous mix, the
7. Rothberg, op. cit., p. 6.
8. Inter·Bureau Committee, Technology in Food Marketing, U.S. Department
of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1952), p. 28.

TABLE
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE

Automatic Equipment

OF

Approx.
Year
Intro·
dllced

Depan-o.matic,
pan return conveyor

1949

Cooler, conveyors
to slicers

1930

12

BREAD PLANTS HAVING ADoPTED SELECTED EQUIPMENT

BY

1947, 1954, AND 1958, UNITED STATES'

PERCENTAGE OF PLANTS OF SPECIFIED SIZE ADOPTING SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT

..,
(\

YEAR

<'>

2000 Lb./Hr.
(from 1000·3000)
1947
1954
1958

4000 Lb./Hr.
(from 3000·5000)
1947
1954
1958

6000 Lb./Hr.
(from 5000·7000)
1947
1954
1958

8000 Lb./Hr.
(7000 and above)
1947
1954
1958

20

75

40

90

40

95

45

95

25

50

60

75

70

90

80

90

;:ro

~

C

~

~

~

R.
~

0

30

40

Pan stacker and
unstacker

1955

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Final proofer

1915

0

0

0

0

2

5

5

8

Pneumatic flour
handling

BY

10

50
0

0

5

8

C

'"

I;

.Q.
10

t:x:I

~

R.

1946

0

8

15

5

50

75

5

50

85

5

75

90

Continuous dough mix

1956

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

0

3

0

0

2

Tro hoists

1930

25

50

75

75

80

85

75

85

95

70

75

95

'"t;j
'i

c

R.
~

-.

<'>
....
C

• Informed estimates by bakery equipment manufacturers.

~

"H>-

~
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elimination of batch mixing is of major significance in facilitating
fully automated bread production.
Developed out of basic research in cereal chemistry, the process
of fermenting a yeast broth rather than the dough itself cuts doughprocessing time from several hours to a matter of minutes. An optimum blend of: (1) equal parts of Hard Red Spring and Hard Red
Winter wheat flour; (2) oxidant solution with potassium bromate
and iodate; (3) melted shortening; and (4) yeast broth, is metered
continuously and automatically into the dough mixing machine.
Introduced in 1953 and operational by 1956, continuous mix is
apparently best suited for medium sized plants among which it
had been adopted by approximately 5 percent by 1958.9 Table 12
shows it had been installed in none of the small and only a few
of the large bread plants. The rate of adoption is expected to
increase substantially in the 1960's owing in part to a dramatic labor
saving potential of three to four men per shift (Table 13). For an
investment cost of $150,000, continuous-mix machines enable bread
plant managers to replace six of 12 stages in the conventional production line: flour-scaling units, batch mixers, fermentation room,
dough troughs and hoists, dividers, rounders, an overhead proofer,
and a molder-panner.
Through a sizable effect on the capital-labor ratio in bread
plant cost structure, continuous mix intensifies the economic disadvantages of under-capacity plant utilization. Investment pay-out
time in terms of labor saving is from three to four years with threeshift operations, five to six years with two shifts and increases to
eight to 12 years with a single shift operation. Continuous mix also
introduces a certain inflexibility into plant operations as only white,
rye, and whole wheat breads can be produced. If other variety
breads, buns, rolls, and sweet goods are produced, additional automated-batch equipment of minimum size requirements must also
be maintained. Some ingredient savings are realized because dusting
can be eliminated and because improved automatic control of
metering devices allows closer compliance with minimum weight
laws. Improved fermentation control produces a bread structure

9. The Do·Maker of Baker Process Company, a subsidiary of Wallace and
Tiernan Chemical Co. is the outstanding case in point. The number of
operating units increased from two in 1955 to five in 1956, to ten in 1957, to 21
in 1958, to 56 in 1959. A second unit manufactured by the American Machine
and Foundry Co. entered the field in 1958. See, "The Progress of Automation-What It Means to the Economy of the Baking Industry," Bakers Weekly
(June 19, 1961), pp. 22-26.
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TABLE
COMPARISON

OF

SELEerED AUTOMATIC

Continuous mixf

EQUIPMENT

COST

WITH

4000

LABoR.

LoAVES PER

Costb

Number
Men
Replaced

$150,000

3

1 shift e
2 shifts
3 shifts

$12,840
25,680
38,520

11.68
5_84
3_89

4

1 shift
2 shifts
3 shifts

17,120
34,240
51.360

8.76
4.38
2.92

Labor Cost Saving"

Yean to
Pay-out

Depan-o-matic,
pan return
conveyor

$ 16,000

2

1 shift
2 shifts

8,560
17,120

1.86
.93

Cooler, conveyors
to slicers

$ 65,000

2

1 shift
2 shifts

8,560
17,120

7.58
3.79

Pan stacker
and unstacker

$ 17,000

1 shift
2 shifts

4,280
8,560

3.97
1.98

Final proofer'

$ 75,000

1 shift
2 shifts

8,560
17,120

8.76
4.38

2
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COST SAVING AND YEARS TO PAY OUT INVESTMENT IN PLANTS OF
HOUR CAPACITY, 1954d

Automatic
Equipment"

/

• The approximate labor cost per man per year is assumed to be $4,280 per man. This
cost is based on a wage of $2.00 per hour. a 40 hour week, and an additional 7 percent of
fringe benefits and Social Security matching costs.
b Cost of equipment is taken from an equipment company, Approximate Installed Equipment Cost, table dated March I, 1954.
"Equipment was selected on basis of replacement equipment of a different nature than
that replaced, addition without replacement. and replacement especially pertinent to labor
saving rather than on the basis of a larger size of the same type. Continuous mix is an example of replacement of old equipment of more than one station by a single new machine.
d Total standard equipment assumed in operation of the plant is $291,000 before the
addition of any equipment.
• The 4000 loaves (pounds) per hour plant size is assumed to be operating at full capacity
while in operation whether it be one, two, or three shifts.
f Continuous mix replaces at least three men and under optimum conditions replaces
four men.
• With a plant of 8.000 loaves per hour production capacity, the addition of an automatic
final proofer would cost $120,000. or $45,000 more than at the 4,000 loaves per hour capacity
plant. and would replace four men. The result would be a labor cost saving of $17,120 on
one-shift basis; $32.240 on a two-shift basis; and $51,360 on a three-shift basis. The pay-out
time would be seven yean, 3.5 years, and 2.33 years respectively for one-, two-, and threeshift operation.

of uniform, small cells which has provided some visible basis for
claiming a differentiated product.
Automatic Conveyor Systems
Traveling aprons move bread-in-process between and within the
stages of production in a continuous assembly line operation. From
the panner through a final proofer, oven, depanner, cooler, slicerwrapper, and to the loading dock, panned bread is moved by an
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automatic conveyor system. There is considerable variation among
the rates of adoption of the newer machines at the various production stages. For example, modification of final proofing to allow
continuous flow of panned bread by traveling apron from the
panner to the oven has proceeded slowly in the postwar years.
With an investment of $75,000, the automatic final proofer
replaces two men resulting in a pay-out time of about 4.5 years
under two-shift operations of medium sized plants (Table 13).
Although introduced as early as 1915, by 1958 automation of the
final proofing operation had occurred in only about 10 percent of
the large plants, 5 percent of the medium sized plants, and none
of the small bread plants. Table 12 shows, however, that there has
been a 150 percent increase in the number installed since 1947.
This increase in the use of automatic proofing equipment seems
to be associated with adoption of the continuous-mix process and
with more precise oven control. Prior to the development of automatic continuous mix and closely controllable ovens, flexibility was
required in the final proofing operation to adjust to plant breakdowns and to variability in oven output, and in mixing and first
proofing time. With the current innovations and plant engineering facilities, the feasibility of automatic final proofing is
greatly increased.
Modification of the cooler to allow continuous flow of baked
bread by traveling apron from the oven and depanner through to
the slicer-wrapper was introduced in 1930, and by 1958 had been
adopted in approximately 90 percent of the large plants, 75 percent
of the medium sized plants and 50 percent of the small bread plants.
While none of the small plants had installed automatic coolers and
traveling aprons by 1947, nearly half of the medium and large
sized plants had done so by that date. Under two-shift operation of
medium sized plants, with an investment of $65,000, the automatic
cooler and conveyor replace two men resulting in a pay-out time
of about 3.8 years.
Introduced in 1949, the automatic depanner and pan return
conveyor were adopted in 90-95 percent of the medium and large
sized bread plants and in about 75 percent of the small plants by
1958. The number of medium and large sized plants in which this
innovation was adopted more than doubled from 1954 to 1958,
while among small bread plants, adoption quadrupled during the
same time period. The high rate of adoption among all plant sizes
probably reflects the relatively low capital investment, which in the
case of medium sized plants was $16,000 in 1958. Nonetheless, the
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automatic depanner and pan return conveyor replace two men,
providing a pay-out time of about one year under two-shift operations. They not only save labor but increase the average life of
bread pans.
Oven Operation and Design
With the end of World War II practically all bread plants,
regardless of size, changed their bread formula-increasing the ratio
of sugar, shortening, and skim milk to flour. This change, coupled
with improved oven performance and stepped up heat is estimated
to have cut average baking time per pound from approximately
35 minutes to 18 minutes. 1o The additional heat and zone control
of heat supply combined with the modified bread formula roughly
doubled the capacity of practically all bread ovens in the United
States during the postwar years. During the changeover period, a
continuous automatic oven into which products are automatically
loaded, baked, and unloaded without continual supervision, was
adopted in 90 percent of the medium and large sized plants, and
in 75 percent of the small bread plants. With little or no time lost
due to adjustment, the modern oven is capable of baking pan
breads, sweet goods, pies, cakes and rolls.
In summary, it has been shown that while advances in baking
technology have been utilized in small bread plants to a limited
extent, most of the recent innovations have been readily fitted into
the operations of medium and large scale plants. This is due, in
part, to the lower investment and labor costs per unit of output of
large as compared with smaller versions of the same machine. The
significant innovations are in the areas of production process and
materials handling. Moreover, each stage of bread production has
been subject to output-increasing mechanization and to labor saving
automation of the station-to-station movement of product.
Foremost among technological developments are those that have
made possible a shift from batch operations to continuous mixing.
The conventional batch method of bread production by its nature
took more time and labor. There were periods of dough fermentation and intermediate proofing and considerable hand labor, putting
the product-in-process into or taking it out of machines or rooms
at each of the 12 production stages. Thus, baking has become an
organized and partially automated assembly line through development of the pneumatic ingredient handling equipment, continuous
10. Hearings,

op.

cit., pp. 6189-6190.
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dough mix, automatic final proofer, automatic oven, automatic
slicer and wrapper, automatic depanner, pan return conveyor, pan
stacker and unstacker, automatic cooler, conveyor to slicer, and
conveyor to loading racks.
Under typical conditions, the shift to automated baking in any
given plant is only partial, with several of the operations carried
on as before, and thus many bread plants have not achieved the
optimum level of equipment utilization. Although the adoption of
new equipment is far from complete, the equipment is available and
its efficiency and output-increasing potentials are felt in nearly
every bread market.

Technological Advance and Production Costs
A comparison between the cost of bread production in model
plants with standard automated-batch equipment and continuousmix equipment reflects the magnitude of cost changes associated
with technological change in the postwar years. In this context,
"technological change" is interpreted as any change in input-output
relations that is not directly attributable to changes in factor prices
or variations in the rate or scale of production.H The synthesis of
unit cost curves for model bread plants of various sizes used for this
comparison has the advantage of focusing attention on the merits
of currently employed baking equipment in relation to optimum
equipment available. Of course, an increasing number of plants
use all of the latest available equipment, but the vast majority
do not.
Figure I demonstrates that under the existing level of technology,
the efficiency potential of automatic continuous-mix equipment relative to standard automated-batch equipment is significant for each
of the four representative sizes (see Table 4) of model bread plants.
At an output rate of 56 hours per week, the advantage of automatic equipment over standard equipment ranges from 1.6 cents
(15 percent) per pound when comparing small scale plants to 1.1
cents (13 percent) per pound when comparing large scale plants.
Subtracting the 1.1 cents per pound from the 1.6 cents per pound
in the example above yields a cost advantage for the small plant
compared with the large plant due to automatic equipment of 0.5
cents per pound. However, the cost advantage due to automatic
equipment at an operating rate of 36 hours per week is less for a
small than for a large scale automatic plant. A decrease in plant
1I. Conference on Price Research, Cost Behavior and Price Policy (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943), p. 143.
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operation from a 54 hour week to a 36 hour week is associated
with a per unit cost increase of 1.3 cents in the case of the small

II

in

....

z
10 III

9

90
z
:>
0

Q.

FOUR STANDARD (AUTOMATED BATCH) PLANTS

or

III
Q.

8

....In

--

0

(,)

--------~---~ ---~.--------/
a,ooo Ib• .Ihr.
FOUR AUTOMATIC (CONTINUOUS MIX) PLANTS

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

TOTAL WEEKLY OUTPUT (THOUSANDS OF POUNDS)
SoURCE: These short-run plant cost curves are based on engineering studies and
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FIG. I.-Comparison of average total cost curves for model bread plants with
standard and with automatic equipment, and no daily variation in demand, 1959.

automatic plant as contrasted with only 0.7 of a cent in the case
of the large automatic plant, or a difference of 0.6 of a cent in
cost in favor of the large scale automatic bread plant. Under-capacity utilization of small automated plants is relatively more costly
than it is for large plants.
These economies of automatic processes in baking are due
largely to change in the capital-labor ratio per pound of output. In a
medium sized bread plant, for example, replacing hand labor and
less efficient machines with fully automatic continuous-mix equipment results in a decrease in direct production labor from 15
workers per shift to five workers per shift. At full-capacity operation, per pound production labor costs are reduced from 0.9 of a
cent to 0.3 of a cent. The concurrent increase in capital investment
required for this medium sized plant is approximately $158,000,
from $674,200 to $832,000, which amounts to a per pound increase
in cost due to increased investment of only .03 of a cent, from 0.34
of a cent to 0.37 of a cent per pound, or a 9 percent increase. Thus,
since the reduction of labor cost due to the increased investment
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is 0.6 of a cent per pound, or 67 percent, there is a net saving of
0.57 of a cent per pound of bread output due to the substitution of
continuous-mix equipment for labor and standard automatedbatch equipment.

Production Scale Economies
There are marked economies of scale in bread production. With
an increase in size of plant, at full capacity utilization, unit production costs decrease significantly for the relevant range of plant
size. Scale economies are due primarily to larger equipment which
results in: (1) less investment per unit of output and, hence, lower
per unit depreciation costs, (2) economy of labor utilization, and
(3) economy of plant administration. In order to estimate the magnitude of scale economies, model plants of 2,000, 4,000, 6,000 and
8,000 pounds per hour were synthesized from engineering and
accounting data. 12 Shown in Figures 1 and 2, these model bread
Q~
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SOURCE:

Tables 29. 30. 31. 34. and 35.

FIG. 2.-Comparison of average total cost curves for model bread plants
with standard and with automatic equipment, operated under conditions of
average daily variation in demand, 1959.
12. Model plants were synthesized through the application of the building
block method based primarily on engineering data. For a review of the methodological framework used, see L. L. Sammet, "Structural Trends and Economics of
Scale in Agricultural Marketing and Processing," Proceedings of the Western Farm
Economics Association (August 13-15, 1958), pp. 187-201. See notes to Tables
30 and 31 for the data sources and assumptions made. See Tables 32 to 35 for a
detailed tabulation of fixed and variable costs per pound of bread.
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plants coincide approximately with the typical small, medium,
and large plants in current operation, with both the 6,000 and the
8,000 pound-per-hour model plants falling in the large size category
(Table 4). In addition to analysis of the four plant sizes from 2,000
pounds-per-hour output to 8,000 pounds-per-hour output, comparisons within size are made on the basis of: (1) standard batch equipment vs. automatic mix equipment, and (2) production geared to
daily variation in demand vs. uniform production through the week
-capacity fixed independently in all cases (Tables 14 and 15).
TABLE

14

COMPA1USON OF PER POUND PRODUcnON COSTS OF SMALL AND LARGE MODEL BREAD
PLANTS UNDER A RANGE OF HOURS PER WEEK OPERATION AND WITHOUT DAILY
VA1UATION IN OUTPUT, UNITED STATES, 1959
CONTINUOUS MIX EQUIPMENT

STANDARD BATCH EQUIPMENT

Hours
per
Week

36
48
72
96
120
144

8,000
2,000
Lb./Hr. Lb./Hr.
Small Large

11.69¢
10.59
9.84
9.21
8.93
8.74

SoURCE:

Per-

Differ·

cent

ence

2.58¢
2.07
1.76
1.46
1.36
1.25

9.11¢
8.52
8.08
7.75
7.57
7.49

2,000
Lb./Hr.
Small

8,000
Lb./Hr.
Large

Difference

cent

10.19¢
9.14
8.08
7.62
7.32
7.12

8.04¢
7.49
6.99
6.70
6.54
6.43

2.15¢
1.65
1.09
.92
.78
.69

21
18
13
12
9
9

22
20
17
15
14
14

Per-

Same as FiKure 1TABLE

15

COMPARISON OF PER POUND PRODUCTION COSTS OF SMALL AND LARGE MODEL BREAD
PLANTS USING STANDARD AND AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT UNDER A RANGE OF HOURS

-I

PER WEEK OPERATION
STATES, 1959

,,,".,~ .,~

Hours
per
Week

2,000
Lb./Hr.
Small

8,000
Lb./Hr.
Large

36
54
72
90
108

11.72¢
10.39
9.86
9.33
9.15

9.12¢
8.40
8.09
7.81
7.70

SoURCE:

""".

AND

TYPICALLY

~

DAILY

VARIATION

OUTPUT,

UNITED

CONTINUOUS MIX EQUIPMENT

ence

Percent

2,000
Lb./Hr.
Small

2.6¢
2.
1.77
1.52
1.45

22
19
18
17
16

10.22¢
8.84
8.19
7.74
7.49

Differ-

IN

8,000
Lb./Hr.
Large

Difference

Percent

8.05¢
7.34
7.00
6.76
6.62

2.17¢
1;5
1.19
.98
.83

21
17
14
11
11

Same as Figure 2.

Under conditions of 54 hour week operation, a daily variation in
demand for bread, standard equipment, and no storage of product,
cost per pound decreased from 10.4 cents for the small plant to 8.4
cents for the largest plant, a scale economy of 2.0 cents per pound
(19 percent) between the small and the large bread plant. Using
automatic equipment rather than standard equipment, other things
remaining the same, the per pound decrease in cost was 1.5 cents
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(17 percent) from 8.84 cents for the small plant to 7.34 cents for
the largest plant.
Increasing the hours of weekly operation from 54 to 108, also
assuming weekly cycle of demand, standard equipment, and no
storage of product, the per pound cost decreased from 9.15 cents
for the small plant to 7.7 cents for the largest plant or 1.45 cents
(16 percent). Substituting automatic equipment for standard equipment under the same conditions, cost per pound declined from
7.49 cents for the small plant to 6.62 cents for the large plant, or
a decrease of 0.83 cents (11 percent).
Comparing the small plant with the large plant, but under the
assumption of uniform production, 48 hour weekly operation, and
standard equipment, cost per pound declined from 10.59 cents to
8.52 cents, a difference of 2.07 cents per pound (20 percent). Substituting automatic for standard equipment, ceteris paribus, cost per
pound decreased 1.65 cents (18 percent) from 9.14 cents for the
small plant to 7.49 cents for the large plant.
Expanding weekly operation to the full 144 hours possible
under uniform daily production and using standard equipment,
cost declined from 8.74 cents per loaf for the small plant to 7.49
cents per loaf for the large plant, or a decrease of 1.25 cents (14
percent). Under the same conditions, except for the use of automatic
equipment rather than standard equipment, cost per pound
decreased .67 cents (9 percent) from 7.12 cents for the small plant
to 6.43 cents for the large plant.
Thus, it can be concluded that under a variety of conditions
economies of scale are considerable. Costs decline with each increase
in size of plant, but at a decreasing rate. Additional increases in
the size of a bread production line beyond 8,000 pounds per hour,
however, do not result in significant increases in efficiency. A 10,000
pounds-per-hour bread line, for example, has essentially the same
per-pound costs as an 8,000 pounds-per-hour line.

Under-Capacity Utilization of Plants
Station Excess Capacity
The technical organization of production extant in the bakery
industry can still be characterized as a "batch process" or discontinuous process of manufacturing. This combined with the perishability of the product-in-process results in a critical relationship
of output rates between machines or stations. With the exception of
sweet goods in some plants, storage or stockpiling of partially fin-
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ished product between production stages is virtually impossible.
Thus, sustainable output rate of the lines is in large part limited
to the output rate of the lowest capacity machine or station on the
line. Stations or machines with higher output capabilities simply
run at under-capacity. There is a minimum of flexibility in a bread
line for adjustment of a particular machine in terms of running
longer hours to achieve fuller utilization of other machines. This is
because once the bread production process is started, there must
be continuous movement of product through the various stations
until the baked bread is wrapped. Variations in time between operations must be kept to a minimum. Mixing time, for example, is
crucial to a fraction of a minute. From mixing through fermentation, dividing, rounding, intermediate proofing, and panning there
is very little opportunity for adjustment in production time. Once
the bread has been panned and final proofing is in process, it must
be baked before proofing goes too far. Baking time cannot be altered
significantly; cooling proceeds only until the bread is at the proper
temperature for slicing; and wrapping is combined with slicing to
maintain freshness. Bakers typically install machines at each station
with sufficient capacity so that the oven can be operated at close
to its rated output. Hence, in practical operation of the plant, the
speed of the production line is geared to oven capacity. With
demand fixed, the baker sets the number of hours of oven operation
that will meet that demand schedule. This means operation of from
one to three shifts with varying amounts of overtime rather than
adjustments of oven speed within the limited flexibility of the
oven output rate. Since all other stations are usually geared to the
output rate of the oven, all machines or stations usually have a
rated capacity equal to, or greater than. that of the oven.
The life of equipment at the different stations of the line varies,
typically lasting 30 years or more without excessive maintenance
cost due to wear. Significant disparity between machine capacities
at stations develops through the process of replacement. Technical
advance that raises both output per man hour and output per hour
of operation does not occur simultaneously at stations. Replacement
of equipment at a given station, whether the available equipment
be more advanced technically or simply larger, poses a problem of
station excess capacity owing to piecemeal replacement of equipment in the normal course of events over a period of years. Under
these conditions much equipment is commonly operated at some
percent of its rated capacity. There are, however, some notable
exceptions to the tendency toward excess capacity within plant
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stations. Moulder-panners and slicer-wrappers, for examples, are
sometimes operated in multiples in large plants. Use of the large
oven and multiple machines at some stations allows closer matching
of station machine capacities and, hence, more efficiency within
station use of capital equipment.
The implications for line or plant excess capacity which stem
from the introduction of continuous mix into an existing plant
may be dramatic. A continuous mix machine replaces six of the
12 stations in the conventional bread line. Hence, with a given
oven, a continuous-mix machine of sufficient capacity to utilize
the oven fully will of necessity idle one-half of the existing production line, in the event that conventional equipment is not discarded.
In view of the apparent taste and texture difference between bread
made by conventional mix and bread made by continuous mix, a
firm is unlikely to adopt the latter process for its entire production.
Assuming that the changeover to continuous mix is only partial
(a realistic assumption particularly if the plant produces variety
goods as well as bread), either the continuous mix equipment or
the equivalent half of the conventional line will be idle at all times.
Cyclical Excess Capacity
The weekly cycle of consumers' grocery shopping habits in conjunction with the perishability of bread seems currently to necessitate a weekly cycle in bakery production schedules (Table 16). Thus,
plant capacity adequate to supply the peak demand for bakery
products on Saturday results in various lower levels of capacity
utilization during the week. The most extreme deviation in demand
occurs on Tuesday with an average demand output of 42 percent
less than on Friday. It should be kept in mind that this figure is
an arithmetic average for those plants that baked on Tuesday and
Friday. Moreover, although average plant output on Sunday most
closely approaches the weekly Friday peak level, it falls short of
that peak by 22 percent. Thus, a daily variation in aggregate weekly
production, or an index of daily variation, can be constructed. This
allows capacity to be defined in terms of the cycle and the aggregate
of weekly demand as they exist. The index of daily variation in
production (Table 16) is applied to the model bakery plants (Figure
2). The resulting estimated practical utilization of capacity at
rated hourly output is 108 hours per week, or approximately 75
percent of a full 144 hours per week (24 hours per day, 6 days per
week) of physical production capacity.
This type of cyclical excess capacity, or variation in daily output

TABLE 16
EmMATED DAILY VARIATION IN BREAD PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES OF WHOLESALE BAKERY PLANTS, UNITED SrATES, SECOND QUARTER, 1958
Index of
Daily
Variation-

Days

Daily
Houn of
Operation

2,000
Lb./Hr.

DAILY VOLUMES FOR HOURLY OUTPUTS OF
6,000
4,000
Lb./Hr.
Lb./Hr.

8,000
Lb./Hr.

"":l

~
~

;:::~

Percent

Hours

Pounds

Pounds

Pounds

Pounds

Sunday

77.7

18.7

37,296

59,052

111,888

149,184

Monday

74.1

17.8

35,568

56,316

106,704

142,272

Tuesdayb

57.7

13.8

27,696

43,852

83,088

110,784

~
~

Wednesday

67.7

16.2

32,496

51,452

97,488

129,984

~

ThurSday

70.5

16.9

33,840

53,580

101,520

135,360

~

100.0

24.0

48,000

76,000

144,000

192,000

~
ttl

74.6

107.4

214,848

340,176

644,544

859,392

Friday
Total or average

C

~
!;:)

~

~

~

• Index of daily variation constructed as follows: Based on actual daily operating rates of 20 plants located throughout the U.S. Average daily output
was greatest on Friday. assigned a value of 100, with other days assigned an index value as a percent of output on Friday. Since the range of variation between plants with respect to level of utilization of capacity within the week was large, from 0 to 113 percent of plant output on Friday, no statistical significance can be attributed to the index of averall'e daily variation presented in Table 16. Consultation with informed sources, however, suggest it is representative of the wholesale sell'ment of the industry for the range of plant sizes considered. It compares favorably with expenditures for bakery products by day
of the week in Fleischmann's Consumer Panel Report on Baked Food Purchases, 1955-57, Standard Brands, Inc. (New York, 1957).
b

Average for those plants that bake; five plants out of 20 closed down completely on Tuesday, and were not included in this average.
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~
c

~
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~
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rates within the week, is not generally subject to control within the
bakery industry. The opportunity for bakery management to control cyclical excess capacity varies depending upon: (I) the channel
of distribution, (2) the multiplicity of bakery products, (3) the size
of firm, and (4) the development of efficient freezer storage. With
respect to channel of distribution, control of the variation in daily
output rates is very limited. The home delivery channel has most
nearly approached uniform daily sales within the week, but home
delivery has declined rapidly during the postwar years. Distribution
to institutions and some kinds of restaurants often approaches uniform daily sales. However, such outlets usually take only a small
part of the total output from anyone bakery plant. By far the
largest segment of the industry distributes wholesale to grocery
stores and the daily variation in output is controlled largely by
the weekly cycle of consumer grocery purchasing.
So much for within the baking industry proper. Grocery chains,
integrated into the industry, have some opportunity for levelling
out their bakery plant production because they are in complete
control of retail shelf space. Production in the grocery chain bakery
plant can be scheduled at a level below average weekly store sales,
allowing wholesalers to fill in on peak demand days. This can be
done by grocery chains that sell 80 to 90 percent of their private
label bread and allow two or three wholesale bakers a small amount
of shelf space throughout the week. As the grocery chain brand runs
short on peak selling days, more wholesale bread can be brought
from the stock room or two to three daily deliveries can be
required of wholesale driver salesmen. As expected, wholesale bakeries distributing to grocery chains that control shelf space in this
manner tend to have greater variation in daily output within the
week. Wholesale plants distributing more than 5 percent but less
than 20 percent of their weekly output to stores of grocery chains
tend to have more plant output variation than either those selling
less than 5 percent or more than 20 percent to grocery chains. In
fact, some wholesale plants with more than 20 percent of their distribution through grocery chains close down their operations on
Tuesday as a result of low grocery chain sales on Wednesday.
There is a tendency for plants producing primarily bread and
bread type rolls to have somewhat larger variation in daily output
than plants producing a full line of breads, variety breads, sweet
goods, cakes and cookies. This is because cookies, and some cakes
and sweet goods, can be produced in the middle of the week on
days of low bread demand. Also, within-the-week cold storage has
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proved more practical for cakes and sweet goods than for bread
owing to their smaller volume-to-value ratio. The success of efforts
to control daily variation in production, through filling in with
variety goods, and thereby increasing plant efficiency depends upon:
(1) the ability of workers to shift from one function to another
within the same shift, and (2) the joint use of some equipment with
respect to diverse products.
There is a tendency for medium and large sized plants to have
a greater variation in daily output than small plants, which may be
related in part to the multiplicity of products discussed above.
There is some evidence also that multi-plant firms have experienced
more daily variation in demand than single-plant firms. As a result,
large multi-plant firms often can adjust production schedules of
various products between plants in order to schedule longer runs
at each plant. For example, a major multi-plant firm combines the
Kansas City and Omaha market area and produces a specialty bread
in one plant and rolls in the other, distributing both products to
both markets. The trans-shipment of products between markets to
improve plant utilization depends also upon plant locations and
transportation costs. Moreover, it may be that some medium and
large sized plants of multi-plant firms have greater variation in
daily output partly because through trans-shipment one of a group
of plants can be closed down completely on the lowest demand day.
Control of the weekly variation in output, decreasing the
attendant costs of excess plant capacity, is possible through the
use of freezer storage on a weekly cycle basis. Is Whether this method
of cost control decreases total per unit production cost depends upon
the cost of excess capacity maintained in order to meet the peak of
the weekly demand cycle vs. the cost of freezer operations necessary
to level out the cycle. For a medium sized model plant using automated-batch equipment and operating a six day week, freezing of
13. In addition to the decrease in production costs, marketing of frozen
bread would result in the elimination of the cost of stale returns and there
would be a substantial decrease in distribution costs. See Robert V. Enochian,
Marketing Frozen Bread: A Preliminary Report, AMS-395, Market Development
Research Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (August, 1960), p. 12. According to Enochian, " ... it has been estimated
that the net cost of unsold bread returned to the baker-wholesaler by the retailer
runs as high as 4.3 percent of the wholesale price valuation, or 2.1 percent of
cost .... In either case, the cost of stales ... would be entirely eliminated."
Also, under the assumption that bread could be marketed through frozen
food channels, Enochian estimated that distribution costs could be decreased
by two cents per pound from the current wholesale distribution costs (p. 5)
largely due to the drop shipment method of distribution utilized
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product hypothetically decreases production costs by approximately
0.675 of a cent per pound, and also increases weekly plant capacity
from 214,848 to 288,000 pounds (or 34 percent). This cost estimate
was obtained by subtracting 25 percent of the 0.5 cents per loaf
cost of freezing estimated by Enochian from the 0.8 cents per loaf
cost saving estimated from our model plant cost data. We estimated
25 percent of the 0.5 cents by Enochian because, only about 25
percent of a plant's weekly output would need to be frozen in order
to level out the weekly production cycle. For a large plant using
automated-batch equipment and operating a six day week, there is
no significant decrease in production costs due to freezing of product. Plant capacity, however, increased from 859,392 pounds per
week to 1,152,000 pounds per week (also 34 percent). Thus, for
large scale plants, the output increasing potential of within-the-week
frozen storage of product is more significant than its impact on unit
production costs. However, very little freezing to level out weekly
production cycles in wholesale baking currently occurs except in
the case of some specialty products of retail bakers.14
While a single plant or a single-plant firm may introduce excess
machine capacity at either the station or the plant level through
machinery replacement and adoption, a multi-plant firm has some
opportunity to limit this inefficiency. Among a number of plants
having a variety of lines with the attendant potential disparities of
station capacity, the multi-plant firm can make inter-plant equipment transfers so that station by station the equipment of a production line is roughly of the same capacity. This possibility depends
primarily, of course, upon the possibility of inter-plant demand
sharing within a market, or the trans-shipment of special products
between market areas. The advantage in the alleviation of excess
capacity of the multi-plant firms over the single-plant firms, with
demand remaining unchanged in both cases, may result from underutilizing the least efficient plant of the multi-plant firm. This would
give the multi-plant firm an advantage through greater economy
in variable costs-assuming that the multi-plant is able to idle old
equipment rather than under-utilize the newer equipment. A single
plant firm that has adopted some new equipment would probably
be using the old equipment at capacity while a multi-plant firm may
ship equipment between plants, or ship products between markets,
and use the old equipment at under-capacity while using the newer
equipment at closer to full capacity.
14. Ibid., p. 7.
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Secular Excess Capacity
It is important to develop a logical explanation for the existance of secular or long-run excess capacity in the bakery industry
and an empirical basis for analysis of its economic significance. The
primary basis for the development of secular excess capacity is found
in the nature of bakery equipment and its adoption; the proportion
of variable to fixed costs; the economic organization of bread
markets; and the relationship of consumer demand to population
growth. Plant capacity estimates and average total cost curves for
model plants provide an empirical basis for estimating the economic
significance of secular excess capacity in the industry (see Figure 2).
Postwar increases in distribution and selling costs resulted
in pressure on bakery management to seek out ways to reduce production costs. Since most individual bakery managers could not
achieve this result through variation in the amount and quality of
ingredients, or through an expanding volume of sales, the obvious
alternative was to seek reduction in the production wage bill. The
adoption of output-increasing labor-saving machinery occurred in
direct response to the economic goal of reducing variable costs by
a greater amount than the additional investment increased fixed
costs. Innovations that virtually doubled the capacity of nearly all
bread ovens in the nation induced bakery management to adopt
other pieces of machinery with capacities of approximately twice the
scale of the machines replaced. The cumulative result has been the
replacement of a sufficient amount of equipment, on the basis of
obsolescence rather than wear, to increase the aggregate capacity
of bread plants at a phenomenal rate in the postwar years.
By 1958, the best available evidence of plant utilization levels
for the bakery industry as a whole was approximately 40-60 percent
of practical capacity of durable production equipment. This assumes
capacity is an operation averaging 24 hours daily, 300 days per
year. 15 This level of secular excess capacity in the bakery industry
is an approximation based on the records of bakery machinery
manufacturers, testimony of informed industrial sources, and experience in 30 bakeries surveyed and/or observed by the authors.
A superior estimate of under-utilization of bread plants can be
15. Seasonal demand for bakery products would apparently justify excess
plant capacity of 3 percent currently and 6 percent if the industry were operated at capacity levels. The monthly Federal Reserve Board index of bakery
industry production divided by the average annual index, 1953-58, ranged from
a low of 96.5 percent in January to 102.4 in July. David A. Storey, Market
Performance in the Perishable Bakery Products Industry, Purdue University
Research Bulletin No. 734 (Lafayette: December, 1962), p. 30.
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made from Census and Senate subcommittee data. The reported
capacity of the 275 bread plants owned by the eight largest
wholesale baking companies combined with the reported capacity of the 83 bread plants owned by the largest eight integrated grocery chains together amounted to 12.2 billion pounds
in 1958 (see Table 4). This was almost sufficient to supply the 13
billion pounds of bread consumed in this country that year, based
on a per capita consumption estimate of 75 pounds of bread and
bread type rolls and a population of 175 million. In other words,
the 1958 bread output of the rest of the industry about equaled the
idle capacity of 358 bread plants operated by the largest eight wholesale baking companies combined with the largest eight integrated
grocery chain bakeries. There are 1,353 bakeries which are 90
percent or more specialized in the production of bread and bread
type rolls. About all of the 995 plants owned by smaller companies
than the above group could have been closed with no iII effects on
the industry's capacity to supply consumer demands for bread and
bread type rolls." On this basis, excess number of plants is estimated
at 74 percent, and excess plant capacity is estimated at 60 percent.
This understates the excess capacity of bread plants, because it
includes only those plants specialized 90 percent or more in the
production of bread and bread type rolls. There are in addition
383 plants specialized 75-89 percent in the production of bread and
bread type rolls, 729 plants specialized 51-74 percent in the production of bread and bread type rolls, and an unknown number of
plants classified primarily in the production of sweet goods, cakes,
pies, etc., that also produce bread and bread type rolls.
The economic significance of secular excess capacity in terms
of production cost may be estimated by considering the per unit
costs of bread production at various levels of model plant utilization. Cost differentials between capacity operation and various levels
of under-capacity utilization are sizable for each of the four model
plant sizes considered. Per unit costs decline at a decreasing rate
with each increase in the level of plant utilization until practical
physical capacity is reached. Thereafter, per unit costs increase
sharply. To determine the magnitude of this relationship the rate
of plant utilization is varied from 108 hours per week to 36 hours
• This is not stated as a recommendation that these plants should be
dosed. Possible increase in delivery costs due to poor location of the remaining
plants is not considered here. This is merely an illustration of long-run excess
plant capacity in the industry. Possible reorganization of the industry to resolve
the excess-capacity problem will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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per week under typical conditions which include daily variation
in demand, no freezer storage of product, and the use of standard
automated-batch bakery equipment. For the small plant, per unit
costs increase from 9.1 cents per pound for a 108 hour week to
11.7 cents per pound for a 36 hour week, or an increase of 2.6 cents
(29 percent) for the range of utilization rates considered. For the
large model plant, per unit costs increase from 7.7 cents per pound
for a 108 hour week to 9.1 cents per pound for a 36 hour week, or
an increase of 1.4 cents (18 percent) per pound.
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Costs of Bread Distribution

Thus far the analysis of bakery technology and costs has been
limited to the production process. We shall now examine distribution and selling costs to complete the foundation for the analysis
of industrial performance.

Economic Functions

ill

Bread Distribution

Although bread must be distributed and sold much the same as
any other food product, its perishability, bulk, and inelasticity of
demand create unique selling and distribution problems. Thus, a
brief discussion of the various functions l involved in moving bread
to the point of retail purchase may help to reveal the route distribution cost structure. The fairly distinct functions making up selling
and distribution are: transportation, bearing the risk of product
deterioration, display servicing, record keeping and collection of
payment, and information and advertising.
Bread is transported from the bakery to retail outlets (or in
the case of home delivery, to the consumer) in large part by truck
and to some extent by rail. Truck transport by large semi-trailers
from the plant to the grocery chain dock has been on the increase
but much of the industry's output still moves via smaller trucks
to grocery stores. Time is the over-riding consideration in all delivery
service because of the demand for fresh bread. Also, handling in
transit must avoid crushing and damage to the wrapper. Another
important distribution cost is risk of product deterioration. The
unpredictability of through-the-week cyclical demand, combined
with the perishability of bread, results in some loss in value through
deterioration. Hence, wholesale price less salvage value of stales
is a significant risk that must be borne at some point as a function
of the distribution system. Daily servicing of bread racks and display
1. A more definitive discussion of the functions performed by the various
distribution channels can be found in Slater, op. cit., Chapter 5.
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in retail outlets is performed by either the driver-salesmen or
in-store labor. The consumer's desire for fresh bread and the
perishability of the product make daily deliveries imperative; these
necessitate a complete reorganization of the bread rack every day.
In some cases the bread rack is attended throughout the day and in
all cases stale items are either returned to the plant or marked
down in price for in-store disposal. Record keeping and collection
of payment are another important distribution cost. With daily
delivery and the resulting typically small dollar volume delivery
relative to grocery items in general, the labor time necessary for
record keeping and collection of payment is significant on a per unit
basis. Thus, although record keeping and collection are required
just as much for other products as for bread, volume deliveries and
end-of-month billing have greatly increased distribution efficiency
for many other products, an opportunity that has been largely
ignored in the case of bread distribution. The function of information and advertising is much the same as with food products in
general. There are, however, limits to the utility of bread advertising in the aggregate owing to the product's homogeneity and its
inelasticity of demand.

Nature of Distribution and Selling Costs
The functions listed above can be further broken down into
cost elements. Our discussion of distribution and selling costs will
be limited to these cost factors that affect the economics of bread
distribution. The costs of some of the above functions are joint
costs while others are but a fraction of the total cost associated with
a particular distribution function. Driver-salesman compensation,
for example, is allocated jointly among driving, delivery, display
servicing, and record keeping. Vehicle expense, on the other hand,
is only part of the total cost of the transportation function. These
examples illustrate the problems encountered in the analysis. Many
of the costs are separable by accounting records while others require
detailed labor-time studies. This investigation will draw from both
accounting records and labor-time studies from secondary sources.
Delivc:)ry vehicle expense consists primarily of gasoline, oil,
grease, repairs, tires, and depreciation. These include both fixed
and variable costs. Thus, total vehicle cost directly affects route
efficiency. It is fixed with respect to size of drop, varies with length
of route, and varies to some extent with aggergate sales per week.
Driver compensation cost may be a straight hourly truck driver
wage or a guaranteed minimum per week plus commission on all
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sales with higher commission on the increases in dollar volume
above given levels. Thus driver compensation costs mayor may not
vary with volume per route-week depending upon the channel of
distribution and union-management wage agreements. Also, driver
compensation mayor may not vary with size of drop and length of
route largely for the same reasons.
Sales supervision, salaries, and expenses of the plant or firm
are not directly incurred on the route. Consequently, their cost level
is associated primarily with the number of routes and turnover in
route delivery labor rather than per week route volume, size of drop,
or length of route. Indirect selling costs, such as sales management
salaries and expenses and also shipping clerk wages, are a part of
general overhead costs of a firm. This type of cost varies, therefore,
with the general policies of a firm and between the segments of the
industry. However, these costs are fixed for a given route with
respect to volume per route-week, size of drop, and length of route.
Advertising costs are fixed with respect to a route and vary
with the nature and composition of a given market as well as
between the segments of the industry. Thus, the per loaf advertising
cost decreases with an increase in route volume and with the level
of output in a given plant. There are minor variations in the intensity of advertising market by market. Of major significance, however, is the fact that advertising costs vary between industry segments
or channels of distribution, with the largest cost differential existing between the wholesale baking group on the one hand and the
integrated grocery chain and private label bakers on the other.
Discounts and allowances are costs closely associated with the com-position of a given market and the relative competitive position of
a firm. Allowances may vary between firms or channels of distribution and usually are variable with respect to volume per route-week.
Display servicing costs are either: (I) a part of driver-salesman compensation and hence, fixed per loaf regardless of volume per route,
size of drop, or length of route, or (2) an in-store labor cost fixed
irrespective of volume per route-week, size of drop, or length of
route. Thus, display servicing costs can be expected to vary with
the method of distribution and with size of delivery.

Changes in Relative Importance of Cost Factors
in Wholesale Bread Distribution and Selling
This section introduces the element of change into the discussion of factor costs of bread distribution. This is an important
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consideration because: (1) prices paid by consumers for bread are
affected by changes in the costs of wholesale bread distribution
(distribution costs increased faster than production costs in the
postwar years and by 1958 accounted for more than half of the
consumer bread dollar); and, (2) changes in specific factor costs have
played an important role in shaping the organization and practices
of the industry. Essentially, they reflect changes in scale of operations, in services rendered, and in merchandising practices employed.
This section deals with the distribution costs of bread moving
through the bakery wholesale channel only, which has been the
predominant method of bread distribution in the postwar years.
Omitted in this discussion are retail and home service bakery distribution as well as integrated grocery chain bakery and private
label dock delivery operations.
In 1947, approximately 25 cents of the consumer's bread dollar
was paid for wholesale distribution, or three cents per pound of
wholesale bakery bread sold through retail stores. This compares
with a total distribution margin for bread from the bakery plant
to the consumer of about 40 cents of the consumer's bread dollar
or five cents per retail pound of bread. By 1958, the share of the
consumer's bread dollar paid for wholesale distribution had
increased to 35 cents or about seven cents per pound of wholesale
bakery bread sold through retail stores. The total distribution margin for bread from the bakery door to the consumer increased to
more than half of the consumer's bread dollar or to approximately
ten cents per retail pound of wholesaler's bread sold. Thus, from
1947 to 1958, an estimated 3.7 cents, or 55 percent, of the 6.8 cent
increase in the retail price of a one-pound loaf of bread went for
wholesale distribution and selling services, while only 1.2 cents, or
approximately one-fifth went for retail grocery services. In total,
distribution cost increases accounted for approximately 72 percent
of the bread price increase for this period, compared with 1.9 cents,
or 28 percent, of the increase going for bakery production and
administrative overhead.
Table 17 gives the estimated changes in relative importance of
specific factor costs in wholesale bread distribution. Driver compensation is the main rising cost contributing to the increase in
the average retail price of bread in the postwar years. While it is
evident from the table that all distribution costs have increased
faster than has the average retail price of bread, increased delivery
wages accounted for about one-third of the total postwar increase
in wholesale distribution costs or margins.
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Part of the increase in per unit costs of driver compensation
reflects increased fringe benefits, higher commission rates, and minimum guarantees won by the Teamsters Union. Average weekly
earnings of bread salesmen increased by about 50 percent from $94
in 1947 to about $140 in 1958, but this represents only 0.6 cents2
of the 1.6 cent increase in the average cost of driver-salesman compensation and fringe benefits per pound of bread sold (1.4 cents in
1947 and 3.0 cents in 1958 as shown in Table 17). Even more
important, from an efficiency standpoint, is the fact that volume of
bread delivered per wholesale route and per wholesale route driver
has decreased in the postwar years. Slater3 reported that while the
TABLE 17
ESTIMATED AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION AND SELLING COSTS OF THE WHOLESALE AND
RETAIL FUNCTIONS, BREAD, UNITED STATES, 1947 AND 1958

Functions

Average Costs per Pound
of Net Sales'
1947
1958

Cents

Percent

Percent

1.4

3.0

11.2

15.5

.24

.5

1.9

2.6

.26

.5

2.1

2.6

.4
.6
.2

1.0
1.0
.8

3.2
4.8
1.6

5.2
5.2
4.1

3.l
1.9

6.8
3.1

24.8
15.2

35.2
16.1

5.0

9.9

40.0

51.3

Cents

Driver compensation
and fringe benefits
Sales supervision salaries
and expenses
Shipping clerk salaries and
miscellaneous expenses
Advertising, discounts and
allowances
Delivery vehicle eXfvenses
Stale returns less sa vage
Total, wholesaling·
Total, retailing"
Total, wholesaling and
retailing

Percentage of Retail
Priceb
1958

1947

• One pound loaf of white bread.
b Based on average retail prices published by Bureau of Labor Statistics of 12.5 cents per
pound in 1947 and 19.3 cents per pound in 1958.
• Bakery wholesaling cost items are estimates derived from route cost summaries of medium
to large sized bakeries. Hearing>, op. cit., pp. 6055. 6079--6085, 6579--6581, 658lHi594. Also see
Table 29 for a comparison of these sources.
d Spread between average retail and wholesale prices in urban areas published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and appears in Richard H. Long and V. John Brensike, "Market·
ing Margins for White Bread," The Marketing and Transportation Situation (July, 1958).
p. 18; and Developments in Marketing Spreads for Agricultural Production 1958, Agricul·
tural Marketing Service Repon No. 316, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, D.C.,
1959). p. 11.

2. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. Calculation for 1947 based on reported average
weekly bread route volume sold of 6,746 pounds. Calculation for 1958 based on
the same route volume as 1947 to eliminate the effect of an actual decline in
average route volume to 4.714 pounds by 1958.
3. Slater. op. cit., pp. 352-354. Slater reported that by 1954 average volume
per route declined to 72 percent of the 1945 level. His analysis was based on
distribution data supplied by 12 large interstate baking companies on several
thousand routes from 37 wholesale bread plants located through the U.S.
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historic pattern in average volume (pounds) of bread handled per
route increased from 1935 to a peak in 1945, there has been a downward trend since then. By 1958, average volume per route declined
to 70 percent of the 1947 level.4 Also, the conversion to a five-day
work week in 1951 in many bakery markets, while bread continued
to be delivered six days, resulted in the addition to the distribution
payroll of a "swing man," working one day a week on each of five
routes. Thus, the driver-salesman wage share was increased and
divided among a larger number of delivery personnel while route
volume continued to decline. Comparison of non-production labor
input and output in the baking industry with the dairy, meat,
canned and frozen foods, sugar, and grain mill products industries
reveals that, from 1947 to 1957, baking was the only industry in
which output per non-production employee and man-hour decreased
during this period. 5
The second most important increase among distribution costs
occurred in product deterioration commonly referred to as "stale
returns." Stale returns less salvage value represented about onefourth of the total percentage increase in the wholesale distribution
margin. Product deterioration is, in part, a production cost resulting from management's inability to predict daily sales, but it also
reflects a shift to the selling expense of excessively large displays. The
third most important increase in distribution costs occurred in
advertising, discounts, and alllowances. These selling and product
promotion expenses accounted for about one-fifth of the increase
in distribution costs between the two base years. To a large extent,
advertising costs have resulted from intensified efforts to differentiate the branded bread product, while discounts and allowances
are a payment to the grocer for the right to attract the consumer
with grocery shelf display in an increasing struggle for share of
markets. Postwar increases in sales supervision, shipping clerk, and
miscellaneous distribution salaries and expenses only slightly
exceeded percentage bread price increases, as did delivery vehicle
expenses. Aggregated, these factors accounted for only 1.2 cents of the
10.4 cents increase in the share of the consumer's bread dollar going
for wholesale distribution and selling expenses.

Route Factor Relationship and Distribution Efficiency
This analysis of wholesale bread distribution costs will help
us to compare the various channels of bread distribution, and also to

op. cit., p. 6084.
op. cit., p. 19.

4. Hearings,
5. Bright,
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analyze market behavior. As will be shown, efficiency in wholesale
bread distribution is primarily a function of volume per route-week,
volume per delivery, and length of route. The principal per unit
cost factors conditioned by these variables are driver-salesman labor
and vehicle operating expenses.
Volume Per Route-Week
To develop relationships between route cost factors and efficiency
in wholesale bread distribution, data were obtained on 490 routes,
and the effect of route volume on per unit cost was estimated.
Typical operating conditions and 1959 cost-price relationships were
assumed. How costs varied with size of route is shown in Figure 3.
Three characteristics of this relationship are particularly significant.
First, an increase in the size of wholesale bread routes from $450
to $1,500 sales per week was associated with a decline of approximately 5.5 cents per pound in route costs, excluding advertising
and other non-route costs of distribution and selling. Second, unit
costs declined with each increase in route sales, but at a decreasing
rate. A 100 percent increase in size of wholesale bread routes (from
$450 to $900 per week) was associated with a 50 percent decline
in cost per pound, whereas, the second $450 increase (from $900 to
$1,350 per week) was accompanied by a 25 percent decline; thereafter, the unit cost declines by 16 percent for the maximum size
route considered. Unit cost might continue to decline for route
volumes in excess of $1,600 per week, but would soon level off
and conceivably increase.
Third, the way factor costs vary with changes in weekly sales
is significant. The cost that declined the most, 3.8 cents per pound,
over the range of volumes considered, was driver compensation.
This was due largely to the fact that most driver-salesmen were
employed under contracts specifying a guaranteed minimum wage
per week and a base pay plus commission on sales above a given
level. See the appendix for an example of Teamsters Union contract specifications. A significant proportion of driver-salesman cost
was fixed for the lower route volumes while the proportion of variable cost became more significant for the higher volumes. Vehicle
operating expenses declined by a lesser amount, 1.7 cents per pound.
This is associated with the allocation of fixed vehicle expenses over
increased unit sales, but it is also related to the lower mileage
traveled on the higher volume routes. The latter aspect of route
factor costs will be considered in a subsequent section. Another
important factor, not shown in Figure 3, the variation of non-route
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FIG. !I.-The effect of volume on per unit cost of truck and driver-salesman,
wholesale bread routes, 1959.

costs of distribution and selling-such as advertising, discounts and
allowances, sales supervision salaries and expenses, and shipping
clerk wages-are largely fixed per route-week. If added to the route
cost curve, they would have a marked effect in increasing its vertical slant.

Volume per Delivery
Data made available by the Economics of Distribution Founda-
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tion illustrate how labor efficiency varies with volume per delivery.6
Loscher made route labor-time observations from which the effect
of volume per delivery on labor efficiency can be estimated. She
found that large volume stops were more efficiently served than
small volume stops. Labor efficiency in terms of units delivered per
minute increased with each increase in sales per delivery but at a
decreasing rate. The first 100 percent increase in size of drop from
$1 to $2 was associated with a 45 percent increase in labor efficiency;
the second 100 percent increase from $2 to $4 was accompanied by
a 33 percent increase in efficiency; the third 100 percent increase
from $4 to $8 resulted in a 20 percent increase in labor efficiency;
the fourth 100 percent increase from $8 to $16 was accompanied by
a 13 percent increase in labor efficiency; thereafter increases in
volume per delivery observed up to approximately $28 were accompanied by practically no change in labor efficiency.
The average percentage of delivery time spent by driver-salesmen in record keeping declined from about 50 percent to 20 percent
from the smallest to largest delivery volume considered. Labor time
devoted to physical handling of merchandise increased from 50
percent to about 80 percent of total delivery time over the same
range of delivery volumes, reflecting primarily an increase in average percent of delivery time spent in performance of the display
function from 20 to 50 percent.
Thus, it was observed that the record-keeping function became
increasingly efficient over the range of delivery volumes considered,
that delivery efficiency increased with size of drop, and then stabilized at the highest volume observed. Efficiency in rearranging
goods on the display shelf increased sharply from the lower to
medium range of volumes delivered but declined slightly for the
larger drops. These relationships are the closest approximations
that can be made from the available information which is illustra-

6. Elan M. Loscher, An Analysis of the Job of Driver-Salesman, report submitted to the Economics of Distribution Foundation, Inc. (New York: October 17,
1956), p. 6. Of particular relevance here is a case study of a typical New York
City bread route which in August, 1956, experienced the following daily sales:
Sales per Stop
Number of Stops
Less than $1.00
6
$1.00 to $2.99
19
$3.00 to $7.99
15
$8.00 to $1l.99
3
Over $12.00
4
Total daily deliveries
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tive of the general tendencies stated. 7 Studies of milk delivery by
Clarke and Bressler provide ready examples of comprehensive distribution analysis based on a large number of observations of route
cost and volume relationships. Although the basis for analysis here
is less extensive than that of the Clarke and Bressler studies, the
logical implications for economies of route delivery are very much
the same.
Length of Route
The remaining relationship to be considered with respect to
the influence of route factors on wholesale bread distribution is how
efficiency may be affected by changes in length of route. Two characteristics of this relationship are of major importance. First~ truck
operating expenses, owing to a high proportion of variable costs,
are largely a function of number of miles driven. s Thus, when
route mileage per week is allowed to vary from 200 miles (a city
route) to 500 miles (a suburban route) to 1;000 miles (a rural route),
with route sales per week held constant at 5,000 pounds, vehicle costs
per pound increase from 0.61 cents for the city route to 1.04 cents
for the suburban route to 1.75 cents for the rural route. Rising
vehicle cost per pound delivered associated with increased length
of route has implications for inefficiencies due to cross hauling and
the location of bread plants. Hence, geographic expansion of wholesale bread routes will increase the total cost of bread distribution
unless route volume can be increased at a rate sufficient to offset
the rise (see Figure 3).
Second, variation in the length of wholesale bread routes
results in changes in driving time which, in turn, affect the amount
of labor time available for servicing stores. Driver-salesman time
is allocated primarily between the driving and servicing functions,
exclusive of approximately 20 percent of labor time per week for
loading and unloading merchandise at the plant, turning in receipts
and the next day's order, and personal break time on the route. If
7. See D. A. Clarke, Jr., Milk Delivery Costs and Volume Pricing Procedures in
California, California Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 757 (Berkeley,
December, 1956); and R. G. Bressler, Jr., City Milk Distribution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952).
8. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084. These figures are averages for several thousand
wholesale bread routes throughout the U.S.
TRUCK EXPENSES (PER 100 MILES)
1947 National 1958 National
Total variable expenses
6.90
$7.19
3.87
Total fixed expenses
2.00
402
436
Average size of routes
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length of route is allowed to vary, as in the example above, weekly
driving time increases from approximately 10 hours for the city
route to 16.6 hours for the suburban route to 20 hours for the
rural route.
The amount of labor time spent in driving the delivery truck
depends on the distance to be traveled and the rate of speed
maintained. Speed, in turn, depends on such factors as traffic and
road conditions. Obviously, rural routes with some driving on high
speed highways achieve less driving time per mile than routes operating on congested city streets.
Thus, in the calculation here, driver time for the city route is
based on a speed of 20 miles per hour as roughly representative of
city conditions, while for the suburban route it is based on 30 miles
per hour, and the rural route on an average speed of 50 miles per
hour. If labor time is held constant at 50 hours per week, then the
time available for servicing stores declines from approximately 30
hours for the city route to 23.4 hours for the suburban route to 20
hours for the rural route.
Hence, where average delivery time per customer is uniform
for the three routes considered, the decline in total delivery time
available would result in 22 percent fewer customers being served
by the suburban route compared with the city route and 33 percent
fewer customers served by the rural route compared with the
city route. Also, under the same conditions, route sales per week
would decline by similar proportions.
Wholesale bread firms are to some degree able to avoid the
effects of the required additional labor time for servicing stores
that is associated with longer routes by off-loading the problem
onto labor. This stems from the driver-salesman commission system
of compensation in which delivery labor cost is a function of weekly
sales volume and has little relation to the number of hours worked.
In actual operations observed, driver-salesmen with longer routes
tend to work longer hours. Thus, if length of route is allowed to vary
as in the example above, while the amount of time for servicing
stores is held constant at 30 hours, the driver of the city route works
50 hours per week, the driver of the suburban route 56.6 hours
per week, and the driver of the rural route 60 hours per week. Therefore, despite a 20 percent increase in hours of work, and under the
assumption that both routes have the same weekly sales, the rural
route driver receives the same compensation as the city route driver.
To sum up, the efficiency of wholesale route delivery is largely a
function of driver-salesman labor and delivery truck costs as they
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are related to economies of volume per route, volume per delivery,
and length of route. Driver-salesman labor efficiency increases with
both increases in volume per route and volume per delivery and,
to a lesser extent, with decreases in route length. Truck operation
efficiency by contrast is most closely associated with length and
volume of route and is affected by size of drop only to the extent
that size of drop is a function of route length and volume. In
conclusion, there is an empirical basis for believing that distribution
and selling costs will vary within and between channels of distribution according to route factor utilization and the extent of services performed.

Costs of Bread Distribution by Alternative Methods
To the extent that the changing structure of the bakery industry
is associated with changes in the competitive relationships between
segments of the bread market, comparison of the cost of alternative
distribution methods becomes of major importance. The comparisons presented as Table 18 may be used to estimate the relative
efficiency of different distribution methods. Average total costs of
bread distribution exhibit considerable variation between the three
primary methods used by the industry. It must be recognized, however, that variation in average costs reflects different marketing
functions performed and the size composition of route customers,
as well as different efficiencies of the alternative distribution systems.
In 1959, a sample of typical wholesale bakeries utilizing the driversalesman system of distribution experienced an average cost of
6.8 cents per pound of bread delivered primarily to retail stores,
while a sample of typical chain store owned bakeries and private
label wholesalers using a semi-trailer dock delivery system had average distribution costs one-fourth as great, or about 1.5 cents per
pound of bread delivered to retail stores. This compares with an
average distribution cost of 14.7 cents per pound of bread delivered
direct to the customer's door by a small sample of home service
bakeries utilizing the driver-salesman system.
The major difference between costs of wholesale and home service bread distribution occurs in direct and indirect route labor.
These costs are higher for home delivery, reflecting primarily the
differences in bread volume handled per stop and per week. Practically all bread sold through home delivery is in lots valued at
less than 50 cents, requiring an average of about four minutes per
delivery. Thus, for a 50-hour week, route volume is limited to about
$375 which, in turn, limits driver compensation to about $77. As
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a result, the turnover in driver-salesmen is high, leading to higher
supervisory and training expenses. Home delivery, on the other
hand, avoids the retail grocery margin which averaged 3.1 cents per
pound in 1958. The net result is an estimated difference in total
cost of about 5.8 cents per pound for home delivery above that for
wholesale bread distribution.
TABLE 18
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION COSTS PER POUND OF BREAD PRODUCTS SOLD, BY DISTRIBUTION
CHANNEL, UNITED STATES,

Item

1959
House-to-House
Driver-Salesman
Routes·

Cents

Distribution costs, total
14.7
Delivery vehicle expenses
1.2
Driver compensation
8.0
Sales supervIsion salaries,
3.0
expenses
Other distribution costs
2.5
Advertising
0.5
Stale return loss
Shipping clerk salaries,
expenses
Indirect selling salaries,
expenses, stale returns 2.0

Wholesale
Driver-Salesman
Routesb

Semi-Trailer
Dock Delivery
Routes C

Cents

Cents

6.8
1.0
3.0

1.5
0.7
0.3

0.5
2.3
1.0
0.8

0.0
0.5
(d)

0.5

a Driver compensation and delivery vehicle expenses are a median of five house-ta-house
routes in a lar~e Midwest market, 1959; advertising, supervisory and indirect salaries and expenses are estimates based on Clayton D. Nielson, "An Analysis of the Door-to-Door SeIling
Methods of Omar, Inc. for the Period 1951, 1952 and 1953," Master of Business Administration thesis, University of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1954). For example, sales supervision salaries
and expenses includes: junior salesman, 2 percent; supervisor, 2.6 percent; and route admin . .
istration, 6.2 percent; for a total of 10.8 percent of sales valued at 24 cents per pound.
b These cost items are typical based on averalle data from: (I) 490 wholesale routes and
(2) route cost summaries of 122 medium to larlle sized bakeries supplied by a national association of bakers. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6084.
C These items are estimates of typical semi-trailer dock delivery operations of chain store
bakeries and supermarket private label operations of Wholesale bakers in large Midwestern
markets, and are reasonably consistent with other data available. A chain store bread distribution cost study by the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly reported
costs of one cent per pound for delivery labor and truck expenses, which is the same as our
estimates. The Senate study reported chain bread advertisinll costs of about 0.08 cents pel
pound, but did not report display servicinll costs. Report, op. cit., p. 113.
d Whatever costs are incurred from the discount and instore sale of day-old products are
allocated as a cost of retailinll and compensated out of retail store margins.

The major difference between the costs of wholesale and private
label bread distribution reflects the different combinations of services performed and the resulting level of efficiency of labor utilization. Practically all bread sold at wholesale in the United States is
tied to a "service package" that includes in-store and media advertising, delivery and display handling, point of sale payment, and
assumption of the risk of value loss through overstocking.
Most private label bread, on the other hand, is delivered by semitrailer to grocery docks or warehouses from which point grocery
management controls the remaining distribution functions. It is
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handled and displayed by in-store workers, and when overstocked
may be featured as a "special" within the store at marked-down
prices. It is advertised jointly with 50 or more other food products.
It is often ordered and paid for by mail through a general accounting system.
The net result is an estimated total cost of more than five cents
per pound more for wholesale than for private label bread distribution. The implication is that organizing labor by function rather
than by product, especially in large volume super markets, results
in more efficient labor utilization.
It is important to note that differences between the costs of
wholesale and private label bread distribution reflect, in part,
different size compositions of route customers served. Wholesale
delivery labor requirements are higher because of the time required
to provide the "service package" to a combination of: (1) a large
number of small outlets such as small grocery stores, gasoline stations, drug stores, and dime stores, (2) supermarkets and grocery
chains that carry 6-8 brands of bread on their shelves in addition
to a private label brand that dominates total bread sales, and (3)
a few medium-large outlets such as independent supermarkets where
the wholesale brand may dominate total bread display and sales.
While, in general, private label distribution has a cost advantage
over wholesale distribution, the combination of both systems in one
retail outlet may increase distribution cost above either system
operating alone. Given that wholesale bakers operate on a relatively steep average distribution cost curve, the replacement of a
part of their sales in a particular retail outlet by private label
bread would significantly increase wholesale distribution costs. Private label delivery, on the other hand, operating on a relatively
flatter average cost curve, may not lower its distribution cost enough
to offset the increased cost experienced by wholesale bakers supplying the same retail outlet. Thus, for a significant range of
volumes, the combination of the two distribution systems in one
retail outlet may prove more costly than either system alone. Moreover, in an outlet handling both private label and wholesale brands,
the wholesale brands may also bear the production and distribution
costs inherent in the weekly cycle of demand for bread discussed in
Chapter 3, thereby subsidizing the decrease in costs for the private
label operation. As above, the decrease in average cost per loaf for
private label bread would probably not be sufficient to offset the
increased costs experienced by the aggregate of wholesale brands.

5 /

Price and Nonprice Conduct
of Firms in Bread Markets

Since retail prices of bread have risen much faster in the past
decade than those of other foods and indeed of all consumer products,! there is good reason to consider the conduct of firms in bread
markets to see how it may have contributed to this development.

Price Leadership in Large City Wholesale Markets
Price leadership is the generally accepted practice in largecity wholesale bread markets in the post World War II years.
Executives of large wholesale baking companies freely testify to
its prevalence. Company replies to a U.S. Senate investigation questionnaire regarding 1952-58 bread price changes in selected largecity markets demonstrate its ubiquity. Uniform prices for wholesaler brands are achieved by the leadership of either dominant or
cost barometric firms. Price leadership tends to have results analogous to those of collusive price fixing, which is infrequently discovered in bread pricing. Moreover, it is generally acceptable in
the eyes of the law, whereas collusive price fixing has been held
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2
Price leadership can be inferred from the repeated occurrence
of virtually simultaneous price increases of equal magnitude. For
example, between 1953 and 1958, bread producers in Seattle, Washington, including two large companies, Continental and Langendorf,
raised their prices simultaneously on five separate occasions. 3 In
New York City, on February II, 1957, the large companies, General,
Ward, and Continental, raised their prices simultaneously. In
1. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Agriculture presented in Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6093 If.
2. Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 302.
3. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6123.

82

Price and Nonprice Conduct of Firms in Bread Markets

/

83

Detroit, Michigan, in 1954 and again in 1956, wholesale baking
companies including Continental and Ward raised their prices
effective the same day. In San Francisco, on June 11, 1956,
Continental raised the price of white bread and on August 13,
1956, Langendorf and Campbell Taggard raised their price to
approximately the same level as Continental. Again, on June 12,
1958, Langendorf raised the price of a one-pound loaf from 17.8
to 18.8 cents, followed the next day by Continental and Campbell
Taggart.'
Over the six year period from 1952-58, there were a total of 80
price changes in 24 cities surveyed by a Senate subcommitte, and
in only three instances did the large baking companies reduce prices
of their principal brands of bread. 5 In virtually every instance of
change, all large baking companies adjusted their prices to the
same level within four days of an increase by a price leader. The
president of a large wholesale baking company testified at the Senate
hearings that "we cannot get a penny more than our major competitors."6 By and large, price competition occurs infrequently in
large city markets and then often only under duress. A director of
a large management affiliation of independent baking companies
and a Massachusetts bakery operator testified before the Senate subcommittee that bakery firms try not to compete on price. 7 But this
does not result in a uniform price for all bread sold in a given market
owing to the increase in private label and secondary brands,
although these also tend to sell at uniform though somewhat
lower prices.
Firms generally accept price leadership on the basis of an
"identity of interest" in maintaining returns on investment and
market shares rather than with the view of joint profit maximization. In wholesale bread markets, sellers typically are few, but they
differ in size, and they face the possibility of private label expansion by grocery chains in markets with essentially static demand.
Under these conditions, firms tend to practice uniform pricing
and distribution costs tend to rise owing to non price competition
for market shares. Members of the wholesale bakery oligopoly
group recognize their mutual identity of interest and accept price
leadership which results in periodic adjustment of price to cover

4.
5.
6.
7.

Ibid., p. 6118.
Report, op. cit., pp. I4~147.
Hearings, op. cit., p. 6120.
Ibid., p. 6540.
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increasing costs and to achieve profit goals. In the vernacular of
the trade, price followers raise price "to meet competition."8
Thus, in the typical large city market, a price leadership pattern
has emerged. The price at which most of the firms in the market
offer to sell bread of like quality and weight is determined by
adopting the price announced by one of their number.9 The role
of price leader may rotate among the few but usually falls to the
larger firms in the market. Smaller rivals generally follow for one
of two reasons. First, they consider the larger companies better
equipped to assess full costs and to frame a satisfactory price policy
for the entire market group. Usually changes in average input
prices occur simultaneously for all companies in the area, and the
barometric price leader is thought to be watching weekly cost
changes, both his own and those of his competitors. lO Second,
dominant firm price leaders are followed because they are recognized as having the greatest interest in preventing price cutting
8. Although the phrase "to meet competition" is used by the " ... major
baking companies [to] explain such practices as price discrimination, secret discounts, stales clobbering," etc., it is " ... something more than a convenient
explanation to offer persons outside the industry. Rather, it is so deeply ingrained
in the industry's own price-making philosophy and operation that it is frequently found in the interoffice working documents upon which decisions to
change bread prices are based." It is most frequently used in connection with the
justification of price increases. The following quote is illustrative: Memorandum
from the Chicago regional office to the president of Continental Baking Co.,
dated February 23, 1959, "This is to advise that Interstate Baking Co. made
the following changes in the wholesale prices of their bread products this morning.••• I recommend on our following bread products we meet this competitive
increase . ..." [italics added] Report, op. cit., p. 148.
9. For a discussion of this definition of price leadership, see Arthur F. Burns,
The Decline of Competition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), pp. 7&-77.
10. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6124. This analysis treats all baking companies as
separate entities. A number of large wholesale companies have interlocking directorates with each other and with potential suppliers of bakery inputs. An F.T.C.
study of interlocking directors among the 1,000 largest manufacturing companies
in the U.S. showed that Continental, General, American, Interstate, and Ward
had direct or indirect ties with each other and/or with several suppliers of bakery
inputs. For example, Continental interlocked with General through Marine Midland Trust, with General Foods, National Biscuit, Standard Oil, and American
Sugar Refining; and, with Swift (which produces shortening) through Underwood,
and with Wilson (also produces cooking oil) through Guarantee Trust. General
Baking Co. interlocked directly with National Sugar Refining and indirectly with
National Dairy, American Sugar Refining, Anheuser-Busch, General Mills, and
Best Foods. These ties provide channels for a meeting of minds among the
top companies in the baking industry and with suppliers. It was reported that
interlocking directorates were much more numerous than similar relations in any
of the branches of the food industry previously studied. Federal Trade Commission, Interlocking Directorates (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1951), pp. 64-711.
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and they are the most able to enforce their policies upon others
because they often command the greatest amount of productive
capacity and financial resources.
Price leadership, then, involves the selection of a price by a
leader as opposed to the case in a purely competitive market where
price would be determined by independent market forces. It is
imperative that the price level be satisfactory to all members of the
oligopoly group in order to forestall open price competition. Thus,
the prevailing price level for a particular market area, as established
by the actions of leader and followers, is derived largely through
the application of the cost barometric or "cost covering" principle.·
Costs are well known in the industry through trade and cooperative
management associations that publish various informational and
advisory material. Hence, a price leader is reasonably well supplied
with information upon which to base changes in price based on
changes in costs of firms participating in the oligopoly core.H
Oligopolists naturally wish to protect their profit position even
while competing for market shares. The maintenance of profit
levels has had a special appeal for some members of the baking
industry who are somewhat disadvantaged as compared with manufacturers at large. Further, the increasing level of excess capacity in
the baking industry as a whole places most bakers in a vulnerable
position with respect to the point at which they produce on their
average total unit cost curve. Thus, the price level resulting from
oligopoly pricing behavior is partially determined by the relative
cost structures of the oligopolists within any single market. Moreover, when the aggregate industry level of analysis is considered,
it is apparent that price is determined also by their recognition of
mutual dependence on a broader level, market area by market area.
While one might expect that the price chosen by the price leader
would conform pretty closely to his production costs, there is considerable evidence· that the price set acts more like an umbrella
that will cover average unit costs of any members of the oligopoly
group in the market, irrespective of plant size and utilization level
of the price followers. The umbrella price is frequently set at a
level to cover costs not only of the large baking company participants but also of any large independent bakeries with a sizable
share of the market, which may be affiliated with one of the three
bakery cooperative management groups in the industry.
• See footnote 12 of this chapter.
11. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6054, 6589--6594.
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This type of price leadership arises from the fact that there are
many combinations of market shares and plant sizes from market to
market. For example, while company A may be the price leader in
market I, because it has a substantial share of that market and
as a consequence is producing with a large plant at a high level
of utilization, it may face company B in market II under conditions
such that size of plant, market share, and level of plant utilization
by company B are far superior in that market to those of company
A. Thus, the determination of price level by a price leader within
any given market area may be largely in terms of the cost relationship between large multi-plant companies on the national
level, with only the question of who is going to be the leader
being determined, usually by share of market or concentration,
within the area.
Share of market and cost advantage within a market area notwithstanding, leadership is sometimes provided by a major or
an independent firm with a very small share of the market and/or
high costS.12 This apparent contradiction to expected price behavior
on theoretical grounds is partially explicable in terms of historic
establishment of leadership, membership among the largest eight
multi-plant companies, and demonstrated reliability of the firm
in initiating price increases justified by rising costs, i.e., correctly
gauging the price level desired by the various participants in
the market.
Once price leadership is established and prevailing prices are
accepted by most producers, price leaders have little trouble keeping other firms informed of price changes. The president of a large
baking company testified before a Senate committee that prenotification several days in advance of price change is required by grocery
chains, which pass the information along to other bakery route men
servicing the stores. IS Price change information is also made available by phone, mail, and at meetings. 14
12. While in many instances of price increases the advances have first
been announced by the dominant firm in the market, in a surprising number
of other cases the lead has been taken by companies with relatively low profit
rates or relatively small shares of the markets in question. Perhaps the most
conspicuous example among the largest eight bakeries in this respect has been
Ward Baking Co. From 1955 to 1959, Ward's average annual rate of return on
stockholders' investment has been the lowest in the group (6 percent). Six of
the other large firms have shown average annual rates of return of from two
to three times that of Ward (12-19 percent). Despite this, Ward has been a
frequent price leader in the markets in which it sells. Report, op cit., p. 149.
13. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6121.
14. Report, op. cit., p. 159.
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Most wholesale bread producers quickly adjust their prices to
that of the price leader. There are sound bases in economics for
their action. Most bakers have learned that they cannot materially
increase their share of the aggregate volume of bread sales with an
openly aggressive pricing policy because each price decrease is met
with at least similar decreases by competitors. They are forced to
go down with the leader when he drops his price if they are to maintain volume. Moreover, when the leader raises his price, they have
good reason to follow suit. If the price rise was due to cost increases,
the follower firms may need the higher price even more than
the leader firm, which may be operating at a lower cost level. In
addition, all firms stand to gain from increased revenue in the
short run as aggregate sales remain substantially the same. If they
do not follow, the price leader can simply drop his price again,
and little has been gained or lost.
Failure to follow the price leader would be interpreted by the
leader and other firms in the market as "price competitive," and
inconsistent with expected behavior. Open price competition may
be avoided also to discourage consumers from shopping or buying
on the basis of price. Oligopolists much prefer to persuade consumers through advertising of product differences other than price
and thus to keep their market shares undisturbed by price-induced
shifts. Also, nonprice competition is preferred to price wars which
might bring about distress selling, i.e., sales at prices below costs.
In recent years, nonprice competition has been widely used as a
pricing tactic. This includes changing loaf size, baking a secondary
loaf, giving special allowances to grocery stores, and similar forms
of price concession other than a downward change in price itself. 15
These competitive practices have the advantage that they can usually
take place at the same time that price covers increasing costs.

Differential Pricing in
Outlying Wholesale Markets
In the section above, wholesale bread pricing was approached
from the viewpoint of typical behavior in large city markets. There
are, however, several important subordinate cases. Paramount
among these is the case of differential pricing behavior in the "outlying" or fringe areas of large city bread markets. Company replies
to a U.S. Senate investigation of 1958 bread prices show a price
differential of from 1-4 cents per pound between the large city and
15. Ibid., pp. 66-90.
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the outlying market areas served by large city plants. 16 Figures 4
through 8 Hlustrate five typical cases of this differential bread pricing. These territorial price differentials are the result of the historic
failure of large city companies to increase prices in outlying areas
as much or as fast as they do in the city.
In its effects, this has approached discriminatory price cutting,
and it explains, in part, the increased concentration among large
baking companies and the correlative decrease in the number of
wholesale baking companies. It has the advantage of generally being
considered legal, whereas, discriminatory price cutting has been held
in violation of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act.17 It should be pointed out that the practice here described as
differential pricing in outlying areas of large city wholesale bread
markets was defined as "route price discrimination" by the Senate
subcommittee report. IS In the course of the hearings, the persistent
theme of the independent bakers was: "we feel it is unfair competition. It is an example of the profits of operation in one area financing the development of the invaded area."19 Equally persistent, moreover, was the reply by major bakers: "If we want to do business in
that area we have to do it at the lower price. We have to meet
competition in that area."20 Apparently this defense has proved
effective in recent years, for the case on record in which the Federal
Trade Commission issued orders against territorial price discrimination by a bread producer was before World War II, and then not
against a large baking company.21
During the war, most outlying areas in small cities and rural
communities located within 150 miles of large city markets had
been dominated by smaller independent firms. With the end of
World War II and the easing of distribution restrictions, major
baking companies with plants in large cities looked with renewed
interest upon the possibilities of expanding into these outlying
16. Differential pricing "assumes its most striking form when the price
charged at a distant community is lower than that charged at the plant where
the bread is baked. This was found to be a very prevalent practice among the
larger wholesale bakers...." Ibid., p. 39. This finding is supported by extensive
testimony of company management and is documented by market area maps with
prices, plants, and mileage shown. Ibid., pp. 38-66.
17. Corwin D. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law: A Review of Experience, The Brookings Institution (Washington, 1959), p. 458.
18. Report, op. cit., p. 39.
19. Ibid., p. 49.
20. Ibid., P. 55.
21. In the matter of Metz Brothers Baking Co., Sioux City, Docket 3740,
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, September 16, 1938.
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FIG. 7.-Differential pricing of bread in outlying areas of the Buffalo, New
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markets. The need for wider distribution consistent with the adoption of new machinery of greater capacity inspired many of them
to initiate semi-trailer delivery to depots set up in outlying areas
some 150 miles from their large city plants. Driver-salesmen delivery
systems operate out of these outlying depots much the same as in
large cities.
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In general, price behavior of large city firms entering an outlying area differs from their price behavior in large stable metropolitan markets because their goals differ. Their objective in outlying areas is to capture substantial market share rather than to hold
their own or to rely upon gradual accretion to their sales as population increases in the metropolitan areas. It follows that outlying
independents cannot all share in the identity of interest that
typically exists in large city markets. Most independents in outlying
market areas are in the position of attempting to hold their sales
volume against the inroads of large city companies.
When a major firm attempts to sell in an outlying area, it no
longer faces the identity of interest typically shared by the oligopoly
group in large city markets. For if price leadership had been exercised in the outlying market previous to the large city firm's entry,
it is doubtful that the market participants would be willing to
recognize a new leader without serious price competition. Or, if
there had been no price leadership previously, the firms in the outlying market probably would react by using price as a competitive
weapon. Thus, although the dominant independents of an outlying
market area mayor may not conform to the general picture of
oligopolistic price behavior, when the area is entered by one or more
large city companies, price may become one of the competitive
tactics used.
Differential prices in outlying market areas usually arise out
of the refusal of large city companies to raise prices there as large
city market prices are increased. Although there are a few notable
examples of open and hidden price cutting by large city companies
in the process of entering outlying areas, the typical case is pricing
at a level "to meet competition" in the initial stage, and then
refusing to participate in efforts to raise prices as costs increase.
As a competitive tool of large city companies operating in outlying
market areas, price is thus used almost exclusively in a negative
sense. This is due, in part, to the expectation that independents
may respond in kind to positive price actions. Moreover, the
indirect price approach is not as questionable to the Federal
Trade Commission.
That large city baking companies seldom take the lead in
lowering prices in outlying areas may be understandable in view
of the propensity of independent bakers in these areas to initiate
price decreases themselves. Many independents apparently believe
they can preserve or improve their market shares only through
price competition and, hence, do not pay strict attention to the rules
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of the oligopolist's competitive game. Price competition is about
the only tactic that is as freely available to the great majority of
independent firms as to the large companies. They are prone to use
it in last-ditch attempts to stay in the baking business. Moreover,
they also have improved their plants through the adoption of
volume-increasing equipment and need a larger market to maintain
"economic" production. However, they are virtually foreclosed from
entering the large city markets of the major companies, owing to
the possibility of severe retaliation by them, as well as their access
to advertising.
An independent bakery in an outlying area can hardly persuade
a sizable number of grocery retailers in the large city to accept a
new unknown brand in preference to long established brands.
Even if it did succeed in entering some large city outlets, they would
probably be scattered, of small size, and hence uneconomic. Moreover, interviews by the authors with independent bakers in outlying areas of Midwest markets suggest that they cannot readily
afford the discounts, free bread, and/or other concessions expected
by the large city grocer, that might secure adequate shelf space in
a sizable number of grocery outlets. Also, they believe the oligopoly
group established in a large city market would take immediate
action to forestall such an entry of new wholesaler brands. On the
other hand, the independent baker in an outlying area can sometimes invade the large city area of the market by the use of private
label contracts and drop shipment. Evidence presented later in this
study shows that many small grocery chains have secured private
label bread from outlying independent bakers when the oligopoly
group in large city areas refused to supply it.
The refusal of large city companies to raise prices in outlying
areas to cover cost increases can only be enforced as a pricing tactic
because they are relatively secure from retailiation above the
single-market level, owing to the one-plant, one-market nature of
most independent baking companies operating in these areas.
Their security vis-a-vis the outlying independents is in marked contrast to their vulnerability in large city markets which are dominated
by an oligopoly core of wholesale bakers. In the latter situation, the
use of price tactics in one market is subject to retailiation in another
market in which the same firms may meet and the relative positions
with respect to scale efficiencies and market share may be reversed.
A big company may gain in one large city market through price
tactics but would lose through retaliatory price tactics in another
one, so price is much less apt to be used in large cities than in out-
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lying markets by baking companies. The power to retailiate through
price in another market is not usually available to independents
operating in outlying market areas. Large city bakers are therefore
not so reluctant to use price tactics in those outlying areas where
they can do so with relative impunity. Price tactics can be effectively
used to squeeze the profits of independents until they are forced to
close, whereas market-share distribution in large city markets is
determined almost entirely by non price tactics.
Notwithstanding the economic facts of the matter, the practice
of differential pricing, as described above, has thus far been successfully defended by large multi-plant companies as not being
"area price discrimination." It can be argued that differential pricing reflects real cost differentials in marginal terms. The defense
can rest on realized returns to scale in production, advertising, and
other overhead costs;22 the relatively small increase in per unit costs
of delivery over greater distances; and the assumption that bread
produced for shipment to the outlying area is the marginal product.
A price difference alone cannot be labeled discriminatory until a
nondifference in costs is demonstrated; as Adelman suggests, buyer
A in an outlying area may pay a lower price than B in a large city
area of a market and yet be discriminated against. 23
Large city firms have a real incentive to extend their market.
They want to expand sales enough to realize the returns to scale
made possible by advances in baking technology. But the oligopolis tic structure and behavior in large cities tends to foreclose their
sales expansion there, so they naturally try to gain business in
outlying areas. The Senate report presents data suggesting that
refrigerated semi-trailer delivery of bread a distance of 50 miles
costs about one-half cent per pound. 24 When only this cost item is
considered, it is apparent that its absorption by large city plants
selling in outlying market areas offsets the locational advantages
of small independents in these communities. 25 But this overlooks
the shape of the production cost schedule. Chapter 3 of this report
shows that with production at some point less than optimum, the
large city plant can be expected to produce additional products
for distribution to outlying market areas at costs justifying a differ22. E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 72.
23. M. A. Adelman, "Review of the 'Price Discrimination Law,' by Corwin
D. Edwards," American Economic Review (September, 1960), pp. 790--795.
24. Report, op. cit., p. 96.
25. H. L. Purdy, M. L. Lindahl, and 'V. A. Carter, Corporate Concentration
and Public Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 651.
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ential price of some considerable magnitude. Whether a price differential of from 1-4 cents per pound, the range actually found in
1958, or even greater differentials are justified, depends on a consideration of advertising, and other overhead costs, and whether, as is
assumed, the bread sold in outlying market areas is the marginal
product of a plant.
Although this assumption would be consistent with marginal
economic analysis at the firm level, its use as a defense of differential
pricing of bread in large city and outlying market areas may be
questioned. As the Attorney General's committee to study the antitrust laws puts it, "the idea that the cost of serving a given buyer
is less than that of serving other buyers, for no other reason than
that this buyer's additional volume spreads the overhead, imputes
arbitrarily to a particular buyer the savings of larger volume."26
Adelman also suggests in this connection that the outlying area
buyer might with equal logic have been considered the first buyer
and have the whole overhead charged to him, as to be called the
marginal buyer and have none of it imputed to him.2T

Predatory Price Practices
Collusive Price Fixing
Collusive price fixing by direct and express agreement is infrequently discovered in bread markets. In so far as it exists, it is
usually concealed because of its illegality under the antitrust
laws. Nonetheless, there are several recent examples of litigation
charging groups of wholesale bakery firms with violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In 1957, four companies failed to
contest federal grand jury charges of "illegal combination and conspiracy to fix and maintain prices at which white, rye, and whole
wheat bread would be sold to wholesale accounts in Oklahoma,
North Texas, South Kansas and Southwest Missouri" markets. 28
Fines were imposed totaling $25,500. Also in 1957, five companies
were indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to fix the wholesale price and terms of sale of bakery products in the Las Vegas,
Nevada, market. 29
26. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 334.
27. M. A. Adelman, A&P: A Study in Price· Cost Behavior and Public
Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 180.
28. U.s. vs. General Baking Co., Continental Baking Co., Mead's Bakery, and
Colonial Baking Co., a subsidiary of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, et. al.,
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House). par. 66.305.
29. U.S. vs. Continental Baking Co., Phoenix Bakery. Fisher Bakery, et. al.,
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House). par. 66,345.
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In 1958, four companies with bakeries in Memphis, Tennessee,
were found guilty by a U.S. district court of fixing the wholesale
prices of bread, buns, and rolls, and policing the market ranging
up to 150 miles from Memphis (with annual sales totaling $9 million) to insure adherence to such prices. so Fines were imposed totaling $1l3,500. The case has since been appealed to a higher court
and found in favor of the defendants. The ultimate outcome of
the case is not resolved.
Evidence submitted in the latter case suggests how enforcement
of possibly collusive price agreements by major producers in large
city markets may be applied to independent producers in outlying
market areas. 31 With the widespread invasion of outlying areas of
bread markets by major baking companies, some outlying independents come under considerable pressure to conform to the accepted
price and non price competitive practices established in the large
city areas of these markets. When price leadership in invaded areas
proves ineffective, major companies may resort to collusive agreement to hold price at the desired level while competition for outlying market share proceeds on a nonprice basis.
Price Discrimination
While the oligopolistic structure of sellers in most wholesale
bread markets results in group efforts to avoid the full impact of
open price competition, individual firms sometimes attempt to
capture increased market share through price discrimination. In
recent years, the Federal Trade Commission has brought several
cases against medium and large sized baking companies for price
discrimination not justified by cost differentials. This practice has
been held in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
One example of bread price discrimination appeared in a recent
U.S. Supreme Court decision. 32 In September, 1948, a medium sized
baking company with three plants cut its bread price in half (from
14 to 7 cents a pound) in Santa Rosa, New Mexico, but did not
reduce its bread prices in any other town in which it operated.
The "discriminatory" price was continued for several months and
as a result a small local bakery was forced to go out of business.
The Supreme Court held that Section 2(a) of the Clayton Antitrust
30. u.s. vs. Continental Baking Co., American Baking Co., Colonial Baking
Co., a subsidiary of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Hart's Bakery, et. al.,
Trade Regulation Reporter (New York: Commerce Clearing House), par. 66,345.
31. From trial transcript as reported in Report, op. cit., pp. 161-162.
32. Moore vs. Mead's Fine Bread, U.S. Supreme Court Decision, December
6, 1954, 1951 Trade Cases (New York: Commerce Clearing House), par, 67,906.
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Act and Section 3 of the Robinson Patman Act were violated and
awarded treble damages amounting to $57,000.
In 1958, one of the largest eight wholesale baking companies was
ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to discontinue making
discriminatory 5 percent price discounts to certain favored customers
not made on a proportionately equal basis to other competing customers. ss This practice had been initiated in East Coast markets
in 1955. The defendant admitted all the facts of the case and the
practice was held in violation of Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. In the same year, one
of the largest baking companies was charged by the Federal Trade
Commission with giving discriminatory price discounts amounting
to 10 percent of established wholesale prices. 84 The defendant also
was accused of giving special promotional allowances of an additional 5 percent in a discriminatory manner. The Federal Trade
Commission charged that neither of these discounts was made
available to all competing customers on proportionately equal
terms. There are several other Federal Trade Commission charges
of price discrimination against wholesale baking firms that are
still pending. 35

Price Cutting - Secondary and Private Label Bread
Most retail grocers who can buy in large quantities-i.e., chains
and affiliated groups of independents-stock two lines of bread.
One consists of several wholesaler brands selling at uniform prices,
and the second is a lower-priced line, offered at 1-10 cents per pound
less. Except for the type of wrapper or other superficial difference
between them, the two lines of bread are essentially identical. In
selling the standard or "primary" loaf, wholesale baking companies
depend upon extensive advertising for consumer acceptance, and
upon driver-salesmen services combined with higher net retail
margins for shelf position in grocery stores. The selling of the
other bread also depends upon the reputation of the label and on
33. In the matter of Ward Baking Co., Docket No. 6833, U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, December 30, 1958.
34. In the matter of William Freihofer Baking Co., Philadelphia, Federal
Trade Commission Docket No. 7072, 1958 Trade Cases (New York: Commerce
Clearing House), par. 27,080.
35. For example see "FTC Charges Discount Deals Against Continental and
Huber," Bakers' Weekly (November 9, 1959), p. 30; and, "Southern Bakeries
Denies Charges of Price Discrimination by FTC," Bakers' Weekly (May 30, 1960),
p. 16.
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shelf location for consumer appeal, but has the added competitive
advantage of a price differential.
This advantage originally arose through the vertical integration of chain grocers into the baking industry. By baking bread in
their own plants for sale in their retail stores, they were able to
effect cost savings, which were at least partially passed on to the
consumer. The smaller independent grocers, at first unable to meet
this price competition, eventually joined together into buying
groups to match the chains' purchasing power. These groups of
affiliated independents then proceeded to obtain their own line of
bread in one of two ways. Either they owned and operated a bakery,
thus directly emulating some of the chains, or else they bought
bread on a bid or specification basis under contract from wholesale
bakers. The bread thus bought was not the regular wholesaler brand
but was purchased in quantities large enough to effect economies
reflected in a lower price. It was also wrapped under the retailer's
label, thus avoiding all the advertising and other selling costs
associated with the wholesaler's own brand.
This "private label" bread has become increasingly popular in
recent years. The proportion of total bread sales represented by
standard wholesale brands has been on the decline in the post
World War II period. In 1958, Slater36 estimated that about 25
percent of total bread sales were private label, of which about
two-fifths were produced in bread plants owned by vertically integrated grocery chains (according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census).
In an attempt to regain some of these lost sales, many wholesalers
have introduced a secondary brand which sells at a somewhat lower
price than their regular brand, though usually not as low as that
of private label bread. No estimate of its sales are available, but it
is believed to be much less important than private label bread.
A 1959 survey of 43 markets located primarily in the Eastern,
Southern, and Central Regions of the U.S. reveals that 20 markets
offer both types, 12 have one or more private label brands but no
secondary wholesaler brands, nine markets have a secondary brand
but no private label brands, and only two markets have neither. 87
A 1958 survey of 54 bakeries affiliated with a large management
group found that half the companies were producing either a private label or secondary loaf of bread at prices averaging five cents
36. Slater, op. cit., p. 23.
37. Survey of Secondary and Private Label Bread-Selected Metropolitan
Markets, Bakery Products Division, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (St. Louis, September
I, 1959).
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below wholesale prices of the primary loaf, representing 24 percent of their volume. as
When, as repeatedly happened in the early stages of the development, the oligopoly group of baking companies in any given market
area refuses to provide a secondary or private label bread at prices
competitive with the large chain bread prices, grocery retailers
frequently persuade a wholesale baking firm in an adjoining market
to do so. The contracting bakeries can get into private label production primarily because of the decrease in average costs of production and distribution due to better utilization of facilities (see
Chapters 3 and 4). A chain with five supermarkets in a city may
have an annual bread account of over $200,000. A regional chain
with 50 supermarkets could have an account of over $2,000,000. This
is sufficient to entice bids from baking companies located up to 500
miles from the grocery stores. With the resulting decrease in average cost due to increased output, the baking company could, in
theory, lower the price of all the bread it sells. This would, however,
directly alert and mobilize its competitors and market shares would
very likely stay the same. The firm would gain some additional
sales in the private label market but would lose by virtue of the
lower price in its primary market. However, by maintaining the
prevailing price level in the primary market and defining the contract bread as the marginal product, the company can temporarily
succeed in selling private label bread at a substantially lower price.
This additional market can be held, however, only as long as the
relevant competitors either remain unaware of it, as is quite
unlikely, or are in no position to defend themselves through retaliation. Typically, once a contracting bakery is in a secondary loaf
or private label operation, bakeries ,in the invaded market suffering
decreased market share: (1) retaliate with a secondary loaf or
private label bread of their own, (2) set up a retail store handling
day-old products (dumping station), or (3) cut price in the primary market.
Price cutting by wholesale baking firms is perhaps the most
important development that may follow the entry of one or more
secondary or private label brands into a market at lower prices than
those of the established wholesaler brands. When, for example,
the Pan-O-Gold Bakery of Fort Dodge, Iowa, entered into private
label contracts with the Hinky Dinky chain in Omaha and with
the Super Valu Stores buyer group in Des Moines in 1958, it is
reported that wholesale bakeries in the latter area, led by Campbell
38. Hearings,

op. cit.,

p. 6343.
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Taggart and Continental, retaliated by reducing prices some four
cents per pound on their standard or primary loaves in both the
Des Moines and Fort Dodge areas. 39 Of course, not all baking firms
in both markets were fortunate enough to gain supplemental volume. Some lost a significant amount of market share, and their average unit costs of production and distribution increased. Aside from
the possibility that some independents may quit the game via the
merger route, this kind of situation is ripe for a general price
increase for primary wholesaler brands in both areas to cover the
higher unit costs of lower volume operation. In fact, by 1960, primary wholesale bread prices in these markets had risen to former
levels and even higher.40

Grocery Chain Bread Pricing Behavior
Grocery chain bread pricing policy is a very important part of
bread market behavior. The private label price policy of grocery
chains affects the market structure and behavior of wholesale bread
producers in two ways. First, the bakers have few alternatives to
marketing an increasing share of their production through the
grocery chains, many of which are integrated into bread production.
By 1958, the ten largest grocery chains had about 27 percent of
total retail food store sales. All were integrated into bread production and, on the average, their private brands represented about
40 percent of total bakery product sales in their stores. 41 Second,
there is a differential impact of vertical integration by grocery chains
upon large vs. small wholesale baking companies.
Grocery chains, in general, are accustomed to oligopolistic pricing in their relationship to other grocery chains and, hence, tend
nearly to conform with the price policies of the wholesale bakery
oligopoly core. Of course, they are not subject to encroachment on
their market share by wholesale bakers; their bread sales will
expand naturally owing to the growth in chain store merchandising
of all foods. Thus grocery chain firms generally do not need to price
significantly below the major wholesale baking companies. They
can increase market share over time and make substantial profits
by keeping their prices close to wholesale bread prices in their
markets. There are, however, important exceptions to the general
case of price following, especially in the establishment of new stores,
39. Ibid., p. 6127; also, Report, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
40. National Bread Price Survey, Bakery Products Division, Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. (St. Louis, September I, 1960), p. 18.
41. Calculated from sales data in Report, op. cit., p. 103; and Economic
Inquiry into Food Marketing, op. cit., p. 30.
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in the entry of grocery chains into new market areas, and less frequently, in competition among grocery chains.
Recent bread market behavior of grocery chains is based on
their ability to exploit opportunities for technological and organizational changes in bread distribution. Shortly after World War I, the
fast-growing grocery chains sought to secure quantity discount prices
from wholesale baking companies consistent with the economies of
large-volume deliveries and the elimination of special services to
smaller stores. Also, in this period of rapid chain growth, many
chains failed to follow the resale price maintenance policy of wholesale baking companies and used bread as a "price leader." By and
large, bakers refused to sell to chains under such conditions. They
were under pressure from non-chain grocers not to do so, and they
faced the possibility that chain control of retail bread prices would
tend to "weaken the wholesale price for bread."42 As a result, most
large grocery chains integrated vertically into bread production.
Two distinct bread marketing practices have emerged: (I) the
curtailment and simplification of service associated with chain label
bread. and (2) the policy of selling at lower prices than primary
wholesale brands, thus allowing consumers some price-product alternative. These principal aspects of grocery chain price policy allow
some variety with respect to marketing strategy such as utilizing
bread as a promotional item or the establishment of a grocery chain
as a price leader.
In most markets, integrated grocery chains establish private label
bread prices below prices of wholesale brands. Company replies to
a U.S. Senate investigation questionnaire regarding 1958 bread
prices in cities where one or more of the largest seven wholesale
baking companies have plants show that integrated chain bread was
generally retailed at prices of 15, 16, or 17 cents a pound. 43 This
was usually from two to five cents less than prevailing retail prices
for wholesale brands. The differential ranged from 0.5 cents to 7.2
cents per pound. Census data show the average difference between
prices of integrated grocery and wholesale bakery brands in 1958
was 3.3 cents per pound, or 17 percent, for the nation as a whole
(Table 22).
For representative markets, the price differential tends to be
greatest in the Central and Northeastern U.S., and least in the
42. A. C. Hoffman. Large·Scale Organization in the Food Industries, Monograph No. !l5, Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Congress, !lrd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 47.
43. Report, op. cit., p. 108.
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South and West where the price of private label bread "follows"
very closely price levels for wholesaler brands. "For the nation as
a whole, the chains tore price is not the determinant price. The most
that may be said is that the private label prices charged by grocery
chains tend to establish a floor below which retail prices for the
wholesalers' products, with some exceptions, do not fall. In the vast
majority of markets, however, the retail prices of the principal
wholesale bakers are primarily determined by factors other than
chainstore private label price."44 The inference may be made that
as long as only a few of the largest chains integrate into baking, a
price differential of 3.3 cents per pound has little or no noticeable
effect on wholesale bread prices nationally. Of course, for individual
markets, and for greater differential prices, the effect may be significant indeed, as will be discussed below.
Price differentials of a few cents may be sufficient to achieve
consumer acceptance of private label brands because wholesale
bakeries have no alternative but to supply integrated grocery stores
with wholesale brands under nonprice terms that are relatively
unfavorable. These include adverse shelf location, stacking, and
size of display, all of which tend to limit the sales of wholesale
bakery brands in large chain stores. The extent of this exclusion
varies considerably. For example, in 1958, A&P private label bread
products represented 80-90 percent of total bread product sales
in A&P stores. 45 But this is a unique case. A&P is the second largest
producer of bakery products as well as the largest food retailer.
44. Ibid.
45. These estimates are based on tabulation of value shipments by the bakery
plants of the ten largest grocery chains, to which is added an average store
markup of 17 percent; these are then compared with the 4-5 percent of total
chain sales that are bakery products. The basic data are as follows:
Value Shipments,
Total Sales,
Private Label Bread All Products
(In millions of dollars)
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
$180.5
$ 5,095
Safeway Stores, Inc.
33.9
2,225
Kroger Co.
43.7
1,776
American Stores
19.7
875
National Tea
8.5
794
Food Fair
2.l
734
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.
8.1
666
First National Stores
15.3
532
Grand Union
0.7
504
Colonial Stores
8.6
437
Total
$321.l
$13,638
Value shipments of private label bread from ibid., p. 103; total sales of grocery
chain companies from Federal Trade Commission, op cit., p. 76.
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Safeway Stores and National Tea are more typical of the ten largest
grocery chains, as a whole, in that private label products are about
40 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of total bread product sales
in their stores.
Table 5 compares the percentage of consumers who buy brands
of the major wholesale baking companies with the percentage who
buy brands of grocery chains in 27 large city markets. In over threefourths of the markets, chains tore brands account for less than 10
percent of consumer preferences. 46 There are indications that several
of the largest grocery chains may have reached the upper limit to
the restriction of wholesale brands from sales in their stores. With
wholesale brands in their stores, they can off-load some of the inventory and production problem associated with heavy week-end
demand onto wholesale baking companies. Moreover, through the
acquisition and construction of new stores, they have gained a
greater share of total grocery sales, including bread, and have thus
achieved fuller utilization of existing plants.
On occasion, integrated grocery chains have temporarily set
their private label bread prices at a level far below those of wholesaler brands, resulting in a differential much wider than normal.
Company replies to a U.S. Senate investigation of retail bread
prices by the ten largest grocery chains between July 1, 1958, and
June 30, 1959, revealed 290 cases of special sales in one or more
stores at prices of ten cents or less. 47
In order of size of grocery sales, the ten largest grocery chains
reported the following number of bread sales at ten cents per pound
or less: A&P, 60; Safeway, 76; Kroger, 104; American Stores, none;
National Tea, 5; Food Fair, none; Winn-Dixie, 28; First National,
none; Colonial Stores, 4; and Grand Union, 3. These promotional
prices were usually less than half the prevailing retail price of
wholesale brands in the market areas involved. They were usually
continued for three to six days and were confined to chain stores
located in one or two cities at a time.
Cut-rate bread sales in some markets, however, continued for
nine months and one large chain held simultaneous sales through46. In none of the 27 areas did market share of all reported chain store
brands equal the preference for the brands produced by the single leading major
wholesale baking company. In only one city was the leading grocery chain bread
preferred by half as many consumers as the brands produced by the leading
wholesale baking company. In 19 of the 27 communities, at least five times
as many consumers preferred the leading wholesale company's bread to the
leading chain store brand. Ibid., pp. 105-107.
47. Ibid., pp. 115-118.

106

/

The Baking Industry, 1947-1958

out all its stores. Three of the ten largest grocery chains reported
no instances of bread sales of ten cents per pound or less, and 279
of the cases were reported by four chains including the three largest,
A&P, Safeway and Kroger, and one of the fastest growing, now
seventh largest chain, Winn-Dixie. The latter four companies have
used "price leader" bread sales regularly to build store traffic in
those areas in which much of their recent expansion has taken place.
However, no bread sales of ten cents per pound or less were reported
in regions west of the Rocky Mountains.
As long as this practice occurs infrequently and briefly and is
restricted to a few markets, its effects on major wholesale bakers
with plants in a number of states may not be severe. The large
multi-plant wholesalers apparently can absorb temporary losses in
markets affected by these promotions by offsetting them with profits
in other markets where chains abstain from such practices. An
important point is that integrated grocery chains can set bread
prices relative to input costs such that single-market wholesale baking companies are squeezed and will operate with a
minimal profit or a loss, while the integrated, multi-market grocery
chains, who produce and deliver their own private label bread at
average costs below those of the non-integrated firms, can at the
same time prosper.

Non-Price Competition in Bread Markets
The primary competition between wholesale baking companies
distributing bread to grocery stores is on a non price basis. Instead
of price competition, the usual market conduct pattern seeks
improvement in the consumer franchise of individual wholesale
brands by preferential product display in retail outlets, product
advertising and promotion, and variation in product. In contrast to
their pricing behavior, these oligopolists apparently do not achieve
spontaneous coordination of their non price practices. 48 Independent
action is preferred if it is expected to achieve advantages that are
unlikely to be matched in the short run, if at all, by other wholesale
baking companies. Thus, the nonprice conduct of firms in bread
markets closely conforms to the theory of monopolistic competition. 49 These non price practices have two principal results: (1) they
alter the relative competitive strength of small and large baking
companies, and (2) they create a cost-push effect on prices. The
48. Weston, op. cit., p. 109; also Fellner, op. cit., p. vi.
49. Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cam.
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
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concept of "cost push" as used here refers to the tendency toward
rising costs resulting from the various non price practices in distribution and selling, as well as from capital investment in new equipment, which is not used efficiently. These rising costs can be tolerated
under the protective cover of cost barometric price leadership in
bread markets, discussed above. The basic factors contributing to
rising costs and prices in bread markets are very difficult for anyone
firm to control, but it should be noted that they are primarily
endogenous to the industry.
Product Display
Perhaps the most widely used and significant non price practices
in wholesale bread markets in the postwar years have been the
various tactics of firms to win favored display positions for their
brands in retail outlets. Under the umbrella of cost barometric
pricing, firms resort to the purchase of rack position with cash,5o or
in lieu of cash give free bread, building improvements (such as display racks, counters, signs, new floors, paint, etc.), special entertainment (such as travel and tickets for shows and sports events), and
management service (such as consultation on store layout, accounting, tax study and so forth). They also try to dominate display
shelves with "massed displays."5l The term "massed display" is
defined as the overloading of display space in retail outlets beyond
expected sales. Its purpose is to appeal to consumers through what
has been colorfully termed "pile psychology."52 It is utilized for this
purpose by grocery chains with private label bread, and by driversalesmen with wholesaler brands, to gain or maintain preferential
shelf space in retail outlets.
The bread industry came out of World War II with government
controls over some market practices. Under the ,\Var Food Administration the consignment of bakery products to grocery stores and
the removal of day-old products were prohibited. With the end of
50. An example of buying out distributive shelf display is provided by the
president of an independent bakery in Lincoln, Nebraska, who submitted a sworn
affidavit to the House Committee on Small Business dated November 3, 1955.
Affiant stated that at Sutton, Nebr., in October, 1955, Colonial Baking Co. of
Des Moines, Iowa (an affiliate of Campbell Taggart), paid Oscar Griess Grocery
Store $50 worth of bread free and as a result Wendelin Baking Co. was elimi·
nated as a seller of bread in the store. House Committee on Small Business,
Price Discrimination, The Robinson-Patman Act and Related Matters, Part 1,
84th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956),
p.370.
51. For a discussion of other similar practices, see Report, op. cit., pp. 67-84.
52. Ibid., p. 69.
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controls in 1946, consignment selling was again introduced by
wholesale bread producers. Consignment selling facilitates the domination of distribution outlets by firms who overload limited display
shelves with their bread, and thus force competitors to accept disadvantageous display space. Largely as a result of this form of
nonprice competition, average costs of "stale return" loss increased
from 1947-58 at a rate second only to distribution labor costs (see
Chapter 4). The percentage of bread returns to route sales increased
from 1.3 percent in 1947 to 7.4 percent in 1958, for a sample of 105
baking companies affiliated with a management cooperative. Even
though a small part of this was recovered through sales of "day
old" product, the remaining loss rose from 1.1 percent of sales in
1947 to 4.8 percent of sales in 1958.53
This experience is typical of the industry as a whole. Moreover,
in a specific case of retaliatory overloading of grocery bread display in a single midwestern market, "stale return" loss of a mediumlarge single-plant baking company almost doubled in four years,
increasing from 4.9 percent of sales in 1954 to 9.5 percent of sales
in 1957.54 A careful study of the stale bread problem in the baking
industry estimated that net loss from stale bread in the 1920's
averaged about 2.5 to 3 percent of sales. 55 It concluded that a stale
loss not in excess of 0.5 to I percent of production is an attainable
standard in wholesale bread markets.
When effective, these nonprice competitive tactics can result
in making grocery outlets no longer available on equal terms to all
wholesale baking firms in a market. When non price concessions are
given in the form of merchandise and services which have indefinite
value, it is difficult for grocers and competing bakers to tell which
company is offering the best deal. This tends to facilitate the
intended result of dominating distributive outlets. However, while
various non price tactics may be introduced by one firm as offense
weapons, they are almost invariably adopted by others as defense
weapons.
The introduction of one or more of these tactics into a market
rarely goes unnoticed by competitors but is adopted or matched
in value by all. When this happens they typically neutralize each
other and no single firm is better off than before, while all have
experienced increased costs. Higher costs may be more difficult to
53. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6593.
54. Report, op. cit., p. 71.
55. J. S. Davis and Wilfred Eldred, Stale Bread Loss as a Problem Of the
Baking Industry, Publication No.1, Food Research Institute, Stanford University (California, February, 1923), p. 7.
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bear for independent firms in competition with one or more large
firms in the outlying area of a market. Moreover, by their nature,
some nonprice tactics, e.g., buying up shelf space, foreclose the
possibility of adoption by rivals. Thus, nonprice practices as well
as overt price policies are effective in the extension into outlying
markets by large companies and the corollary demise of smaller
firms.
Advertising
Among the food industries, baking was one of the first,56 and is
today one of the foremost, users of advertising. In the postwar years,
the ratio of advertising to sales has been about a third higher for
baking corporations than for all corporate manufacturers of food
products. In absolute terms, bakery corporations' advertising
expenditures have been increasing faster than those of all food corporations but their sales have not responded in kind, so that relative
to sales, the increase has been roughly the same for both. According
to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, corporate food processors
spent 1.1 percent of their sales on advertising in 1947 and 2.0 percent
in 1957. By comparison, advertising expenses of bakery corporations represented 1.6 percent of their sales in 1947 and 2.8 percent
in 1957. Or, to look at it another way, the bakers' share of all food
corporation advertising rose from 12.1 percent to 14.6 percent in
the ten-year period. 57 Since food processors are generally heavier
advertisers than other manufacturers, these results would be even
more dramatic were the comparison drawn between bakery advertising and that of non-food manufacturers.
Wholesale bakers do virtually all the advertising in the bakery
industry. Among these companies, the ratio of advertising to sales
varies considerably and is inversely associated with size of firm.58
In 1958, the four largest bakers spent $32.8 million on advertising,
or about 4 percent of their sales, a ratio more than two-thirds higher
than the industry average. By comparison, independent wholesale
56. E. J. Sperry, "65 Years of Bakery Advertising," Baking Industry Magazine
(April 12, 1952), pp. 149-150.
57. Data for food firms from U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of
Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1947-58 and 1957-58. Data for bakery
firms from U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service, AMS 399, Advertising Expenditures by Food ManUfacturing Corporations, 1947-57, by Roberta Lamb (reprinted from The Marketing and Transportation Situation, July, 1960).
58. There is one major exception: the largest wholesale baking company
spent about 5 percent of sales on advertising; the remaining members of the
big four and big eight wholesale bakery groups spent approximately 3 percent
of their sales on advertising. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6055, 6062, 658()"{)581.
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bakeries affiliated with the three largest management cooperatives
spent about $25 million, or 4.4 percent of sales. Although complete
data on advertising expenditures by small unaffiliated wholesale
bakeries are not available, one document indicates that, for a limited
sample of such firms, they amount to about 5.2 percent of sales, or
close to a third more than the big four. 59 These relationships suggest that media advertising is one form of competition where the
larger firms can achieve economies of scale not likely to be matched
in the short run, if at all, by smaller rivals. Of course, there are
occasional exceptions to this rule where a smaller firm, in attempting
to insulate its market from larger competitors, will engage in heavy
advertising relative to its sales.
Since wholesale baking companies account for practically all
advertising by the baking industry, it is clear that house-to-house
and multi-unit retail baking companies use other means to isolate
their markets. These include special service in the case of house-tohouse delivery. Multi-unit retail bakeries use a differentiated product, location, and service. All of these involve selling costs which,
as suggested by the theory of monopolistic competition, are incurred
primarily to secure a degree of market isolation, i.e., protection
from cross elasticity of demand.
Evidence of private label selling expenditures by the ten largest
chain store bread producers indicates advertising expenditures in
1958 amounted to about $1.2 million or less than one percent (0.68)
of their bread sales. 60 This ratio was one-fourth of the industry
average, and about one-sixth of that of the largest four wholesale
baking companies. Lower advertising expense for private label bread
reflects, in part, lesser total advertising effort, in part economies of
joint-product advertising of about 50 store items with bread in
newspaper ads, and in part, the tendency to advertise the chain name
rather than specific food items. Moreover, to the extent that conventional bread advertising is intended to influence the managers
of grocery stores as well as consumers, advertising is of less importance to private label bread producers. Retailers of private label
bread have complete control of their own shelf space and it is to
their advantage to sell as much of their own label as possible. Hence,
they need not be convinced through advertising by the contracting
bakery company. As the baker of private label bread secures his
retailer demand through contract, his selling costs, including advertising, are unnecessary.
59. Ibid., p. 6092.
60. Report, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
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Advertising is one of the most obvious forms of bread promotion. It usually includes expenditures on television, radio, magazines, newspapers, and billboards. In addition to these, sales promotion policy may include: "consumer deals, premiums, coupon offers,
menu-related item promotions, contests, sample and demonstration
programs, special displays, various trade deals, and special promotion associated with the introduction of new products."61 Estimates
of the costs of non-advertising promotion practices are not available
for the bakery industry. But it is not unreasonable to expect that
for many large wholesale baking companies these costs are as great
or greater than advertising expenses. To an increasing extent, subsidization of grocery store outlets with in-store facility and promotional allowances is becoming a major instrument of sales promotion
policy. While costs of in-store facilities are usually hidden in broad
ill-defined categories of a firm's operating statement, there is evidence that promotional allowances to chain stores amounting
to 3-5 percent of sales are not uncommon. 62 Thus they frequently double the promotion expenditure on bread sold through
these stores.
In its early days, advertising undoubtedly performed an informational function that helped to expand the market for bakery
bread relative to that baked at home. Through advertising, consumers were made aware of the existence and the convenience of
this new form of mass-produced, wrapped bread. By the end of
World War II, however, commercially produced bread was an
established and well known staple of the American diet. It is
doubtful that bread advertising has contributed significantly to
any further increase in the aggregate demand for bread.
In the postwar years, the purpose of bread advertising has shifted
to influencing the distribution of total bread sales among wholesale
baking companies. Bread advertising is increasingly aimed at persuading rather than informing the consumer. Criticism of recent
advertising appeals to unreal or even harmful values has come from
the Federal Trade Commission. 63 In 1954, the largest baking company was ordered to discontinue advertising:
(I) that Wonder Bread restored normal growth processes in
physically retarded children;
61. Sidney Hoos, "The Advertising and Promotion of Farm Products-Some
Theoretical Issues," Journal of Farm Economics (May, 1959), p. 355.
62. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 6344, 6641-6651.
63. In the matter of Continental Baking Co., Inc., Stipulation No. 8553, u.S.
Federal Trade Commission, October 5, 1954.
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(2) that any amount of Wonder Bread consumed daily is a nutritional substitute for other foods having a greater total
nutritional value;
(3) that Wonder Bread improves a child's appetite for other
foods; etc.
In 1952 a West Coast baking company was ordered to stop advertising that its breads produced "better complexions or a smoother,
more beautiful skin, or contributed to the health except to the
extent that they may contribute to the prevention of the development of those conditions which may be due to deficiencies of vitamins and minerals."64
Numerous other examples of "misleading advertising" of bread
are found in Federal Trade Commission actions. Perhaps the most
frequent are stipulations and complaints against low-calorie bread
promoters who say directly or by implication that as part of a diet
this bread will enable the consumer to lose weight or will prevent
the gaining of weight. Typical of such advertisements:
"When a woman's PANTHER SLIM
[picture of Elizabeth Taylor and panther
with basket of bread in his mouth]
... she's vital as well as slender. A good
figure is more than luck when a lady watches
her weight the famous HOLLYWOOD WAY. HOLLYWOOD
BREAD is high in protein, vitamins and minerals,
yet has only 46 calories per 18 gram slice."65
The Federal Trade Commission has brought complaints against
scores of diet bread advertisers, and all except three have agreed
to discontinue the low-calorie theme. 66 Lite Diet Bread (Bakers'
Franchise Corporation), Hollywood Bread (National Bakers Service,
Inc.), and Slender-Way (Safeway Stores) admit that, on an ingredient
basis, the difference between diet bread and regular bread is not
significant, but they argue that through thinner slices and smaller,
lighter loaves, diet bread has fewer calories per slice. If the consumer
is misled, they say, it is because of his long-standing misconception
that regular bread is fattening.
Product Variation
There is considerable evidence that product variation policy is
a significant aspect of firm behavior in bread markets, both in its
64. In the matter of Silver Leaf Baking Co., Spokane, Washington, Stipulation 8306, U.S. Federal Trade Commsision, August 26, 1952.
65. In the matter of National Bakers Services, Inc., Docket No. 7480, U.S.
Federal Trade Commission, April 30, 1959.
66. Baking Industry Magazine (August 6, 1960), p. 69.
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impact on costs and on the competitive relationship between bakery
firms. Product variation can be defined as the "periodic alteration
of products, of the sort not necessarily identifiable as improvements,
in order to stimulate a consumer demand."67
The regular introduction of superficial product and packaging
changes in variety breads, or diet breads, or of "new" loaves of
white bread exemplify this policy. On the individual firm level,
product variation has a rational basis in recent studies of consumer
behavior. Engle, for example, found that bread consumers tend to
shift their brand or product loyalties every three to five years,
reflecting a sense of monotony and a desire for something new or
different. 68 He urged baking companies, as a matter of policy, to
adopt rates of product variation and selling outlays consistent with
the noted consumer turnover cycle. Product variation by baking
companies generally has taken three forms, usually not associated
with significant improvements in bread quality. In the postwar
years, firms have periodically introduced one or more selling "features" such as variation in size of loaf, texture, and wrapper.

Variation in Pan Size, Shape, and Type
Many baking companies, seeking to broaden the appeal of
bread to buyers who have not previously been important bread
consumers, have added a "low calorie" loaf by using smaller pans
and thinner slices. Others have added a "high nutrient" loaf by
using larger pans and thicker slices. 69 Many, in addition, cater to
the sandwich trade with a larger number of uniform square slices
by using longer pans with lids. These are examples of many product
variations that have increased the obsolescence cost of pans. A
president of a large baking company testified that largely as a
result of the multiplication of superficial changes in loaf sizes,
their pan expenses increased "about 400-fold" between 1947 and
1958.70 Independent decisions by firms to change pan sizes may not
be matched by rival firms in the short run owing to a lag of several
weeks for delivery from pan manufacturers. Meanwhile the leader
may gain some market share at the expense of rivals.
Changes in Bread Texture
Several firms have introduced "new" loaves of white bread

In

67. Bain, op. cit., p. 323.
68. Engle, op. cit., p. 195.
69. In 1958, a large baking company advertised "10 percent more food value
in every slice of big new 'Yonder bread." Testimony was given that the only
significant change was to enlarge loaf and slice sile by approximately 10 percent.
Report, op. cit., p. 89; Hearings, op. cit., p. 6673.
70. Ibid., p. 6113.
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recent years having unique textural characteristics, but otherwise
not significantly changed. The most notable example is the uniform
small-hole texture achieved by chemical action in the continuousmix production process. The process is complicated and expensive;
equipment investment costs may be increased by $150,000 for the
adopting firm. In the short run, this innovation has not usually been
matched by all rivals in any given market area. The manufacturer
of the equipment has reported that firms adopting this process in
the latter 1950's experienced short-run increased sales of 10-40
percent. 71 In this case, independent action may tend to bring about
a short-run redistribution of market shares.
Another product variation of this general type is to divide
and twist the dough as it is placed in the pan. This results in a
distinctive indention in the loaf crust clearly visible to consumers
through a cellophane wrapper. The fact that rival firms in many
cases do not adopt the twisting process, however, is an indication
that twisted bread is a relatively ineffective tactic in gaining
market share. Apparently the effect upon share is small enough so
that rival firms are not compelled to adopt twisting in defense. The
process is easily accomplished; two unskilled employees or a $20,000
machine adds only a small amount to production costs of "twisted
bread."

New and Fresh Packaging
Since World War II, most bakeries have shifted from wax paper
to cellophane, and recently some have tried polyethylene breadwrapping materials. Wax paper is the cheapest of the three and has
the advantage of color, so it is frequently used to wrap the most
expensive loaves of bread. Although higher in price, cellophane is
the most widely used today. It is suited to handling by high speed
machinery, and facilitates visible inspection of bread by the consumer, but also tears easily when opened. A few firms have recently
perfected new wrapping machines to handle polyethylene, which
is preferable to either wax paper or cellophane for home storage
of bread by the consumer. At this time, independent decisions
by some firms to adopt polyethylene wrap have not been matched
by all rival firms in the short run, primarily because of technical
complications. Thus, the innovator of new and fresh packaging may
possibly gain market share from rival firms in the short run.
71. Dough-maker Continuous Dough Mixing, undated publication by Wallace
& Tiernan, Inc., Belleville, N.J.
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Industrial Performance

Performance refers to the economic effects on the general welfare
of market adjustments made by buyers and sellers.l There are
various performance criteria which, to different observers, may be
considered crucial indicators of how well the market activity of
baking companies contributes to public welfare. The evaluation
of market performance presented here considers: the level of profits
relative to long-run interest rates and to those of comparable industries; the progressiveness of firms in improving product quality;
and the changes in price relative to average costs, to the price of
similar products and to the cyclical problem. Nor are these criteria
alone enough to characterize the net performance of bread markets.
We must also measure the economic costs to society of less-thanoptimum performance with respect to:
(1) production efficiency-the rate at which firms adopt available
technology and techniques of production to bring individual
plant cost curves down to the long-run industry cost curve;
the size of plants and firms relative to optimum scale; and
the under-utilization of production facilities;
(2) distribution efficiency-the rate at which firms facilitate labor
specialization and other economies to bring individual distribution cost curves down to the long-run industry cost curve; the
size of delivery and routes relative to optimum scale; and the
under-utilization of distribution facilities;
(3) the aggregate selling or sales promotion costs relative to consumer benefits.
A comparison of the existing organization of bread markets with a
model of optimum system suggests the relative importance of these
various performance criteria, and hence the direction of possible
adjustment or remedy.
Only a few decades ago concepts of perfect competition and
monopoly were thought sufficient to treat economic problems. Econ1. Bain,

op. cit., p.

11.
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omists had derived theorems about the socially desirable performance of markets characterized by large numbers of small firms,
homogeneous product, and free entry and exit, at one end of the
scale, and of single-firm monopoly at the other.
During the past 30 years, however, students of market structure
and industrial organization have found that concepts of perfect
competition and monopoly are not sufficiently adequate bases for the
normative appraisal of individual capitalistic markets,2 and have
attempted to formulate explicit criteria of adequate and optimum
market performance under various intermediate graduations of
oligopoly or imperfect market structure. Thus, if a reduction (or an
increase) in a market's concentration would improve market performance, it is better to say so directly, not to suggest that the con·
clusion follows from an ideal of perfect competition. 3 The tradi·
tional "monopoly problem," associated with the evils of high
concentration, is not a very useful concept in appraising actual
market performance. In its stead, we shall consider the whole
problem of achieving "optimum levels of market performance" in
individual capitalistic markets, from the public viewpoint.
While these judgments are necessarily tentative, we can minimize
the range of possible dispute about the relationship between the
performance criteria selected and the more basic aims of a democratic society by reference to the enabling legislation under which
this study was made. The Congress of the United States in 1946
specified that the primary objective of publicly supported research
into the economic problems of marketing agricultural products is to
improve the efficiency of marketing methods and facilities and to
reduce distribution costs. 4 Congress declared that "an efficient marketing system to distribute in an economical and orderly manner
that which is produced" by agriculture is indispensable to "the
welfare, prosperity, and health of the nation."5 As applied in this
case, Congress has established efficiency as a norm or criterion of
bread market performance and has tied market efficiency to the
public welfare.
For purposes of this analysis, a bread market would be defined
as "adequate" if its actual performance were not extremely detrimental to the public welfare with respect to any single criterion
nor moderately detrimental with respect to several. A bread market
2.
3.
4.
5.

Sosnick, op. cit., pp. 383-384.
Ibid., p. 385.
7 U.S.C. 1621 (Public Law 733, 79th Congress, Title II, Sec. 202).
H. Rep. 2458, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, July 8, 1946.
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would be defined as "optimum" if its actual performance were as
favorable in all respects as unavoidable circumstances permit. 6 Thus,
the level of performance attainable in bread markets depends, in
part, on the limiting circumstances of the environment. Important
limitations to the improvement of any market's performance
include: the nature of the product, consumer demand, and capital equipment.
Bread products are largely staple food, with general uniformity
of quality between producers within a market. Because bread
products are consumed fresh and have a high bulk-to-value ratio,
spatial conditions of bread markets restrict a firm's ability to improve
performance. Consumer demand for bread products is price inelastic and negatively income elastic and is limited by population location and growth. The purchasing pattern for bread is largely set by
the purchase of other foods. Capital equipment in bread plants has
a single use and, once adopted, represents a fixed input in the
short run.

Price, Profit, and Product Performance
Market Price Performance
Generally speaking, bread markets have performed somewhat
inadequately in product price behavior. Price increases in bread
products have tended to lead the business cycle during the postwar
period. The average u.s. price of white bread has risen more than
twice as fast as prices of all consumer goods, according to reports of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Between 1947 and 1958, the average
retail price of all food products increased about 24 percent and the
price index of consumer products rose about 26 percent, while the
average retail price of white bread increased from 12.5 cents to 19.3
cents per pound, a rise of 54 percent. Figure 9 shows that most of this
6.8 cent increase in average retail bread prices represents larger payments to the baking industry. Payments to farmers for ingredients
used in baking bread dropped from 3.7 cents per pound in 1947
to 3.0 cents in 1958, or about 20 percent. In addition to their larger
payments to bakeries, consumers paid more for bread to retail
grocers, from 1.9 cents per pound in 1947 to about 3.1 cents per
pound in 1958, up about two-thirds. Thus, wholesale prices of bread
did not increase quite as fast as retail bread prices during this postwar period (Table 8).
Exclusive of the cost of ingredients, however, payments for the
6. Sosnick,

op. cit., pp.

41~11.

llS

/

The Baking Industry, 1947-1958

bread baking and wholesaling functions increased from 5.1 cents
per pound in 1947 to 11.2 cents in 1958, an increase of 120 percent I
Clearly, had the postwar increase in payments for bread baking and
wholesaling increased only at a rate equal to the increase in price
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SOURCE: U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing Margins in White Bread, Miscellaneous Bulletin No. 712 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 8-9.

FIG. 9.-Estimated average retail and wholesale prices, gross margins of
retailer, baker and miller, value of farm ingredients, pound loaf of white
pan bread, United States, 1947 and 1958.

of all foods, the rise in average wholesale and retail bread prices
would have been less than the price rise for all food, because cost of
ingredients dropped. This does not imply that increases in bread

I
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prices should have been held to those of all food, because technological changes have occurred in food industries, altering the underlying production functions, an aspect of bread market performance
discussed later in this chapter. This reservation about price comparisons should be kept in mind when taking an overall view of these
price changes.
The above account of price increases is based on average retail
prices in 48 urban areas reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This is the most general and relevant measure of average U.S. bread
price levels because we are rapidly becoming a nation of city and
suburban dwellers (estimated at 70 percent of total population in
1960). But those remaining in small towns and rural areas tend to
pay lower prices for bread.
Although it is impossible to measure the proportion of total
bread consumption involved, it may be estimated roughly at 30
percent. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 that consumers in metropolitan area markets tend to pay an average of two to five cents
per pound more for white bread than those living within a 150-mile
radius in outlying small towns and rural areas, despite additional
transportation costs of about one-half cent per pound for every 50
miles bread is shipped (as for example, by common carrier). These
average price differentials are hidden within the average prices
reported to the Census Bureau by wholesale baking companies, as
shown in Table 19. It is also important to note that the lower
TABLE

19

COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE TRANSFER PRICE PER POUND OF WHITE PAN BREAD
AMONG SEGMENTS OF THE BAKERY INDUSTRY, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1958

Segment of
Bakery Industry

Wholesale
Integrated grocery
chain
Home service
Multi·unit retail
Bakery industry,
total

Share
of Total
Pound.
Shipped,
1958

Average
Transfer Price
Year

Change in
Average Transfer Price

1947

1954

1958

Percent

Cents

Cents

Cents

1947·1954

79

10.9

15.2

16.0

4.3

40

5.1

47

11
9

9.7
12.5
11.3

11.4
17.4
14.6

13.3
18.6
18.9

1.7
4.9
3.3

17
39
30

3.6
6.1
7.6

37
49
67

100.0

11.0

15.1

16.0

3.9

3.1)

5.0

45

1947·1958

Cents Percent Cents Percent

Average prices for seflDlents of the industry were computed from reports of value
of shipment and total pounds shipped data ~iven in: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Census of Manufactures, 1947, 1954, 1958, op. CIt.
SoURCE:

average prices in non-metropolitan areas are gross estimates and
only indicative of a tendency. Evidence of prices paid in a large
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number of non-metropolitan markets shows that in many cases
average prices are higher than in metropolitan areas of the same
markets. This is an illustration of the pricing pattern explained in
Chapter 5 in which a large city baking company maintains a lower
price in an outlying area until its entry is firmly established. In the
short run, consumers in the area benefit by a lower price. In the
long run, however, there are instances where bread prices have then
been raised to cover average total unit costs, including costs of
common carrier shipment to the outlying area.
Postwar increases in retail bread prices have not been uniform
for all bread. Some consumers have bought bread made by retail
grocers under their own private labels; others have chosen brands
of wholesale baking companies; and still others have used the products of bakers offering home delivery or have bought bread in specialty bakery stores.
Average price data prepared from Census Bureau reports and
presented in Table 19 show that from 1947 to 1954 the average
differential between the transfer or wholesale price of private
label and wholesaler brands widened from 1.2 cents per pound to
3.8 cents per pound. Although this is admittedly a gross figure, it
suggests that integrated grocery chains pursued a pricing policy
on private label bread that increasingly enhanced the material
welfare of consumers during this period. Since 1954, however, this
price differential has tended to narrow and by 1958 had fallen to
2.7 cents per pound. The price and profit performance of integrated
grocery chains varies significantly between market areas, as will be
shown in a subsequent section of this chapter.
Estimates by the industry place the proportion of private label
bread sales to total industry sales at about 25 percent.7 As shown in
Table 18, II percent of the industry's total bread output is baked
in plants owned by integrated grocery chains. Although the balance
of private label bread consumption cannot be estimated with any
precision, evidence presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that it is a
significant aspect of production in many wholesale bakeries. Table
19 suggests that multi-unit retail baking companies charge higher
prices for white bread in their specialty stores than either wholesale
brands or private label brands distributed through grocery stores.
In making this comparison, one must add an average retail grocery
store margin for bread estimated at 17 percent to the wholesale and
private label brand transfer prices shown in the table.
The discussion of market price performance has thus far been
7. Slater,

op. cit., p.

2!l.
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confined to the price of white bread. Table 20 shows the average
price increase of all important bakery products in the postwar years.
The percentage price rise of non-bread products has been about half
that of bread and bread type rolls during this period, but the
non-bread products were the higher priced ones in 1947. In the
case of cakes, pies, and handmade cookies, superior price performance from the consumers' point of view may reflect the competition
of substitute products such as cake mix, frozen pies, and machinemade cookies. Census data show that output of these three bakery
products has decreased in the postwar years, while output of their
TABLE 20
AVERAGE TRANSFER PRICE PER POUND, VARIOUS BAKERY PRODUCI'S, TOTAL INDUS.
TRIAL PRODUCTION, UNITED STATES, 1947, 1954, AND 1955
Average Transfer Price per Pound

Bakery Product

Bakery products, total a
White pan bread
White hearth bread
Wheat bread
Rye bread
Specialty breads
Rolls, bread type
Sweet yeast goods
Soft cakes
Pies
Cookies, handmade
Doughnuts (doz.)

1947

1954

1958

Change
1947-195R

Cents

Cents

Cents

Percent

15.2
11.0
12.3
U.S
12.7
14.5
16.2
29.S
32.3
24.4
31.2
25.9

19.0
15.1
15.4
16.0
16.2
17.6
20.1
37.1
35.3
25.7
37.1
30.1

21.0
16.0
IS.6
IS.1
IS.4
19.9
23.4
36.S
3S.4
29.1
36.S
35.2

3S.2
45
51
53
45
37
44
23
19
19
IS
36

SoUllCE: U.s. Bureau of the Census, Census of ,HartH/actures, 1947, 1954, 1958, op. cit.
a Average price per pound for total shipments for which poundage and value were reported. Does not include some pastries and unspecified items.

substitutes has increased. 8 This represents a net loss to the baking
industry since these substitutes are produced by other food industries. An even larger share of cake sales is in the form of semiprepared cake mix, manufactured by the milling industry, while
more pies are produced by the frozen foods industry, and machinemade cookies classified in the cracker industry.
8. From 1947 to 1954, production of soft cakes in the baking industry declined
from 1,200 million pounds to 1,047 million pounds, or about 13 percent. For the
same period, output of cake mix, a substitute product produced in another indus.
try, increased from 605 million pounds of soft cake equivalent to 795 million
pounds, or about 31 percent. "1954 Census of Manufactures," op. cit. It is
estimated that output of frozen pies and other frozen bakery products has
increased rapidly in recent years and by 1955, accounted for 17 percent of total
output of the frozen prepared foods industry. W. G. Gechtel, ''The Future of
Frozen Bakery Products," Bakers' Weekly (May 18, 1959), p. 39.
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Profit Criteria of Bread Market Performance
Market performance is often assessed in terms. of the profitsto-sales ratio or the rate of return on net investment after payment
of federal income taxes. One authority suggests that a standard
profit rate of 4 percent of net investment after taxes may be considered as a "normal" or target rate of return in the 1940's and
1950'S.9 Of course, reported profits are not divided on company
income statements between imputed interest on capital, return for
innovations, frictional gains or losses, and rent on scarce capital
resources or monopoly returns. The implications of this view, however, are that since most baking innovations are developed by
baking equipment manufacturers, most innovation costs are paid
for through the purchase of equipment, and since frictional losses
tend to offset frictional gains, the remaining elements of profit above
4 percent can be attributed to "economic rent," or "above normal
returns." This argument, rigorously applied to the baking industry,
would suggest that average rates of return above 4 percent on net
investment after taxes are more than are necessary to attract an
efficient level of capitalization and tend to encourage an inefficient
distribution of resources at least in the short run. Thus, the average
return on investment of wholesale baking companies of 10-12
percent in 1958 indicates an excess profit rate of about 6-8 percent
or one and one-half to two times the standard of optimum performance posited above (Table 21). But the application of this standard
of optimum performance is not sufficient for analysis.
In the first place, although above normal profits of wholesale
baking companies are sizable, their complete elimination would
result in little change in the price of bread products. For the period
1947-58, such profits amounted to roughly two-thirds of total profits
of wholesale baking companies, or approximately $45 million per
year. This amounts to only about 1.7 percent, however, of the
total $2.8 billion sales of wholesale baking companies in 1958. At
most, such above normal profits account for approximately 2 percent
of the consumer's bread dollar.
In the second place, a study of costs indicates that factors other
than profit explain the postwar increase in bakery margins and
bread prices. In 1958, the average net profit of wholesale baking
companies after taxes was approximately 3.2 percent of dollar sales,
9. Bain, op. cit., p. 383; this compares with a 1953-59 average of about 3.5
percent interest rate on prime commercial paper. Monthly Letter, New York City
Bank Gune, 1959).

TABLE 21
PROFITS (AFI'ER TAXES) AS A PERCENTAGE OF STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY, SELECTED BAKING FIRMS, FOOD FIRMS, AND MANUFACTURING FIRMS,
UNITED STATES, 1940 AND 1947-58
Baking Company or
Industrial Group

1940

1947

1948

1949

1950

6.5
7.5
.2

17.0
10.2
33.0
18.9
25.0
17.6

22.7
16.7
40.6
20.8
33.2
22.6

15.7
10.3
32.4
14.4
26.5
17.3

14.8
10.2
26.0
13.6
24.3
16.2

11.4
8.2
20.1
12.0
16.4
11.2

11.6
8.8
18.9
11.7
18.1
10.9

12.8
6.7
16.8
12.7
17.5
13.6

7.9

15.8

21.2

14.7

14.1

11.1

11.6

11.7

Continental
General
Campbell Taggart
American
Interstate
Ward
Langendorf
Southern
Largest four a
Eighteen multi-rlant
baking firms
Eighteen single-~lant
baking firms

8.0
8.9

All food processing"

8.3

19.4

16.6

All manufacturingd

8.8

17.0

18.9

1951

1952

1953

1954

12.2
6.8
20.2
12.2
20.4
7.4
13.8
8.9
11.9

1955

16.0
6.3
20.8
14.4
19.4
7.3
17.9
6.5
13.7

1956

15.1
7.2
19.9
14.9
17.9
6.2
15.0
1M
13.6

1957

1958

14.1
7.7
19.6
14.1
18.4
7.4
19.0
13.7
14.2

1M
7.7
18.7
12.1
15.0
5.6
15.7
13.4
1M

....
;;S

~

15.1

11.7

11.9

13.2

11.9

12.0

12.5·

11.7·

.:

....'"
"'l

[

15.7

11.4

10.5

8.9

8.7

7.9

10.6

13.9

11.0

8.9

9.2

9.0

9.7

10.0

9.9

9.6

13.8

17.1

14.4

12.3

12.5

12.4

15.0

13.8

12.9

9.8

• Federal Trade Commission, as reported in Hearings, op. cit., p. 6138.
b Cost and Margin Trends in the Bakinll Industry, op. cit.
• Compiled from Moody's industrial manual and annual reports.
d Statistics 0/ Income, U.S. Treasury Department. Internal Revenue Service, various years. These data are for corporation food manufacturers and
all manufacturers filing corporate income tax returns.
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or slightly more than one-half cent per pound (0.512 cents).10 This
is slightly lower than the average net profit of 5.8 percent or
0.638 cents per pound reported by wholesale baking companies for
1946-47. In recent years, falling average profit rates of wholesale
baking companies have been associated with rising consumer prices
for bread.
In the third place, although average profit levels of wholesale
baking companies have been consistently higher than those of food
processing and manufacturing industries throughout the postwar
period, the three profit series have tended to move together. The
Federal Trade Commission publishes rates of return on net investment after taxes of 421 identical companies in 24 selected industries
for the prewar year of 1940 and the postwar period. Between 1940
and 1958, the group of 14 reporting baking companies showed the
greatest increase in rates of return of reporting companies in
24 industries. l l
In part, this is because the baking companies started from a
lower base, but their profits also rose to higher levels in the postwar
years. In 1940, all manufacturing industries sampled earned 8.8
percent on net investment as compared with 7.4 percent for the
baking companies. By 1958, all manufacturing industries earned
9.8 percent as compared with 10.1 percent for the baking companies.
The four largest baking companies reported profits of 13.4 percent
in 1958, as compared with 7.9 percent in 1940 (Table 20). The
average rate of return on net investment for the four largest baking
companies was at a postwar high of 21.2 percent in 1948, almost
three times the prewar level, but not much greater than profits
reported for food processing and manufacturing industries at that
time. By 1954, the average rate of return reported by the four largest
baking companies had fallen to 11.9 percent as compared with 9.0
percent for all food processing and 12.4 percent for all manufacturing industries.
Large multi-plant baking companies tend to earn higher rates
of return than smaller single-plant companies in recent years,
while, in 1950 and 1951, average profits for the two groups of firms
were nearly the same (Table 21). By 1955, profits of single-plant
10. Hearings, op. cit., p. 6579. This is the reported earnings of the four largest
baking companies on sales of white bread. This compares with profits of 2.92
percent on sales of all products including bread.
II. The industries sampled included more than 50 percent of total assets
of all manufacturing industries. Federal Trade Commission, Rates of Return For
Identical Companies in Selected Manufacturing Industries, 1940, 1947-58,
Department of Justice (Washington, D.C., 1960), P. 10.
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companies averaged about one-third less than profits of multi-plant
companies. Indications are that this trend has continued since 1955,
with one important exception. Single-plant baking companies affiliated with bakery management groups apparently have earned considerably higher returns than nonaffiliated companies. In 1958, the
eight largest wholesale baking companies reported accounting profits
of $32.8 million or about 3 percent (2.92) on sales of $1,125 million.
The 123 plants operated by predominantly single-plant firms affiliated with Quality Bakers of America management group had profits
of $12.2 million, or 4.35 percent of reported sales of $280 million. 12
Price and Profit Performance of Integrated Grocery Chains
Thus far the discussion of the profit criteria has dealt primarily
with profits reported by selected wholesale baking companies. These
have been such as to have little appreciable impact on bread
prices. Some additional evidence is available on the profits earned
by the bakery divisions of integrated grocery chain companies.
Table 22 shows the bakery profit experience of the A&P grocery
chain from 1924 to 1939. The company is, and was during this
TABLE 22
BAKERY SALES, INVESTMENT, AND PROFITS-A&P BAKERY DIVISION-1924-1939
Retail
Sales
Year
(thousand
dollars)

1924
$ 9,162
15,174
1925
21,913
1926
29,646
1927
34,627
1928
36,451
1929
1930
38,752
37,824
1931
32,413
1932
34,391
1933
1934
38,126
1935
41,027
1936
42,183
41,793
1937
1938
40,853
Av.1924-39

Invest·
mentin
Bakery
Plant and
Equipment
(thousand
dollars)

$2,569
3,086
3,288
3,668
4,268
4,698
4,871
4,951
4,859
4,373
4,014
3,681
3,461
3,313
3,035

Unadjusted
Rate of
Profit
Return
on Investment

(thousand
dollars)

$ 440
407
1,998
2,585
3,540
3,855
5,464
4,621
3,885
2,942
3,176
3,156
2,784
2,956
5,191

(percent)

17.1
13.1
60.8
70.8
82.9
82.0
112.2
93.3
80.0
67.3
79.1
85.7
80.4
89.2
171.1
81.6

Adjusted'
Profit
Rate of
Return
on Invest·
ment
(thousand
dollars)
(percent)

$ 120
-53
1,384
1,840
2,539
2,796
4,224
3,391
3,303
1,703
1,956
2,374
1,898
2,538
4.333

4.5
-1.7
42.2
55.8
59.3
59.2
86.8
68.4
67.9
39.1
48.6
64.6
55.0
76.7
142.0
59.1

SoURCE: From company records in trial transcript quoted by Adelman, M. A., AiTP,
A Study in Price· Cost Behavior and Public Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1959), p. 254 •
• Adjusted bakery profits estimated as follows: bakery sales are multiplied by the retail
net profit rate for the year, yielding the estimated retail profit on bakery goods. This is
subtracted from the unadjusted profit, and a rate of return calculated on the same investment base.

12. Hearings, 01'. cit., p. 6088.
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period, the largest retailer of food in the United States and also
the largest producer of private label bakery products. The average
unadjusted rate of return on net investment in its bakery division
was 81.6 percent during this 15 year prewar period. This was several
times the average rate of return after taxes reported by wholesale
baking companies in 1940, and suggests that grocery chains may have
had a considerable incentive to enter the baking industry because of
the potential improvement in their profit positions.
There is some evidence on the extent to which more recent
grocery chain integration affects the performance of bread markets
with respect to profits and prices. Indications are that as long as
only a few of the largest grocery chains integrate into baking (they
accounted for about 11 percent of total U.S. bread output in 1958),
price differentials between private label and wholesaler brands
probably do not appreciably affect the price behavior of wholesale
baking companies on their own brands. Analysis of private label and
wholesaler brand prices in a large number of bread markets has
shown that no consistent relationship exists between the two. This
finding lends support to the view that the lower average prices
paid by consumers of private label brands are unrelated to prices
of wholesaler brands. Integrated grocery chains deliver their private
label bread at costs much below those of the nonintegrated firms,
and pass part of this differential forward to consumers of private
label bread.
Table 23 presents evidence from various sources which indicates
that, for the U.S. as a whole, in 1958 consumers paid an estimated
3.3 cents per pound, or 17 percent, less for private label bread than
for wholesale brands.
The data suggest that the five largest integrated grocery chains
received approximately 1.5 cents per pound profits on their bakery
divisions. After provision for corporate income taxes, this is estimated at about a 30-35 percent return on net investment (less depreciation of plant and equipment) of their bakery divisions.1 3
While this is two or three times the rate of return on net investment by wholesale baking companies (also after corporate income
taxes) in 1958, it has very little effect on consumer bread prices.
Assuming that grocery chains integrated into private label bread
production charge themselves the same gross store margins per dollar
13. Net investment estimated on the basis of reported depreciation allowance of 35 cents per hundred pounds of bread produced by the largest four
wholesale baking companies and 17 cents for the five largest integrated grocery
chain bakeries, depreciation at 15 years in 1958. Report, op. cit., p. 113.
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TABLE 23
ESTIMATED AVERAGE WHOLESALE BAKERY AND INTEGRATED GROCERY CHAIN BREAD
COSTS, PRICES, AND PROFIT MARGINS, BY REGION, UNITED STATES, 1958

Regionaand
Brand

WESTERN REGION
Wholesaler brands
Groce:-;; chain brands
Chain di erential
NORTHEAST REGION
Wholesaler brands
Grocerli chain brands
Chain d' erential
CENTRAL REGION
Wholesaler brands
Groce~ chain brands
Chain di erential
SoUTHERN REGION
Wholesaler brands
Groce~ chain brands
Chain di erential
AVERAGE, U.S.
Wholesaler brands
Groced; chain brands
Chain di erential

Aver·
age
Cost
of
Bread
Production and
Wholesale Dis·
tribu·
tion b

Pre·
vail.
ing
Wholesale (or
Trans·
fer
Price)"

Esti·
mated
Bakery
Profits
(Before
Taxes)d

Cents

Cents

Cents

15_7
12.4
-3.3

17_9
17.0
-0.9

2_2
4.6
+2.4

15.1
1l.8
-3.3

17.5
14.3
-3.2

15.5
12.2
-3.3

Retail Grocery
Store Margine

Pre·
vail·
ing
Con8umer
Retail
Price!

Percent

Cents

5.1
5.0

22.2
(22.3)

23.0
22.0
-1.0

2.4
2.5
+0.1

3.3
2.7
-0.6

15.9
(15.9)

20.8
17.0
-3.8

16.0
12.5
-3.5

0.5
0.3
-0.2

3.2
2.5
-0.7

16.7
(16.7)

19.2
15.0
-4.2

14.5
11.2
-3.3

15.4
14.9
-0.5

0.9
3.7
+2.8

2.2
2.1
-0.1

12.5
(12.5)

17.6
17.0
-0.6

15.1
11.8
-3.3

16.0
13.3
-2.7

0.9
1.5
+0.6

3.3
2.7
-0.6

17.1
(17.1)

19.3
16.0
-3.3

Cents

a Representative bread markets were selected in each of four regions: Sacramento, Cali·
fornia, in the Western reKion; Brooklyn, New York, in the Northeast region; Chica~, IIIi·
nois, in the Central region; and San Antonio, Texas, in the Southern region.
b Average U.S. costs per pound, white pan bread, 1958, from reports by the four largest
wholesale bakinlr companies and five major lIl"ocery chains' intelrrated bakeries, filed with the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, and ~rinted in, Report, op. cit., p.
lIS. Variation in costs by reKion based on reKional cost variation reported on 123 medium to
Iarge'sized bread plants. Ibid., p. 31.
• Western regional average wholesale or transfer prices from a special tabulation of U.S.
Census data. Average U.S. wholesale price or transfer price of white pan bread from, 1958
Census of Manufactures, op. cit., pp.12·11I. For other reKions, prevailing price of wholesale
brands at wholesale from reports by the seven largest wholesale baking companies to the U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, and prevailing chain store brand transfer
prices computed from, National Bread Price Survey, Anheuser·Busch, St. Louis, (September,
1958).
d Profits of the bread bakery division of wholesaIer and grocery chain bakeries is a residual
estimate, i.e., coL 2·col. I.
• Retail lrfOCery store marKins on wholesaler brandl of white bread computed on a pound
basis from reports on these markets from Anheuser-Busch, ibid. Store margins on grocery
chain brandl of white bread assumed as the same percentalre per dollar sales as on whole·
saler brandl. This Is a reasonable assumption based on prevailiDir practice of chain stores.
• Prevailing consumer retail price of wholesaler brandl of white pan bread in 1958 from
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Development in Marketing Spreads for Agricultural Pro·
ducts, 1958, op. cit., p. 1I. ReKional data from reports by major companies, Report, op. cit.,
pp. 191-194. Prevailing consumer retail price of grocery chain brands, average U.S., calcu·
lated by adding the average grocery store margin to the average transfer price of grocery
chain bakeries, as reported by U.S. Census. Prevailinlt consumer retail price of grocery
chain brandl by reKions from reports on these markets m Anheuser·Busch, op. cit.

sales as they receive on wholesaler brands, the chain bakery divisions
captured only about 0.6 cents per pound (before corporate income
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taxes or about 0.3 cents per pound after taxes) more in profits than
the four largest wholesale baking companies. Were this amount (0.6
cents) passed forward to the consumer along with the 3.3 cents per
pound he currently receives, it would exert very little marginal
effect. It would add about $8 million to the $112.5 million saved
by the 25 percent of U.S. consumers buying private label bread in
1958. Thus the inference seems justified that the benefits to the
consumer in the form of lower private label bread prices resulting
from vertical integration by grocery chains into the baking industry
far outweigh the costs of this integration in the form of excess
profits in 1958.
There are some notable exceptions to this generalization. In
many markets, integrated grocery chains have been content to follow
the price leadership of wholesaler brands. A good example of this
sort of price conduct is shown in Table 23. Average retail price of
chain store bread in most Western markets was 22 cents per pound
compared with average retail prices of wholesaler brands of 23
cents per pound, or a one cent differential in 1958. However, average
costs of production and distribution in Western markets are estimated at only about 12.4 cents per pound for chain brands, as compared with 15.7 cents per pound for wholesale brands, or a cost
difference of 3.3 cents. Assuming the same gross store margins per
dollar sales for both brands, the chain bakery divisions captured
2.4 cents per pound more than wholesale baking companies in profits
(before corporate income taxes). The inference seems justified that
the western consumer benefits very little from the vertical integration by grocery chains into the baking industry. In some markets the
costs to consumers of profits by the bakery divisions of integrated
grocery chains apparently far outweigh the benefits of lower private
label bread prices. Table 23 also illustrates that, in other regions
where the differential between private label and wholesale label
bread is greater than the national average, the effect is that most or
all of the potential integrated grocery chain profits are passed forward to the consumer.
Data on price and profit levels are not sufficient to explain the
net effect of chain integration on performance in bread markets.
Price and profit measures show only part of the effects. Consideration of the impact on efficiency and the cost of non price competition
must await analysis of technological and costs data in a later section
of this chapter.
Product Quality Criteria of Market Performance
A known set of quality alternatives would provide a reasonably
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clear test of market performance. Theoretically, firms should
enhance product quality as long as the marginal cost of improve- ment is outweighed by the additional price that consumers are
willing to pay.14 In real life, however, such quality determinants are
difficult to evaluate, and nowhere more so than in judging bread.
Possible variations in texture and taste have important technical
limits. Nor can the nutritional quality of bread be wholly determined by the consumer. The usual test of softness is more nearly a
test of water and air content than quality. Thus, it is extremely
difficult for consumers to express accurate quality-price preferences
for bread. Also some aspects of bread quality are related to costs
only tenuously if at all. 15 Beyond the problems faced by the individual firm in determining cost-quality relationships lies the more
difficult evaluation of market performance with respect to quality
under conditions of interdependence among firms in a market area.
Even though the relatively inelastic demand for bread with
respect to price indicates that consumers would pay for quality
improvement, the oligopolistic structure of the bread market tends
to preclude it. As we saw in Chapter 2, except for nutritional requirements originally imposed by federal standards, most white
pan bread is probably not appreciably superior in quality to that
produced in the early stages of commercial mechanized production.
There are minor exceptions to this generalization. Some improvement in texture of bread resulted from the continuous dough-mix
production process introduced during the past decade, but this
accounts for less than 5 percent of total bread output. Moreover,
per capita production of non-white bread (wheat, rye, raisin, and
specialty breads) has declined in the postwar years, although not as
fast as white bread. Most bread remains plain white bread.
Due to the virtual homogeneity of product and the difficulty
of consumer quality-price evaluation, costs incurred by anyone
firm as a result of quality improvement are difficult to recoup by
increased prices. With the exception of some notable success with
a dense frozen loaf in recent years (probably less than 1 percent of
total bread output), no single firm has been able to isolate its
demand from that of other firms in the market.
Necessary costs of information and production connected with
14. Bain, op. cit., p. 398.
15. Interviews with bakery operators suggest that change to a more nutritious and firmer loaf could be achieved with practically no increase in cost.
This is especially true if frozen storage becomes practical so that factors now
conducive to spoilage can be controlled without eliminating them from the bread.
Also, frozen bread would not be subject to the squeeze test for freshness.
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the introduction of an improved product are not usually offset by
future returns to a single firm. If the quality change is successful,
it is rapidly imitated by other firms in an oligopoly market situation
with inelastic demand. 16 No one firm can elevate quality above or
below that of other firms for long in an oligopoly situation. If
quality improvement should occur, it would be based on leadership
within an oligopoly market group similar to price leadership.
Otherwise the innovator risks loss of consumer acceptance and of
shelf space in grocery stores. In the case of price leadership, the
impetus for change stems from cost increases experienced by the
market group in general. In the case of bread quality there has
been no comparable signal. The net result is that real bread
quality improvement has not been an important competitive variable in the postwar years.

Efficiency of Bread Production and
Wholesale Bread Markets
Least-Cost Bread Production*
Primary emphasis in Chapter 3 was on the synthesis of shortrun and long-run cost functions for bread baking from engineeringeconomic data. These functions represent the cost of production
with least-cost combinations of technologies and with reasonably
efficient management and worker performance. Few bread companies
have achieved or may be expected to achieve this degree of production efficiency. A comparison of actual with hypothetical production systems suggests relative weights to attach to various factors being used inefficiently, and hence points in the direction of
possible improvement.
There are three major types of adjustments which may lead
• Use of the word "potential" throughout this section, when referring to
the difference between existing and least·cost bread production, is not meant
to imply that removal of the disparity would be desirable or possible in
all markets.
16. A vice· president of Campbell Taggart Associated Bakeries, Inc. (second
largest in the U.S.) reports that "when the really soft breads started coming on
the market about 1947," it was determined that Campbell Taggart would not
use chemical bread softeners to make bread softer than it already was. "We
felt certain that the consumers would soon tire of bread with a softener added,
and that our competitors would suffer. We soon found ourselves in the position
of any other businessman who guessed wrong. We lost business. It took us as long
as seven years in some locations to regain the business we had lost." Steve
Vesecky, "Where's the Good Bread that Grandma Baked?", Co.op Grain Quarterly (May 1958), p. 60.
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to sizable cost reductions (Table 24). These are: (I) adoption of
efficient technology and techniques of production which would
bring individual plant cost curves down to the long-run cost curve;
(2) movement along the short-run plant cost curve by increased
hours of operation to three-shift levels; and (3) movement along the
long-run cost curve by increasing size of plant to optimum scale.
Potential long-run industrial savings are estimated to be about
$183 million per year for the first step, $187 million per year for the
second step, and $150 million per year for the third step.
This amounts to more than one-half billion dollars per year
in potential production cost reductions, or about 23 percent
of net bakery sales of bread and bread type rolls in 1958 (excluding retail margins).
In addition to the specific results, the cost functions provide
the basis for reorganization of production in particular market
situations. While there is evidence that bread market conditions
differ very little throughout the United States, certainly there are
pronounced differences in wage rates and ingredient costs. Such
changes in the economic relationships can be incorporated into
the basic production functions, and the revised functions used to
make meaningful estimates of the costs and savings that could be
expected from reorganization in particular geographic and historical situations.
A full evaluation of the potential cost reductions presented as
Table 23 would require consideration of costs of delivery as well.
However, since most plants tend to be closely located within metropolitan area markets, a considerable amount of plant reorganization could be accomplished without materially increasing delivery
costs. As shown in Chapter 4, delivery costs could be substantially
reduced through economies associated with size of delivery, volume
of delivery vehicle, and specialization of delivery labor.
An important constraint to improving production cost performance in bread markets is the under-utilization of plant resulting
from the daily variation in bread market sales. DeLoach reports
that grocery stores have made little headway in efforts to equalize
sales between days of the week, and that, as a result of consumer
shopping habits, about 70 percent of food sales are on Thursday,
Friday, and Saturday.u When an allowance is made for the daily
variation in consumer buying habits within the week, presented as
17. D. B. DeLoach, Changes in Food Retailing-Causes, Effects, Washington
State University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 619 (Pullman,
October, 1960), p. 23.
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ESTIMATED POTENTIAL PRODUCTION COST REDUCTIONS THAT WOULD RESULT FROM POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BREAD
AND BREAD TYPE ROLLS, BY SIZE OF PLANT, UNITED STATES, 1958

Total

Total

Cents
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PRODUCTION COST REDUCTIONS BY 9PECIFIED ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION
Under Optimum Utilization of Plants
Size of Plant
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Total

4.0

521.5

1.4

187.9

0.9

125.8

0.5

62.1

1.2

150.4

1.4

183.2

2000 Ibs. per hr.

5.4

287.9

1.7

90.7

1.2

64.0

0.5

26.7

2.0

106.6

1.7

90.6

~.

;;
~

~

~

......
~

4000 lbs. per hr.

4.0

158.4

1.6

64.5

0.9

36.3

0.7

28.2

1.0

40.3

1.4

53.6

6000 Ibs. per hr.

2.2

52.1

0.9

22.2

0.7

17.3

0.2

4.9

0.14

3.5

1.1

26.4

1:

8000 Ibs. per hr.

2.0

23.1

0.9

10.5

0.7

8.2

0.2

2.3

0

1.1

12.6

00

SoURCE: Calculated from the engineering-based short- and long-run cost curves presented as Figures 1 and 2. Census reports sales of 13 billion pounds of
bread and bread type roUs in 1958, valued at 17.3 cents per pound or $2,262 million. This assumes that the size distribution of bread plants is the same
as the size distribution of aU plants classified by Census in the industry. See Table 4.
• Difference between an estimated average rate of bread plant utilization in 1958 of 54 hours per week and practical plant capacity of 108 hours per
week, given the external limitation Qf consumer purchasing habits.
"Difference between average plant utilization of 108 hours per week and 144 hours per week, or 24 hours per day, 6 days per week .
• With 8,000 pounds per hour capacity,
d With automatic final proofer, automatic depanner, pan stacker and unstacker, cooler, and continuous dough mix equipment.

~
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Table 16, bread plant capacity is adjusted downward from 144
hours per week to 108 hours per week. Table 24 shows that only a
small part of the costs of under-utilization of bread plants is associated with consumer buying habits, or about $62 million of the
aggregate cost of under-utilization estimated at $188 million.
It should be noted that these calculations of cost-saving alternatives available to the baking industry abstract from the problem of
multi-product plants. This serves the intended purpose of simplifying the analysis to manageable proportions, and white bread represents about 60 percent of the total product of the industry. It may
have the additional effect of slightly overstating the case for optimum plant reorganization presented here. Most bread plants have
multi-product outputs. But bread and bread type rolls are the most
important and represent 75.3 pounds of the 92.4 pound total annual
per capita consumption of the industry's total production in 1958.
The cost analysis here abstracts from the problem of producing the
remaining 17.1 pounds, which is made up of sweet rolls, cakes,
pies, cookies and doughnuts.
Although not tested here, one implication is that similarly
shaped cost functions may be found for many of these specialty
bakery products. Within the bread and bread type roll category, some limitations arise when, for example, some specialty
breads require more expensive ingredients or a minimum amount of
additional equipment to that posited here for white bread plants.
These possible limitations were not measured in this study, but
other sources lead the authors to conclude that in the aggregate,
differences in total production cost per pound are probably not
greater than 5 percent. IS
The achievement of optimum performance in bread and bread
type roll markets would reduce the aggregate investment in plant
and equipment by an estimated $200 million-from about $550 million to about $350 million. As a rough estimate, investment (less
depreciation) in inefficient bread plants in 1958 was between $300
million and $400 million, based on a ratio of sales to investment of
four or five times. 19
In theory, the inefficient plants of 2,000 and 4,000 pounds per
hour capacities could be closed and their owners compensated in
a single year, out of a hypothetical $500 million fund created by
18. See for example, Evert Kindstrand, "Mechanization of Roll and Bun
Operations," The Bakers' Digest (April, 1958), pp. 68-71.
19. Calculated from data presented in Cost and Margin Trends in the Baking
Industry, op. cit., pp. 6-7; and Chapter 3 of this report.
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shifting the production of bread and bread type rolls to 225 leastcost plants. 2o This assumes the estimated investment (less depreciation) of $100 million in plants with near-optimum capacities of
6,000 pounds per hour would not be wholly lost, nor would the
investment of about $50 million in plants with capacities of 8,000
pounds per hour.
New investment of approximately $200 million would be
required to construct 52 new least-cost plants, to expand the capacity of existing plants with capacities of 6,000 pounds per hour in
1958 to 8,000 pounds per hour, and to install efficient equipment
in the plants currently with output capacity of approximately 8,000
pounds per hour in 1958. Such investment is compensated at a rate
of 10 percent annually in the synthesis of least-cost operations used
to estimate potential cost reductions shown in Table 24. Capital
should be readily forthcoming at this rate. If not, profit levels
could be doubled under optimum bread plant organization to 20
percent annually at a cost to consumers of only 17/100 of a cent
per pound of bread produced.
Taking advantage of potential reductions in costs of producing
bread and bread type rolls would have substantial effects on market
structure and industrial concentration levels. If, as hypothesized,
42 bread plants with output of 8,000 pounds per hour were modernized and kept in operation, the eight largest baking companies
would operate exactly half of these, or 21 plants (Table 4). If in
addition, the 131 bread plants with output of 6,000 pounds per
hour were modernized and expanded to a size of 8,000 pounds per
hour, the largest eight baking companies would operate slightly
fewer than half, or 64 plants. This would represent a sizable
increase of about 32 percent over their share of national output in
1958, as measured by both bakery sales and plant capacities.
Moreover, while the eight largest grocery chains integrated into
bread production in 1958 owned only 8 percent of bread plant
capacity, this would be increased to about 12 percent if only 6,000
20. Although economic forces tend to lead in this direction in the long run,
this estimate should not be interpreted as a precise measure in the short run
of the ideal number of needed bread plants in a privately operated bread marketing system. In reality we would expect that there would be many practical
reasons why, in particular cases, such size plants as this smaller number contemplates would not necessarily be the optimum type today and certainly not in
the future. Of the more than $520 million potential production cost reductions,
about $400 million could be realized by maintaining in operation most plants
of 4,000 pounds per hour capacity and above, by adopting automatic continuousmix machinery, and by operating at practical capacity of about 108 hours
per week.
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and 8,000 pound per hour plants were retained. This would leave all
other owners of bread plants with about 39 percent of plant capacity retained and modernized in 68 plants.
It is readily apparent that the critical question of whether concentration at the national level would be increased would depend
upon who builds the 52 new bread plants each with output of
8,000 pounds per hour. If small baking companies were to construct
these 52 plants, the structure of the industry nationally would not
be greatly changed at the eight-firm level. Concentration among the
eight largest baking companies would be increased from approximately 32 percent in 1958 to 38 percent of total bread sales, and
the share of integrated grocery chains in the baking industry would
decline only slightly, from 11 percent of bread sales in 1958 to
9 percent. Another important implication for market structure and
industrial organization is that while concentration in certain bread
markets would be appreciably increased by reorganization to achieve
least-cost production in bread plants, concentration at the national
level could be substantially lower than 1958 levels without adverse
effects on efficient bread production, at the plant level. Also, testimony before the Senate subcommittee indicates that managerial
economies that may accrue from multi-plant organization under a
single management are as readily achievable through voluntary association of independent operations as through multi-plant ownership.
There is little or no evidence that large corporations have appreciable advantage over cooperative and voluntary management groups
in the baking industry.
Census reports that the 1,353 bakeries with 90 percent or more
specialization in bread and bread type rolls employed 38,194 production workers in 1958. These plants had sales of $1,452 million,
practically all of which was for bread and bread type rolls. Total
sales of bread and bread type rolls are reported as $2,262 million
in 1958.
If we assume that production labor imputed to bread and bread
type roll production in plants with less than 90 percent specialization is the same as in specialized bread plants, we can estimate total
production labor for bread and bread type rolls in 1958 as about
60,000 workers. Reorganization of bread and bread type roll plants
to achieve least-cost production in 8,000 pound per hour plants
would displace an estimated 43,000 workers, in both direct and
indirect production jobs. Such a change would require retraining
of displaced bakery production workers, and moving them out of the
baking industry into other industries where rapid growth in labor
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requirements develops. A fund of $100 million annually could be
partially devoted to the task. This amount is the balance of the
hypothetical $500 million fund created by shifting the production
of bread and bread type rolls to 225 least-cost plants after $400 million is set aside to compensate owners of inefficient plants.
With the many institutional barriers to change that exist in
bread markets, it is doubtful that more than a few of these adjustments and consequent savings can be actually achieved in the short
run. However, the material that has been presented should provide
useful guides for bread plant operators interested in planning new
facilities, for groups of plant operators contemplating reorganization, and for agencies planning labor retraining programs.
Barriers to Achieving Production Efficiency
in Oligopolistic Bread Markets
While the progressiveness of firms in adopting new machines
and techniques of production in bread markets is less than optimum,
it perhaps approaches adequacy relative to the costs of progress,
especially when compared with evidently attainable rates (Tables
12 and 13). Baking companies are reasonably quick to adopt many
new machines that increase efficiency and productive capacity. In
some cases, the adoption of machines such as the twister is an
attempt to differentiate the product and thus to compete on nonprice terms. But the usual reason for adopting new machines is to
achieve production efficiency. In concrete terms, this is measured by
the pay-out period in terms of labor cost saving, as illustrated earlier
in this report. Average production labor costs to the industry have
increased from $1.07 per hour in 1947 to $1.97 cents per hour in
1958, a development that makes potential savings on labor costs
attractive. That labor displacement has taken place is suggested by
the fact that the total number of industry production laborers has
declined from 189,000 in 1947 to 145,000 in 1958 while output
increased slightly. In general, firms in the industry consider short
machine pay-out periods as the relevant horizon because of the
insecurity of their market shares and because of the single-use aspect
of most bakery machinery.
Much bakery machinery is purchased on the basis of a two to
four year pay-out period (Table 13). This evidence refutes the usual
assumption that high profit levels are necessary for capital equipment adoption. The findings in bakery equipment markets is consistent with the assumption that firms could experience zero returns
at the time the adoption decision is made without reducing their
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incentive to adopt new machines and techniques of production.
What is economic for the plant or firm, however, may not necessarily
represent efficient performance for the market or industry.
This type of market situation is synthesized in Figure 10. The
situation shown in the figure is one of a wholesale market for standard wholesaler brands of bread. The demand curve DBDB shows
the quantity of these brands that can be sold at varying 'prices in
the market area. We assume, for purposes of illustration, that four
wholesale baking companies are operating in this market. Three are
small-scale, relatively high-cost firms, and one is a larger-scale relatively low-cost firm. The different firm cost conditions are shown
graphically in Figure 10. The average total unit cost structures
refer only to the cost of producing and distributing bread, not to
other perishable bakery products that may be sold by the wholesale
baking plants. The slope of the curve reflects the plant productionTHREE STANDARD AUTOMATED BATCH
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FIG. IO.-Average total unit costs before and after introduction of new production technology into a bread market.
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cost functions, as average total unit costs of delivery and selling
are assumed constant for purposes of this illustration. We have no
problem of determining the price at which wholesale bread is to
sell. It was established by the price leadership of one of the smallscale, high-cost firms at 16 cents per pound to cover his average
total unit costs of 15.8 cents per pound on sales of 140,000 pounds
per week.
Assume first that firm A adopts output-increasing and costreducing equipment and/or techniques of production which nearly
double its production capacity and allow a considerable profit (1.5
cents per pound) over production and selling costs with no change
in output. This shift in its short-run cost structure down and to
the right is suggested by the dotted cost structure, ATUCa> shown
in Figure 10. Although the dominant firm D is making a good
profit (1.3 cents per pound) on sales of 280,000 pounds per week
and might be happy to leave things as they are, firm A has reduced
its costs below those of D. The prospect of greater profits may
induce firm D to adopt output-increasing and cost-reducing equipment and/or techniques that have similar effects on productive
capacity. This shift in its short-run cost structure down and to the
right is suggested by the dotted cost structure, ATUC d , shown in Figure 10.
Excess productive capacity (over and above the 700,000 weekly
consumption in the market), which was formerly about 600,000
pounds per week, now rises to 900,000 pounds per week after the
technological changes introduced by two of the four firms in
the market.
Perhaps more important is recognition of the fact that the
price-quantity solution in this type of market is made more unstable
by technological change. Observers have recognized that "a composite of local market oligopoly, of an outmoded distribution
method, and of union influence on wholesale distribution costs"21
provides a strong incentive for vertical integration of grocery chains
into bread baking and delivery to their own stores in efficient semitrailer volumes. What has been little recognized is that a grocery
chain with sales of 350,000 pounds of bread per week, in a market
with similar conditions to those hypothesized in the model, may
be attracted to the production of bread through construction of new,
efficient bread plants.
Such a chain could operate a 4,000 pound per hour automatic
21. Richard B. Heflebower, "Mass Distribution: A Phase of Bilateral Oligopoly
or of Competition?" American Economic Review (May, 1957), p. 280.
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continuous-mix plant at practical capacity of 108 hours per week
(similar to ATUC a , shown in Figure 10) at a saving in production
costs of about three cents per pound below the wholesale price of
16 cents. Since the total quantity of bread sold in the market remains
almost static, the new firm's sales will cut into those of the wholesale
baking companies in the market by about 350,000 pounds per week.
All are producing at a smaller volume than before at lower levels
of plant utilization and at higher total unit costs. As small-scale and
high-cost firms Band C sell less, they are forced to operate in the
area upwards and to the left of the point of operation shown in
Figure 10 and suffer losses at existing prices.
One of the small-scale high-cost firms becomes a price leader, and
market price of wholesale brands is increased to cover the highercost operations at lower levels of plant capacity. In most cases,
large-scale lower-cost firms follow price increases to keep most of
the small-scale members of the oligopoly group in business and
avoid aggressive price cutting.
The historic result in most bread markets is that consumers have
realized little or no benefit from the progressive adoption of more
efficient bread production technology. There is a strong tendency
toward chronic underemployment of capital equipment in the
bakery industry. This stems primarily from the adoption of new
output-increasing equipment and/or techniques by bakery firms in
spite of an almost static demand for bread. Adoption of new capital
equipment is transformed into higher fixed costs and higher market
prices because, even if some firms increase their efficiency or gain
fuller plant utilization, their success tends to spread the excess
capacity over the other competitors in the market.
Excess capacity persists owing to the acquiescence of an oligopolistic market structure. Market organization is characterized by the
dominance of an interdependent group of sellers whose costs of
operating old and new equipment at less than full capacity are
protected by price leadership. The tendency toward chronic excess
capacity is a long way from being offset by merger and failure which
result in scrapping of some plant equipment.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that although the industry
includes more than 5,000 firms, the plant capacity reported by the
eight largest baking companies in 1958 combined with the bakery
plant capacity owned by the eight largest grocery chains is about
sufficient to supply current consumption levels of bread and bread
type rolls. Excess investment (less depreciation) in bakery plant and
equipment has been estimated as $300 to $400 million.
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Potential Reduction in Distribution Costs
Primary emphasis in Chapter 4 was on the development of
short-run distribution cost curves from survey data. These observations have the limitation of the survey technique in that they fail
to reflect optimum operation of the bread delivery system at minimum cost levels. However, the relative efficiency of the wholesale
driver-salesman route delivery system can be estimated by comparing it with a semi-trailer dock delivery system utilized by some
retail grocery chains to deliver private label bread to their own
stores, by some wholesale baking companies, and by common carrier
trucking firms. Although no evidence is developed on least-cost
organization of semi-trailer dock delivery to grocery stores, the
system does represent a practical alternative to the driver-salesman
system and average cost studies suggest sizable potential reductions
in bread distribution costs (Table 25).
There are two important areas of potential adjustment in bread
distribution which will be discussed here and which may lead to
sizable cost reductions. These are: (I) adoption of a distribution
organization which would facilitate the specialization of delivery,
display, and billing labor by function; ins tore disposal of day-old
bread; and newspaper advertisement of bread prices; which would
bring individual distribution cost curves down to the long-run cost
curve, and (2) movement along the long-run distribution cost curve
by increasing size of the delivery vehicle.
Potential long-run industrial savings are estimated t~ be about
$270 million per year for the specialization of delivery, display,
and billing labor by function, $63 million per year for ins tore disposal of day-old bread, $92 million for exclusive use of newspaper
general food advertisement, $30 million for increasing the size of
delivery vehicle, and $75 million for associated miscellaneous savings in sales supervision, etc. This amounts to more than one-half
billion dollars per year in potential distribution cost reductions,
or about 30 percent of bread and bread type roll sales by wholesale baking companies in 1958 (excluding retail margins).
These considerations do not exhaust the possibilities for
improved efficiency and economy in bread distribution. For example, the assumption is made that bread will be delivered fresh within
24 hours after baking. But bread might be distributed in frozen form
within the established frozen food channels. Preliminary reports by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture indicate that frozen bread distribution could result in a cost reduction of about 2 cents per pound
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below distribution costs via the existing system of wholesale driversalesmen delivery and selling. 22
A comparison of the driver-salesman system with the grocery
dock delivery system suggests the relative weights to attach to various
bread distribution factors now used inefficiently, and hence the
direction of possible remedy. In addition to the specific results
presented in Table 25, the relationships provide a basis for reorganization of distribution in particular market situations. While the
TABLE 25
EmMATED DISTRIBUTION CoST REDUcnONS THAT WOULD RESULT FROM POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, BREAD AND BREAD TYPE ROLLS DISTRIBUTED
WHOLESALE THROUGH GROCERY STORES, UNITED STATES,

1958

Avera~

Costs per Pound
of et Bakery Sales
Semi· Trailer
Wholesale
Dock
DriverDelivery
Salesman
System
System
(cents)
(cents)

Alternative
Organization

Instore disposal
of surplus product"
Semi-trailer
delivery vehicleb
Specializa tion of
labor delivery"
Joint food newspaper
advertising"
Associated miscellaneous saving"
Aggregate cost reduction
in wholesale
distribu tion

Cost Reduc·
tion per
Pound of
Net Bakery
Sales
(cents)

Estimated
Total Cost
Reduction,
U. S., 1958 f
(million
dollars)

0.80

0.17

0.63

$ 63

1.00

0.70

0.30

$ 30

3.00

0.30

2.70

$270

1.00

0.08

0.92

$ 92

1.00

0.25

0.75

$ 75

6.80

1.50

5.30

$530

See Chapter 5 for sources of average costs of distribution via driver·salesman and
semi-trailer dock delivery systems. Specific sources and standards of efficient bread distribution services are Kiven below.
"Estimate based on a study of the stale bread problem by the Stanford Food Research
Institute, which concluded that a loss of 0.5 to 1.0 percent is an attainable standard, and
"losses above 1.0 percent reflect obiectionable trade practices, poor business management, or
both." Davis and Eldred, op. cit., p. 7.
b Using accounting records of representative dock delivery to grocery stores in large Midwestern markets utilizing semi-trailer vehicles, 48,000 pounds per week, delivery vehicle costs
are about 0.7 cents per pound.
• Using the same source as above, semi-trailer truck driver expenses are about 0.5 cents
per pound. Instore functions such as ordering and display servicing are transferred from the
wholesale driver-salesman to specialized instore personnel, and are compensated for out of
the gross retail store marilin, as is the case for most food products distributed through grocery
stores.
d Estimated advertisinll and promotion allowance reductions that would result from the
exclusive use of newspaper general food ads, based on reported chain store costs of private
label bread advertising of 0.08 cents per pound in 1958. Report, op. cit., p. 113 .
• Associated savinllS in sales supervision and accounting is a residual estimate based on
calculated total dock delivery costs of 1.5 cents per pound and average wholesale distribution
costs of 6.8 cents per pound as presented in Chapter 4 of this study.
f Same source as Table 24, adiusted. An estimated 76 percent, or $1.719 million of annual
sales of bread and bread type rolls estimated at $2,262 million in 1958, were by wholesale
baking companies. The estimated total cost reductions are calculated on the basis of $1,719
million sales.
SoURCE:

22. Enochian,

op. cit.,

p. 5.
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conditions under which bread is distributed to grocery stores differ
very little from market to market, day-old bread loss and labor contract specifications including commission rates show pronounced
variation. Specific factor costs can be substituted for the average
cost levels shown in Table 25, and the revised relationships used to
make meaningful estimates of the costs and savings that could be
expected from reorganization in particular geographic and historical situations.
With the many institutional barriers to change that exist in
bread markets, it is doubtful that more than a few of these adjustments with their attendant savings can be actually achieved in the
short run. The driver-salesman commission system of daily delivery
of a single product class to individual grocery store shelves by about
one-half dozen wholesale baking companies is supported by Teamsters Union contract and by individual baking companies, each
bent upon obtaining a favorable shelf position within individual
grocery stores. Nor are most retail grocery firms that operate on a
fixed percentage margin of bread sales likely to favor a bread distribution system which transfers costs of instore servicing of bread
shelves and billing to grocery firms. Although gross grocery store
margins on bread of 16-17 percent in 1958 were not appreciably
lower than average store margins on grocery items of 17.9 percent
in medium-sized chains,23 most groceries are delivered to retail store
docks or distribution centers, and instore display and order servicing are a normal cost of retail grocery firms.
It is estimated that reorganization of bread and bread type roll
distribution to achieve the cost reductions associated with semitrailer dock delivery of wholesale bread to retail outlets would displace about 30,000 delivery and sales employees, in both direct and
indirect categories. This estimate is based on Census reports that
wholesale baking companies with 90 percent or more specialization
in bread and bread type rolls employed about 40,000 non-production
employees in 1958. These companies had sales of $1,362 million,
virtually all bread and bread type rolls, or 79.2 percent of the total
wholesale sales of those products. If we assume these firms had the
same share of wholesale delivery and sales employees as they had of
it sales, we obtain an estimate of about 50,000 workers in both
direct and indirect wholesale distribution jobs. A reasonable opti23. DeLoach, op. cit., p. 22; and Wilbur B. England, Operating Results Of
Food Chains in 1958, Harvard University Bureau of Business Research Bulletin
No. 156 (Cambridge, 1960), P. 10. Markup OD groceries is less than for frozen
foods, produce, meat, and nonfood items, but costs are also lower.
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mum-sized semi-trailer dock delivery system can handle 12,000
pounds per trip, and a single truck can average four trips per week,
delivering about 48,000 pounds per week to retail outlets. This is
more than ten times the average volume for a large sample of
wholesale driver-salesman bread routes reported as 4,714 pounds per
week in 1958. 24 Some of the over-all saving in bread delivery labor
would be offset by increased ins tore labor requirements. The displaced bread distribution employees, as in the case of displaced production workers, could be retrained and assisted in their movement
out of the baking industry into other industries where rapid growth
in labor requirements develops. A hypothetical fund of approximately one-half billion dollars created by shifting the distribution
of bread and bread type rolls to the semi-trailer dock delivery
system could be partially devoted to facilitating this transition.

The Costs of Nonprice Competition
If the efficiencies from increased distribution volume and specialization of the delivery function by semi-trailer dock delivery are
as large as suggested in Table 25, why have not the most efficient
firms continued to grow until they achieved optimum efficiency?
Performance in wholesale bread markets appears closely associated
with the oligopolistic nature of market structure and conduct
(although other variables may be equally important). The general
pattern of price leadership within oligopolistic groups of wholesale
baking companies has been shown to result in prices for wholesaler
brands which are virtually uniform in a particular bread market.
In the short run, price and quality of product are largely predetermined. Individual companies are therefore more concerned
with varying costs and volume of sales. Under the protection of
price leadership, firms focus competitive tactics on preserving their
market shares. They struggle for sales volume by attempting to
differentiate their products. This results in selling expenses which
shift the firm's average total unit cost curve upwards. The public
benefits from this kind of competition in markets characterized
by inelastic demand can easily be exaggerated.
The effects on consumer demand and on bread prices of such
features of non price competition as advertising, product variation,
special packaging, and servicing are clear enough. The evidence
refutes the popular thesis that these non price methods of competition increase demand by informing or convincing potential buyers
24. Hearings,

ap. cit., p.

6593.
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of the desirability of the product and the thesis that larger sales
result in expanded output, which lowers cost through economies of
scale, so consumers can buy at lower prices. If firm A's special selling
effort is effective, sales and production presumably expand for firm
A. But as a result of the inalterable fact of inelastic demand for
bread, the increased sales of firm A mean that fewer people in the
market are buying firm B's bread and its production decreases.
Firm A's combined production and distribution costs may decline,
but at least in the postwar years the consumer has seldom benefited by paying a lower price for bread. In many cases, of course,
depending on the strength of the contending non price promotion
strategies within the market group, firm A has attracted enough sales
away from firm B to force it to abandon the market. Some of firm
A's larger revenues from expanded sales have paid for continued
non price competition to maintain the firm's advantage over other
firms C and D in the market, and price competition tends to be
studiously avoided. The more general market conduct since World
War II, however, has been for firm B to retaliate and adopt means
of nonprice competition similar to those of firm A. If firm B is to
avoid lower production volume with its higher costs, it is compelled
by its market interdependence with firm A to increase its selling
costs along with firm A. As the evidence in Chapter 5 indicates,
most of these increased selling costs have been consistently passed
on to the consumer in the form of higher bread prices.
This type of market conduct is illustrated in Figure II. The
situation shown in the figure is one of a wholesale market for standard wholesaler brands of bread. The demand curve DBDB shows
the quantity of these brands that can be sold at varying prices in
this market area. We assume, for purposes of illustration, that four
wholesale baking companies are established in this market area.
Three are small-scale, relatively high-cost firms and one is a largerscale relatively low-cost firm. The dominant firm A has bread sales
of 280,000 pounds per week, which represents plant utilization of
only about 48 hours per week. Assume that dominant firm A initiates a new promotion campaign (a net addition to ATUCa ) costing $1,400 per week. This results in a shift in its short-run cost
structure upwards as suggested by the dotted cost structure, ATUCa ,
shown in Figure II.
Firms B, C, and D may either wait until they experience losses
in volume or act immediately in anticipation of them. If they are
eager to survive, they immediately adopt retaliatory tactics of nonprice competition (also costing $1,400 per week) which result in a
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Same as Figure 10.

H.-Average total unit costs and market price before and after introduction of a new selling cost into a bread market.
FIG.

shift in their short-run cost curves upward as suggested by dotted
cost structure ATUCb , in Figure 11. The impact of the introduction of a given advertising budget on large and small plants and on
market price is immediately apparent. In this illustration, the
increase in firm A's average unit costs is one-half cent per pound
and in those of firms B, C, and D is one cent per pound, or twice
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that of firm A. Since total demand for the product is not increased,
these increased selling costs must be passed on to the consumer in
the form of higher prices unless one of the small-scale, high-cost
firms is squeezed out. One of the high-cost firms may take the initiative as a price leader and raise the market price of wholesale
brands from 16 cents to 17 cents per pound. Other firms follow,
including the dominant large-scale firm, to keep most of the smallscale firms in business and to avoid aggressive price cutting.
The costs to the consumer of non price competition under an
umbrella of price leadership are twofold. First, the structure and
conduct features of bread markets have a direct cost-push effect
on bread prices that is obvious in the upward shift of short-run
average total unit cost curves. Table 26 shows in a general way the
effects on costs of increased market services and sales promotion
since 1940. Distribution costs rose from about 27 percent of wholesale baking company sales in 1940 to 29 percent in 1947, and to
approximately 40 percent in 1958, the latest year for which data
are available.
TABLE 26
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION COSTS OF WHOLESALE BAKING COMPANIES, UNITED STATES,

1940, 1947,

AND

Type of Expense

1958'
Expense per $ 100
Estimated Total
Costs, U. S.
of Net Baking Sales
(million dollars)
(dollars)
~~~--~~~~~~~---719~4~0~~~1~9~47~b~~~19~5~8~b-1940
1947
1958

Delivery vehicle
$4.8
Delivery and
selling service labor
Stale bread loss
Other promotion
and service"
Subtotal
24.2
Advertising
2.6
Total
$26.8

$5.6

$6.2

13.2
1.9

18.5
4.9

4.7
25.4
3.8
$29.2

6.2
35.8
4.6 4
$40.4

I

$43.4

218.8
24.5
$243.3

$98.8

$174.0

233.0
33.5

519.4
137.6

83.0
448.3
67.1
$515.4

174.0
1.005.0
129.2
$1,134.2

SOURCE: The 1940 data, where available, are from reports of 82 companies with aggregate
s!lles of $329.8. million, representinll' 37 percent whole.ale bread product sales of $904.2 milhon reported m the 1939 census. Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Distribution
~etho~ and Costs, Part I, Important Food Products (Washington, D. C.; Government Printmg OffIce, 1943, p. 58. The 1947 and 1958 estimates are calculated from sources as reported
in Chapter 4 .
• Excludes retail margins.
b 9ales value of wholesale bakery output reported as $1,765 million in 1947 and $2,808
million in 1958. See Table !.
C Primarily sales supervision, special in.tore promotion and miscellaneous sellinII' expenses.
4 Advertising expense for 1958 is a composite of advertising expenditures reported for the
four largest bakinll' companies of about 4 percent of sales, wholesale bakeries affiliated with
the three larll'est management cooperatives of 4.4 percent of sales, unaffiliated wholesale
bakeries of about 5.2 percent of sales. See Chapter 5 for these data and similar sources for
1947. Other sellinII' cost estimates for 1947 and 1958 are composites of reported averall'e costs
from the same sources. See Chapter 4.
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In current dollars,· this represents an increase from less than
one-quarter billion dollars in 1940 to more than one billion dollars
in 1958. Much of this increase was due to the costs of various forms
of non price competition in bread markets. The practice of massed
display of products on grocery shelves is largely responsible for an
increase in the cost of stale bread loss from $34 million in 1947 to
about $138 million in 1958. About 5 percent of the value product
of wholesale baking companies is wasted, or relegated to a lower
value use such as animal feed, through stale-return loss. The practice of advertising to differentiate products and to create consumer
preference for wholesaler brands over private label grocery brands
has added substantially to bread costs. Advertising expenditures by
wholesale baking companies increased from about $25 million in
1940 to about $130 million in 1958. Despite this sizable advertising
expenditure, per capita consumption of the industry'S products has
continued to decline by about 1 percent per year, and it is doubtful
whether society or the industry benefits appreciably from recent
levels and types of bread advertising. Alleged product improvements in the form of wrapper variation, loaf twisting, upside-down
baking, and multiple loaf sizes have undoubtedly raised the cost of
bread production with little or no enhancement of quality, or
wider real choice among products by consumers.25
Costs of these forms of non price competition are difficult to discover because they are hidden in broad ill-defined classifications in
business operating statements, as are the costs of ins tore service and
promotion practices of driver-salesmen. Combined costs of driversalesmen delivery, service, and other promotion costs (less direct
advertising) increased from $316 million in 1947 to about $693
million in 1958, or more than twice the immediate postwar costs.
As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, the sizable increase in driversalesman commission rates won by the Teamsters Union explains
only about 40 percent of the expansion in these delivery and instore
promotion costs. The rest is explained by the decline in average
route volume to 70 percent of 1947 levels, as sales promotion time
of drivers has increased.
The second important cost to consumers of nonprice competi• Part of the increase noted is due to price inflation.
25. Compare the average price of 52 serviced and unserviced foods including
bread in three large chain stores, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1957. Roland
G. Harris and Philip B. Dwoskin, "Convenience Food and Their Costs to Consumers," The Marketing and Transportation Situation (July, 1958), pp. 27-33;
also, Journal of Home Economics (November, 1957), pp. 717-719; and Baking
Industry Magazine (August 6, 1960), p. 69.
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tion is its effect on the efficiency of distribution and production.
The use of any cost level above that of the least-cost organization of
production and delivery as the basis for cost-barometric price leadership reduces the pressure upon all firms to increase their efficiency
and reduce their costs. The extent to which prices are permitted to
exceed the costs of least-cost organization determines the pressure
applied to the less efficient. Too little pressure means increasing
divergence from optimum performance with respect to both distribution and production efficiency.
Under conditions of economically adequate performance of the
wholesale driver-salesman route system, increases in volume per
delivery and per route would result in a movement along the shortrun route cost curve, and the lower unit distribution cost of
increased efficiency would result in lower bread prices to the consumer. A sizable increase in the average sales of bread per grocery
store in the postwar years provided the opportunity for the wholesale driver-salesman route system to realize increased efficiency associated with economies of scale in delivery. In 1958, supermarkets
(grocery stores with more than $375,000 annual sales) accounted for
69 percent of total grocery store sales as compared with only 43 percent in 1952. However, the best available evidence suggests the
opportunities for greater efficiency in bread distribution have not
been realized; quite the reverse has occurred.
A representative sample of wholesale baking companies experienced a 30 percent decline in weekly wholesale route volume from
6,746 pounds in 1947 to 4,714 pounds in 1958, and an 18 percent
decline in weekly volume per customer from 135 pounds in 1947
to llO pounds in 1958. 26 Although the number of customers per
route declined from 50 in 1947 to 43 in 1958, weekly miles traveled
per customer increased from eight to ten miles. If we assume constant 1958 factor prices for purposes of comparison, the route cost
relationships presented in Chapter 4 suggest that delivery costs
increased by 1.5-2.0 cents per pound as a result of these changes in
route factors: a decrease in volume per route, a decrease in volume
per delivery, and an increase in length of route.
Although the driver-salesman system of bread distribution probably cannot be expected to equal the efficiency levels of the semitrailer dock delivery system, it clearly could have approached more
adequate performance levels in recent years had it merely maintained the efficiency levels achieved in 1947. Instead, distribution
26. Hearings,

ap.

cit., p. 6084.
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of bread products has become more inefficient as the competing
firms, under the cost protection of price leadership, focused competition on nonprice tactics to maintain or gain market shares.
Virtually all wholesale baking companies in an individual market
attempt to sell bread in all retail grocery outlets within the area.
Their market is shared on shelves within retail grocery outlets rather
than store by store or areawise. Therefore, in competing to hold
their share of shelf space, they deliver daily and often more frequently than that. They also attend to the placing and arrangement of bread on the grocery shelves. The result is that wholesale
baking firms in general deliver to many stores with a small drop per
store, making inefficient use of both distribution equipment and
labor. Moreover, competitors extend distribution to stores at a
greater distance from their plants. Even if they recognize that the
most extended routes are inefficient, they are often compelled to
continue them either to foreclose the invasion of their area or to
retaliate against other firms. The result is that all wholesale baking
companies that extend their routes experience an increase in distribution cost, as shown above, without an offsetting gain in average
route volume.

Summary: Net Market Performance
The analysis thus far has considered several important criteria
of market performance which have a bearing on the general welfare.
These criteria have been examined individually, including the price,
profit, and product norms, the efficiency of production and distribution, and the costs of non price competition. The relative importance
of these factors is continually changing. Some apply to one segment
or area of the industry and some to others. The important consideration remains to combine these criteria and establish within reasonable limits an estimate of the net performance of bread markets.
In other words, how well does the total market activity of baking
companies contribute to the public welfare?
It is often assumed by observers of industrial markets that
changes in the product, price, and profit criteria of market performance are of primary importance. If it can be shown that the
available economic improvements in product quality have occurred,
if prices have a reasonable relationship to average total unit costs,
and profit levels are not higher than experienced in all manufacturing, then performance of an industry may be said to be adequate
(although perhaps less than optimum), and contributing satisfactorily to the general material welfare. Indeed the evidence with
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respect to bakery profits supports the assumption that average profit
levels of wholesale baking companies are not appreciably higher
than those in all manufacturing, and at 1958 levels, have little
impact on the general material welfare. While bread prices have
advanced rapidly since World War II, they are closely related to
changes in average total unit costs, at least in large-city markets
(70 percent of U.S. consumption). Moreover, consumers often have
the opportunity to purchase alternative private label brands in
grocery chains at lower prices than wholesale brands. While real
improvements in product quality have been very limited, there
is little or no evidence that quality has deteriorated since World
War II.
A consideration of these few performance criteria, however, is
not sufficient to understand the performance of bread markets. In
fact, the findings of this study lend support to the proposition that
changes in the product and profit criteria may be secondary rather
than primary determinants of performance in these markets. The
conduct of firms in individual markets with respect to product
quality seems to be largely predetermined, and prices of wholesaler
brands are quite similar as profit levels tend to be protected by a
pattern of price leadership. Individual companies are therefore more
concerned with varying costs and output.
This study finds that the performance of bread markets with
respect to cost and output primarily reflect the market power of
oligopoly groups and changes in technology. The oligopoly market
structure in wholesale bread markets is associated with interdependent conduct of enterprises with respect to pricing policies, nonprice practices and plant utilization as was shown in earlier chapters. In large part, no individual firm can independently have a
beneficial effect upon market performance without risking serious
economic repercussions for itself or for the oligopoly market group
in question. Yet, technical advance in bakery equipment, in the
transport and handling of bakery products, and in food merchandising in general are dynamic variables tending to bring about economic change in bread markets.
The performance of bread markets with respect to the introduction of efficient equipment and techniques of production, while less
than optimum, has probably approached adequacy. Yet in oligopolis tic bread markets, consumers have thus far realized little or no
benefit from the progressive adoption of more efficient bread production technology.
Moreover, there is a tendency toward chronic under-utilization
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of capital equipment and failure to achieve economies of scale in
the baking industry. The study has revealed important potential
savings in bread production and distribution. The "efficiency gap"
between actual and necessary costs (in relation to given input
prices) to provide the consumer with bread products suggests the
performance of wholesale bread markets in 1958 was adequate
except for the average retail price of bread which, at 19.3 cents per
pound, was about 50 percent higher than would be required to
cover necessary costs. This measure between where the industry
is and where it could be if the economy were to make full use of
its resources without straining productive capacity is in part a
measure of the aggregate costs of oligopoly.
A comparison of the existing system with an optimum market
organization suggests the direction of possible adjustment of undesirable market conditions which annually cost the American public
more than one billion dollars. The more than $520 million potential production cost reduction could be realized by long-run adjustments in size of plant to 8,000 pounds per hour capacity, by adopting automatic continuous-mix machinery, and by operating the
remaining plants at practical capacity levels (dependent in part on
consumer willingness to benefit from early-week shopping). The estimated $530 million potential distribution and selling cost reductions could be realized by reorganization of the wholesale driversalesman delivery system to semi-trailers and dock delivery. Some
progress is being made toward achieving these potential economies,
as noted throughout this report, but there are important institutional barriers at work that seem to account for the sizable lag
in bread market performance.
While individual baking companies often have good economic
reasons for technological adoption and plant expansion, such developments may be a mixed blessing for consumers, farmers, and some
bakery companies. New output-increasing equipment and techniques
of production have considerable potential for reducing costs as noted
above. But levels of cost and output are not autonomous forces; in
bread markets they are largely determined by the conduct of the
industry itself. The alternatives open to bakery management include
some variation of the following market conduct patterns:

(1) price competition to force bread prices to cost levels consistent
with the increased efficiencies of larger plants and with a
decrease in the number of bakeries (perhaps his own included);
or
(2) price leadership which provides an "umbrella" covering pro-
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duction and distribution costs experienced by existing plants
operating at considerably less than capacity.
Empirical and logical bases have been developed in this study
for the proposition that firms participating in oligopolistically structured markets generally have chosen the latter forms of market
conduct. Firms tend to orient interfirm conduct around non price
competition to increase their shares of bread markets. The resulting
increase in seIling costs has little or no beneficial effect on consumers.
Per capita demand for the industry's products has declined by
about I percent per year, and whatever changes in market share
distribution have occurred among the oligopoly market groups have
not been associated with lower costs and prices. This is because if
some firms in oligopoly-structured markets increase their efficiency
or gain fuller utilization of capital equipment, their success tends
to shift excess capacity among participants in the market whose
costs are increased. It is also due to mutual interdependence of oligopolists with respect to advertising, product variation, special packaging and servicing. Immediate immitation or retaliation usually
ocurs, with the result that seIling costs in bread markets increase
with little or no beneficial shift in output between participants.
The general pattern of price leadership within oligopolistic
groups of wholesale baking companies is usually of the cost barometric type, and is designed to keep market price comfortably above
costs experienced by the group. IIIegal price collusion and discrimination are seldom found in bread markets, for price leadership
tends to protect the industry from destructive price competition and
has the advantage of being legal. High cost firms have raised prices
to cover costs of inefficient production and distribution with virtual
certainty that other members of large-city market groups would
follow, even though they may be more efficient. Price leadership
has not usually provided the competitive discipline to drive out the
higher-cost producers, or to force the remaining firms to operate
at efficient levels of utilization of production and distribution facilities. Quite the reverse tends to occur. The market power of oligipoly
groups in large-city bread markets tend to shield inefficient baking
companies and sustain inefficient market practices.
The few exceptions to this practice are largely short run, intersegment, or a part of pricing tactics used by members of the oligopoly group in large-city markets to invade outlying areas of these
markets. These modify but do not alleviate the more general price
conduct and market performance pattern. As a result of increased
plant capacity and grocery chain integration into baking, members
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of the large-city oligopoly core have encroached upon outlying areas.
Large-city bakers have practiced differential pricing and various
nonprice share-gaining techniques in outlying areas beyond those
practices common within the oligopoly core of large-city markets.
The single-market firm in outlying areas is often unable to match
these increased distribution and selling efforts, and usually dares not
compete on price because of its vulnerability to price retaliation.
Thus, there has been a gradual encroachment of the outlying market
areas by the major wholesale bakers and an increase in concentration in the baking industry.
We can expect continued adjustment to fewer and larger bakeries. Just how far this adjustment will go is not yet clear, but potential economies are sizable. Findings of this study suggest that company growth in markets already served would better approach
optimum economies of scale in bread distribution than further
geographic expansion into additional market areas. Although we
have not attempted here an exhaustive study of the economies of
large multi-plant and multi-market company organizations, we have
demonstrated that as these firms meet in several individual markets
their rivalry expressed through price competition tends to diminish.
If company growth occurs in markets already served, concentration which often is already high may become higher, yet costs
may decrease as aggressive non price competitive rivalry may diminish, a development which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for price reduction. It is our judgment that public policy toward
maintaining competitive market structures through placing certain
restraints on growth via merger should consider these different
single- and multi-market effects.
This is not a study of the performance of the grocery retailing
industry, but it has found that grocery chains have achieved marked
efficiencies in distribution and selling without, however, consistently
passing these savings on to the consumer in the form of higher
quality or lower price. We find that a degree of bilateral oligopoly
behavior often develops between an oligopolistic group of wholesale
baking companies and an oligopsonistic group of corporate and
voluntary grocery chains in which the chains often follow in both
price and quality. Certainly, the private label bread price differential in many bread markets more nearly reflects general grocery chain
price policy than necessary bread production and distribution costs.
This study opens a large area of legal-economic research. While
it has dealt specifically with bread markets, the potential gains to
the public from reorganization of bread market structure and con-
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duct may not be unique among food markets in the American economy. Other studies have demonstrated similar technological and
organizational problems-for example, in milk marketing. 27 These
studies provide some of the information necessary to focus the
forces of public opinion and of the law on the whole problem of
attaining optimum market organization.

27. Bressler, op. cit., p. 344-345; Clarke, op. cit.

Appendix

Date: February 1958
CONTRACT AND SCALE REPORT
a service of
AMERICAN BAKERS ASSOCIATION
Union: Teamsters #204
Market area: Omaha, Nebr.
Population: 250,000
Contract Dates: 5/5/57 to 5/7 /60
Opening permitted during term: No
Barg. method: Joint
Branch of industry: Wholesale Bread/Cake
1. Occupational Wage Rates:'
Salesmen-$74.75 2 base pay on 1st $275 in weekly sales &: 6% on sales between
$275 &: $525 &: 7% on all sales over $525 weekly. Guaranteed $77 2 per week.
Salesmen (exclusive cake &: sweet goods) $74.75" base pay on first $225 in
wkly sales &: 6% on sales from $225 to $525, 7% on sales over $525 wkly,
guar $77" wk. Salesmen on route before taking responsibility for it, $72"
1st 4 months, $77 2 after 4 months.
Eff.
Eff.
5/5/57
12/29/57
Transport Drivers
$2.13V3
$2.09Ys
City store delivery
2.05
2.00
Stockroom drivers
2.00
1.95
Maintenance drivers
1.86
1.81
Special delivery drivers
1.78
1.73
2. Working time: 6-daywk. City 54 hrs., country 60 hrs (not inel check-in or
lunch). City men off sts 3:30 P, country 5P (day bef dropout or hoI 1 hr
addit). Exclus ck &: sweet goods off sts 5P. Non-commis dr guar 40 hrs in
6 days exc transp 48 hrs.
3. Principle changes in previous contract: Eff 5/5/57 sales base &: guar incr
$4 wk &: hrly rated incr 10¢' hour. Eff 12/29/57 employer contrib $2 week to
Pensions &: all rates dropped $2 week or 5¢' per hour. Eff 5/4/58 conditions
changed as indicated in.'
4. Shift differentials: no provision.
5. Overtime provisions: Transport drivers, 1Y2 time after 12 hours daily or
51 hours weekly. Special delivery, city store drivers, stockroom and maintenance drivers, I Y2 time after 8 hours daily and 40 hours in 6 days and
I Y2 time after 32 hours in holiday week.
6. Vacations: I week after I year of service
2 weeks after 3 years of service
3 weeks after 12 years of service
Vacation pay for salesmen based on earnings of route during vacation period.
Hourly paid get regular weekly pay for vacation. If holiday in vacation period,
, Wkly rated reported in item I will be incr. elf 5/4/58 by $4 wk, $2.25 of which may
be applied to Teamsters Health Be WeI Fund at union's option Be 5/S/59 wkly rates iner $11
wk, but $2 may be applied to Teams Pension Fund at union'. option. All other employees
incr proportionately on the same dates.
• Betw 5/5/57 Be 12/29/57 rate was $2 wk higher but on 12/29/57 base pay Be also guar,
in case of salesmen, were reduced $2 wk Be the $2 was diverted to cover employer contribu·
tion to Teamsters Pensioll Plan.
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get $10 hoi pay & get extra day off or extra day's pay at management's option.
7. Holidays: 6 holidays. Salesmen & extra salesmen $10 hoi pay if work wk
in which hoi occurs. Transport drivers pd for time lost due to hoI. No.
Sun or HoI deliv of baked goods to stores. Spec deliv to restaurants, hotels,
hospitals, etc okay. No Xmas delivery. Hrly workers get 8 hrs pay for
hoI. Ill:! time after 32 hours.
8. Health and Welfare Or Pension plans: Eff 12/29/57 employer contrib $2
wk per employee to Teamsters Pension Fund' and •
9. Uniforms: If uniforms reqUired, selected by employer. Employer pay t2
of cost, but it remains property of employee who must clean & maintain It.
Unif shall bear union label & consist of cap, shirt, trousers, coat, sweater &
anything else required by employer.
10. Miscellaneous: No strike, no lockout cl. Checkoff clause.
TABLE 27
UTILIZATION OF WHEAT FOR FOOD IN THE UNITED STATES, BY INDUSTRY GROUPS,
TOTAL POUNDS, AND PER CAPITA, 1947, 1954, AND 1958

Industry

Wheat Flour Utilization
1947
1954
1958

Per Capita Wheat
Percent
Flour Utilization
Change
(pounds)
1947·58 1947
1954
1958

BreaUcroducts
I, 0 pounds
8,273,500 8,656,077 9,175,452 10.9 57.9 54.6 52.7
percent
41.7
43.3
45.3
Retail bake Sh'dsS
1,000 poun s
1,855,400 1,195,491
1,191,141 -35.8 13.0
7.5
6.8
percent
9.3
6.0
5.9
Crackers and cookies
1,000 pounds
1,428,800 1,723,161
1,962,652 37.4 10.0 10.9 11.3
percent
7.2
8.6
9.7
Macaroni products
1,000 pounds
833,800
805,853
906,846
8.8
5.8
5.1
5.2
percent
4.2
4.0
4.5
Breakfast cereal
1,000 pounds
362,618
363,345
372,969
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.2
percent
1.8
1.8
1.8
Flour mixes
1,000 pounds
602,459
795,851
891,590 47.9
4.2
5.0
5.1
percent
3.0
4.0
4.4
Other·
1,000 pounds
6,498,523 6,430,722 5,745,150 -11.6 45.5 40.6 33.0
percent
32.7
32.2
28.4
Total, U.S.
1,000 pounds 19,854,900 19,970,500 20,245,800
1.9 139.0 126.0 116.3
percent
100.0
100.0
100.0
SoURCE: Calculated from U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Census Of Manufactures data.
• Primarily household and restaurant consumption, but also includes smaIl amounts of
miscellaneous food industry utilization.

, Wltly rated reported in item I will be incr. elf 5/4/58 by $4 wk, $2.25 of which may
be applied to Teamsters Health Be Wei Fund at union's option Be 5/3/59 wkly rates iner $3
wk, but $2 may be applied to Teams Pension Fund at union's option. AlI other employees
iner proponionately on the same dates.
• Betw 5/5/57 Be 12/29/57 rate was $2 wk higher but on 12/29/57 base pay Be abo guar,
in case of salesmen, were reduced $2 wk Be the $2 was diverted to cover employer contribu.
tion to Teamsters Pension Plan.
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TABLE 28
FOOD WHEAT UTILIZATION INDUSTRIES, VALUE OF SHIPMENT, NUMBER OF COMPANIES,
AND MARKET SHARE OF THE 4, 8, AND 20 LARGEST COMPANIES, WITH PERCENT
CHANGE, UNITED STATES, 1947-1958

Census Industry

Value of
Shipments
($1,000)

Bread product industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Flour mix industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Flour industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1917-58
Cracker industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Macaroni industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Breakfast cereal industry

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Retail bake shops

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
Total

1947
1954
1958
Percent change 1947-58
SoURCE:

4 Largest 8 Largest 20 Largest
ComComComNumber of
panies
panies
Companies panies
(percent)
(percent)
(percent)
(number)

2,403,589
l!,O67,017
3,699,473
53.9

5,985
5,470
5,305
-11.4

16
20
23

26
31
32

36
40
42

78,442
254,136
262,720
234.9

115
123
112
-2.67

41
73
75

60
82
86

78
92
94

2,526,646
1,858,888
1,969,993
-22.03

1,084
692
703
-35.15

29
40
38

41
52
51

57
68
68

540,222
757,193
915,760
74.7

249
262
280
12.45

72
71
65

77
78
72

85
85
82

112,094
149,656
167,510
49.4

219
226
205
-6.39

23
26
25

35
37
41

56
58
64

284,320
345,843
432,974
52.3

55
37
23
-58.18

79
88
83

91
95
95

98
99+
99+

562,372
641,600
728,700
29.6

15,686
16,543
16,653
6.16

6,507,685
7,074,333
8,205,133
26.1

23,393
23,353
23,281
-4.79

U.S. Census of Manufactures reports.
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TABLE 29
AVERAGE

FAcroR

COSTS

OF

PRODUcnON

GROUPS-WHITE BREAD-UNITED STATES,

Production costs
Ingredients
Production labor
Direct
Indirect
Wrapping supplies
Depreciation
Miscellaneous expenses
Total, production
Distribution costs
Driver compensation
Sales supervision
Shipping clerk
Advertising and
promotion
Stare return loss
Delivery vehicle
Total, distribution
SoURCE:

AND

DISTRlBUnON,

SELEcrED

BAKERY

1958

Quality Bakers
of America
(122 members)

4 Largest Wholesale Companies
(203 plants)

5 Major
Grocery Chains
(83 plants)

Cents

Cents

Cents

5.64

5.14

5.72

1.61
.47
1.02

1.48

.44

.35
1.43
10.63

2.00
.68
1.08
.17
1.07
10.72

.59
.30

3.21

.06

.87
.79}
.73
5.76

.66

.08

.60

.94

4.47

1.08

1.83
11.01

U8}

1.14
1.09

HCll.rinlls, op. cit., p. 6593; Report, op. cit., p. liS.
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TABLE 30
SELECfED PRODUcrrON COSTS' OF FOUR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH STANDARD
EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES, 1959
Model Plant Sizes
Selected Cost Items

Pans
Pneumatic flour-handling
equipment
Fermentation room
do-tros, and hoist
Mixers and ingredient
equipment
Divided, rounder, overhead
proofer, moulder-panner
Proof box, monorail,
and racks
Oven
Slicers and wrappers, conveyors
to loading racks
Total equipmentb
Plant·
Total plant and
equipment
Production labor
Direct (per shift)d
Indirect (fixed per week)·

2000
Lb./Hr.

4000
Lb./Hr.

6000
Lb./Hr.

8000
Lb./Hr.

Dollars

Dollars

Dollars

Dollars

15,000

25,000

35,000

45,000

48,000

60,000

72,000

84,000

20,400

27,600

34,800

45,600

30.000

60,000

72,000

96,000

36,000

45,600

66,000

78,000

24,000
54,000

36,000
72,000

48,000
84,000

60,000
96,000

21,600
249,000
200,000

48,000
374,200
300,000

72,000
483,800
400,000

84,000
588,600
500,000

449,000

674,200

883,000

1,088,600

1,220
1,400

1,391
1,400

1,819
2,600

2,076
2,800

• Excluding variable costs which are shown in Tables 31 and 32.
Equipment valued at average installed price, 1959.
• Total plant area divided 40 percent production, 30 percent material and ingredient storage, and 30 percent shippinll". Plant ,·alued at $10 per foot.
d Direct production labor based on engineering estimates of bakery equipment manufacturer. It was assumed that (a) the numbers of direct production workers per shift were 13
for the 2000 lb./hr. plant, 15 for the 4000 lb./hr. plant, 20 for the 6000 lb./hr. plant, and
23 for the 8000 lb./hr. plant; (b) all workers were guaranteed a minimum of 40 hours employment for the week they were employed at $2.00 per hour, with a six and one-half hour
shift guarantee and time and one-half for over-time beyond ten hours; (c) all workers were
employed for a five day week with swing men utilized to fill in on a rotation basis, to allow
six day bakery production; (d) aU workers at each stage of the production process worked an
amount of time equal to oven operating time; (e) all shifts induded one additional employee
as superintendent at $2.50 per hour plus time and one-half for over-time; and (f) total labor
costs were increased 7 percent for Social Security, Worker's Compensation, and vacation allowance_
• Indirect production labor including janitor, maintenance, executive, and office salaries
were derived from estimates by bakery consultants. Although this measure provides an approximation of the average level of administrative expenditure. relative to level of output
and plant .ize, no data has been developed on optimum operations.
b
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TABLE 31
SELECfED PRODUCTION COSTS' OF FOUR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH AUTOMATIC
EQUIPMENT, UNITED STATES, 1959
2000
Lb./Hr.

Model Plant Sizes
6000
4000
Lb./Hr.
Lb./Hr.

8000
Lb./Hr.

Selected Cost Items

Pans
Pneumatic flour
handling equipment
Continuous dough mix
Automatic final
proofer
Oven
Slicers and wrappers,
conveyors to
loading racks
Depan-o-matic, pan
return conveyor
Cooler, conveyors
to slicers
Pan stacker and
unstacker
Total equipmentb
Plant·
Total ~lant and
eqmpment
Production labor
Direct (per shift)d
Indirect (fixed per week)·
Total production labor

Dollars

Dollars

Dollars

Dollars

15,000

25,000

35,000

45,000

48,000
150,000

60,000
150,000

72,000
300,000

84,000
300,000

78,000
54,000

90,000
72,000

102,000
84,000

120,000
96,000

21,600

48,000

72,000

84,000

16,800

19,200

21,600

26,400

36,000

78,000

90,000

102,000

19,200
438,600
180,000

20,400
562,600
270,000

21,600
798,200
360,000

22,800
880,200
450,000

618,600

832,600

1,158,200

1,330,200

449
1,400
1,849

535
1,400
1,935

621
2,600
3,221

792
2,800
3,592

a Excluding variable costs which are shown in Tables 33 and 34.
b Equipment valued at average installed price, 1959 .
• Building size estimated at 10 percent less than for standard equipment due to continuous dough mix floor space saving. Baker Process Co., a Division of Wallace and Tiernan,
Inc., 25 Main Street, Belleville, N. J.
d Direct production labor based on engineering estimates of bakery equipment manufacturer. It was assumed that (a) the numbers of direct production workers per shift were
four for the 2000 lb./hr. plant, five for the 4000 lb./hr. plant, six for the 6000 lb./hr. plant,
and eight for the 8000 lb./hr. plant; (b) all workers were guaranteed a minimum of 40 hours
employment for the week they were employed at $2.00 per hour, with a six and one-half
hour shift guarantee and time and one· half for over· time beyond ten hours; (c) all workers
were employed for a five day week with swing men utilized to fill in on a rotation basis, to
allow six day bakery production; (d) all workers at each stage of the production process
worked an amount of time equal to oven operating time; (e) all shifts included one additional employee as superintendent at $2.50 per hour plus time and one-half for over· time,
and (f) total labor costs were increased 7 percent for Social Security, Worker's Compensation and vacation allowance.
e Indirect production labor including janitor, maintenance, executive, and office salaries
were derived from estimates by bakery consultants. Although this measure provides an approximation of the average level of administrative expenditures relative to level of output
and plant size, no data has been developed on optimum operations.

TABLE S2
AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT CoSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH
AVERAGE DAILY VARIATION IN DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES

SrANDARD

EQUIPMENT

FIXED COSTS

Type and
Size of
Plant
Standard
pounds/hr
capacity

InvestTotal
Oven
ment
Weekly Operating DepreciOutput- Time.
ationb
(Ibs.)

Return
on Investmente

Indirect
Production
Labord

Total
Fixed
Costs

Direct
Production
Labore

Ingredients f

OPERATED

UNDER

CoNDITIONS

VARIABLE CoSTS
Shipping
UtiliWrapand ties and
ping
Misc_ Maint.
SupSupSupplies'
plies'
plies'

Total
Variable
Costs

Total
Costs

OF

(hours) (.............................................................................................. cents per pound

2000
71,604
107,406
143,208
179,010
214,848

S6
54
72
90
108

.650
.433
.325
.260
.216

1.123
.748
.561
.449
.395

1.955
1.304
.978
.782
.652

3.728
I.7R5
1.864
1.491
1.263

1.695
1.609
1.693
1.541
1.609

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.993
7.909
7.993
7.841
7.909

11.721
10.394
9.857
9.332
9.172

113,393
170,089
226,790
283,480
340,176

36
54
72
90
108

.621
.414
.310
.248
.207

1.101
.734
.550
.440
.367

1.235
.823
.617
.494
.412

2.957
1.971
1.477
1.182
.986

1.234
1.172
1.234
1.123
1.172

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

_14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.534
7.452
7.534
7.423
7.472

10.491
9.443
9.011
8.605
8.458

214,848
322,272
429,696
537,120
644,544

36
54
72
90
108

.433
.287
.215
.173
.145

.760
.507
.380
.304
.253

.931
.621
.466
.372
.310

2.124
1.415
1.061
.849
.708

.869
.824
.869
.791
.824

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14

.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.169
7.124
7.169
7.091
7.124

9.293
8.539
8.230
7.940
7.832

286,463
429,694
572,926
716,157
859,392

36
54
72
90
108

.400
.267
.200
.161
.133

.701
.467
.350
.280
.233

.977
.652
.489
.391
.326

2.078
1.386
1.039
.832
.692

.749
.710
.749
.681
.711

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.049
7.010
7.049
6.981
7.011

9.127
8.396
8.088
7.81S
7.703

4000

6000

8000

• See Table 16.
b Depreciation of plant and equipment is based on a 20·year schedule with the exception of pans which were depreciated on a six-year basi •.
• Return on investment (before taxes) is bud&eted at 10 percent per annum.
d See footnote e, Table 29 .
• See footnote d. Table 29.
f Based on averqe costs reported by an associated management group.
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TABLE 1I11
AVEIlAGE FlXED AND VARIABLE UNlT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS
UNIFORM DAILY DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES

WlTH

STANDARD

EQUIPMENT

OPEIlATED

UNDER

CONDlTlONS

OF

0'>

FIXED COSTS
Invest·

Type and
Size of
Plant

Total
Weekly
Output

Automatic
pounds/hr
capacity

(lbs.)

Oven
ment
Return
Operating Depreci· on Invest·
Time
ation
ment

Indirect
Produc·
tion
Labor

Total
Fixed

Costs

Direct
Produc·
tion
Labor

Ingred·
ients

VARIABLE CosTS
S1!ip'
PIng
Utili·
Wrap.
and ties and
ping
Misc.
Maint.
Sup·
Sup·
Sup·
plies
plies
plies

N)

........
Total
Vari·
able

Costs

Total

Costs

(hours) ( ............................................................................................ cents per pound ........................................................................................... )

~

-.

1:1
;...
~

2000

120
144

.646
.434
.323
.242
.194
.162

1.116
.837
.558
.419
.335
.279

1.944
1.458
.972
.729
.583
.486

1I.706
2.779
1.8511
1.390
1.112
.927

1.684
1.516
1.684
1.516
1.516
1.516

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.984
7.816
7.984
7.816
7.816
7.816

11.690
10.595
9.8117
9.206
8.928
8.7411

144,000
192,000
288,000
384,000
480,000
576,000

36
48
72
96
120
144

.489
.367
.245
.183
.147
.122

.867
.650
.433
.325
.260
.217

.972
.729
.486
.365
.292
.243

2.328
1.746
1.164
.87l1
.699
.582

.972
.874
.972
.874
.874
.874

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.272
7.174
7.272
7.174
7.174
7.174

9.600
8.920
8.436
8.047
7.873
7.756

216,000
288,000
432,000
576,000
720,000
864,000

36
48
72

.430
.322
.215
.162
.129
.107

.756
.567
.378
.283
.227
.189

.926
.694
.463
.347
.278
.232

2.112
1.5811
1.056
.792
.634
.528

.972
.777
.864
.777
.777
.777

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.272
7.077
7.164
7.077
7.077
7.077

9.1I84
8.660
8.220
7.869
7.711
7.605

.398
.299
.199
.150
.119
.100

.697
.523
.348
.261
.209
.174

.972
.729
.486
.365
.292
.243

2.067
1.551
1.033
.776
.620
.517

.745
.670
.745
.670
.670
.670

4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

7.045
6.970
7.045
6.970
6.970
6.970

9.112
8.521
8.078
7.746
7.590
7.487

72,000
96,000
144,000
192,000
240,000
288,000

36
48
72

96

4000

6000

96
120
144

8000
288,000
284,000
576,000
768,000
960,000
1,152,000
fVl.1tD ....... •

"'i
;::s-o
~

.'i:.!:t1nP 2e
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36
48
72

96
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~1.
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AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH
AVERAGE DAILY VARIATION IN DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES, UNITED STATES

AUTOMATIC

EQUIPMENT

FIXED CoSTS

Type and
Size of
Plant

Total
Weekly
Output"

Continuous
Automatic
pounds/hr
capacity

(Ibs.)

Invest·
Return
Oven
ment
Operating Depreci· on Invest·
mente
Time·
ationb
(hours)

Indirect
Produc·
tion
Labor"

Total
Fixed
Costs

Direct
Produc·
tion
Labore

Ingred·
ients t

OPERATED

UNDER

VARIABLE COSTS
Ship·
ping
Utili·
Wrap·
ties and
and
ping
Main.
Misc.
Sup.
Sup·
Sup·
plies'
plies'
plies'

CoNDITIONS

Total
Vari·
able
Costs

Total
Costs

OF

( ........................................................................................... cents per pound

2000
71,604
107,406
143,208
179,010
214,848

36
54
72
90
108

.744
.496
.372
.297
.247

1.353
.902
.676
.541
.451

1.955
1.304
.978
.782
.652

4.052
2.702
2.026
1.620
l.350

.508
.483
.508
.463
.483

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

6.168
6.143
6.168
6.123
6.143

10.220
8.845
8.194
7.743
7.493

113,393
170,089
226,790
283,480
340,176

36
54
72
90
108

.671
.447
.335
.267
.224

1.200
.800
.600
.480
.400

1.235
.823
.617
.494
.412

3.106
2.070
1.552
1.241
1.036

.472
.446
.472
.430
.448

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

6.132
6.106
6.132
6.090
6.108

9.238
8.176
7.684
7.331
7.144

214,848
322,272
429,696
537,120
644,544

36
54
72
90
108

.556
.369
.278
.222
.185

.871
.581
.436
.348
.290

.931
.621
.466
.372
.310

2.358
1.571
1.180
.942
.785

.289
.274
.289
.263
.274

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

5.949
5.934
5.949
5.923
5.934

8.307
7.505
7.129
6.865
6.719

286,463
429,694
572,926
716,157
859,392

36
54
72
90
108

.447
.300
.224
.180
.150

.695
.463
.347
.278
.221

.977
.652
.489
.391
.326

2.119
1.415
1.060
.849
.697

.276
.263
.277
.252
.263

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

5.936
5.923
5.937
5.912
5.923

8.055
7.338
6.997
6.761
6.620

4000

6000

8000

"See Table 16.
Depreciation of plant and equipment is based on a 20·year schedule with the exception of pans which were depreciated on a six·year basi•.
• Return on investment (before taxes) budgeted at 10 percent per annum.
d See footnote e, Table 30.
e See footnote d, Table 30.
t Based on experimental engineering data prepared by E. S. Mack, American Baken Corporation, Inc., Teaneck, N. J .
• Based on average costs reported by an auociated management group.

b

~

~
~

'";::s

-.
~

l<

........

0'>

(.)0

TABLE 35
AVERAGE FIXED AND VARIABLE UNIT COSTS FOR MODEL BREAD PLANTS WITH AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT OPERATED UNDER CONDmONS OF
UNIFORM DAILY DEMAND AND 1959 PRICES. UNITED STATES
FIXED
COSTS
-----_.-

Type and
Size of
Plant

Total
Weekly
Output

pounds/hr
capacity

(lb•• )

Invest·
ment
Oven
Operating Depreci·
Time
ation

Return
on Invest·
ment

Indirect
Produc·
tion
Labor

_I
Total
Fixed
Costs

(hours) ( ................................................................................

Direct
Produc·
tion
Labor

Ingred·
ients

VARIABLE CoSTS
Ship.
ping
Utili·
Wrap.
and
ties and
ping
Misc.
Maint.
Sup.
Sup·
Sup·
plies
plies
plies

-..,.
O'l

"Total
Vari·
able
Costs

Total
Costs

cents per pound .............................................................................................. )

2000

'""l

;:rC1>

b;j

-.

~
.....

;:!

72.000
96.000
144.000
192.000
240.000
288.000

36
48
72
96
120
144

.739
.554
.369
.277
.222
.185

1.345
1.009
.673
.504
.404
.336

1.944
1.458
.972
.729
.583
.486

4.028
3.021
2.014
1.510
1.209
1.007

.506
.455
.506
.455
.455
.455

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

6.166
6.115
6.166
6.115
6.115
6.115

10.194
8.136
8.080
7.625
7.324
7.122

144.000
192.000
288.000
384.000
480.000
576.000

36
48
72
96
120
144

.528
.396
.264
.198
.159
.132

.945
.709
.472
.354
.283
.236

.972
.729
.486
.365
.292
.243

2.445
1.834
1.222
.917
.834
.611

.372
.335
.372
.335
.335
.335

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

6.032
5.995
6.032
5.995
5.995
5.995

8.477
7.829
7.254
6.912
6.829
6.606

216.000
288.000
432.000
576.000
720.000
864.000

36
48
72
96
120
144

.552
.414
.276
.207
.166
.188

.867
.650
.433
.325
.260
.217

.926
.694
.463
.347
.278
.232

2.345
1.758
1.172
.879
.704
.637

.287
.259
.287
.259
.259
.259

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

5.947
5.919
5.947
5.919
5.919
5.919

8.292
7.677
7.119
6.798
6.623
6.556

288.000
384.000
576.000
768.000
960.000
1.152.000

36
48
72
96
120
144

.445
.335
.223
.168
.134
.112

.691
.518
.346
.259
.207
.173

.972
.729
.486
.365
.292
.243

2.108
1.582
1.055
.792
.633
.528

.275
.248
.275
.248
.248
.248

4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26
4.26

1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02

.14
.14
.14
.14
.14
.14

.24
.24
.24
.24
.24
.24

5.935
5.908
5.935
5.908
5.908
5.908

8.043
7.490
6.990
6.700
6.541
6.436

4000

6000

8000

SoURCE: Same as Table 88.
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